Stalin's Country Embraces Hitler

In a country where the populace often expresses a terrifying admiration for Joseph Stalin, it should perhaps be unsurprising that there are also those who would express admiration for Adolph Hitler.

In Russia, the National Socialist Organization has managed to eke itself out a growing niche within Russian society. Like many neo-Stalinists, those supporting neo-Nazism in Russia have opposed immigration of any kind. Some have even suggested that Russian women who marry non-Russians should have their citizenships revoked.

Though outlawed earlier in 2010 (with Mein Kampf banned more recently), it's rumoured that the National Socialist Organization has merely gone underground, and is still growing.

While Vladimir Putin has acted to attempt to contain the threat, the greater problem remains his regime's tendency to often glorify Joseph Stalin. A government that glorifies one tyrant essentially writes its citizens license to emulate another.

When one considers that many tyrannies emerge as imitations of previous tyrannies, the danger posed by organizations such as the NSO -- who are also said to be active in Canada -- are quite real.

History Repeated, History Repeating?

Gary Kasparov defeats Karpov -- can he defeat Putin?

For reasons that often seen entirely obvious, the world of professional Chess doesn't attract the same devotion that other sports do.

There are no raucus chants like in soccer, no big hits or long-bomb passes like in football, and no swift transition game like in hockey.

The failure of the United States to develop a competitive chess program was a concern for many Americans during the Cold War. With the world's two nuclear superpowers glaring standoffishly across the North Pole at one another a great deal of rhetorical primacy rested on the World Chess Championship.

Whichever country possessed the championship within its grasp held a key propaganda point. After all, when the world is continually sitting on the brink of nuclear annhiliation the idea that either country possessed the world's best strategic and tactical minds could help give the population of either country the notion -- however hollow -- that they could win a nuclear exchange with their rivals.

The Soviet Union held the advantage in this particular category hands-down. The only American to win the World Chess Championship was Bobby Fischer, who defeated Boris Spassky for the championship in 1972.

He would disappoint his country by refusing to defend his championship, and eventually emerged as a very public conspiracy theorist and anti-Semite.

But the Soviet Union would have a disappointing World Chess Champion of its own: Gary Kasparov.

Anatoly Karpov had won the tournament that decided the challenger to the championship, but won the title by forfeit after Fischer and the International Chess Federation couldn't agree on the rules for the match. Karpov (who didn't actually expect to defeat Fischer in 1975) would hold onto the title until 1985, when Kasparov defeated him.

The first Kasparov-Karpov encounter ran an astounding 48 games, and was called over without result with Karpov leading 5-3 in a match in which the first player to win six games would be victorious.

A rematch was scheduled for 1985. It would be a best of 24. There would be no draws this time (there were an incredible 50 draws in their 1984 encounter), as Kasparov claimed the championship with a 13-11 win.

The two faced each other in a contractually-stipulated rematch in 1986 (Kasparov won narrlowly, 12.5 to 11.5) and again in 1986 (this time they drew, 12-12).

The most ingriguing encounter between Kasparov and Karpov was the fifth confrontation, in 1990. History marks this as a time of great change within the USSR, and nowhere did the conflicts raging within the Soviet Union seem as apparent as in the World Championship match.

Karpov was widely known as a favourite of the Communist party elite. Like many Soviet competitors who were elevated to top-level competition, Karpov showed all the appropriate loyalties to the Communist regime.

Kasparov was an entirely different matter. While he had once been a member of the Communist party, he left it in 1990 and was involved in organizing the Democratic Party of Russia, even as he defended the World Championship against Karpov. It was widely known that Kasparov distrusted and opposed Mikhail Gorbachev.

For a World Chess Champion representing (on paper at least) the Soviet Union -- Kasparov had, in 1990, requested to represent Russia under its pre-Soviet flag -- to so resoundingly oppose the Communist regime was dispiriting to many Communist party members. It earned Kasparov many enemies in the Soviet Union.

Then again, Kasparov was accustomed to having enemies. His contemporaries in professional Chess were known to widely fear and dislike Kasparov. Often, they would cheer when he lost, even in minor tournaments.

Although Boris Yeltsin would eventually disappoint Kasparov, the World Chess Champion's opposition to Gorbachev was seen as a factor in his political downfall.

More recently, Kasparov has been involved in organizing broader opposition to Russian Prime Minister (some say shadow President, despite recent dissent by Dmitri Medvedev). Most recently Kasparov has been a key figure in the organizing of Solidarnost, the opposition's alternative to Putin's United Russia party.

In 1990, Gary Kasparov became a key figure in the eventual downfall of Mikhail Gorbachev, the end of Communism in the Soviet Union, and the eventual dissolution of the regime.

Nearly 20 years later, Gary Kasparov has played a high-profile chess match against Anatoly Karpov once again. As in 1990, he's also organizing against an entrenched political regime.

In Kasparov's defeat of Karpov, history has repeated. As the world looks ahead to what lies in the future for Russia, many can only wonder: can Gary Kasparov finally help engineer the defeat of Vladimir Putin and bring a second round of democratic reform to Russia?

Only time will tell.


From the archives:

May 23, 2009 - "Fighting the Cold War Over a Chess Board"

The New Cold War

When Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as President of Russia, he was certainly not a well-hailed individual.

Previously, Putin had served as an advisor for the Mayor of St Petersburg. Despite a potentially career-breaking scandal, Putin continued to climb through the upper echelons of the Mayor's office before moving on to Moscow after an unsuccessful attempt to win the Mayor's office for himself.

In 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin as a deputy Prime Minister of Russia and, later on in the very day of this appointment, made him Prime Minister. Within four months, Putin would be President.

Putin ensured continued political successes by uniting a broad collection of small political parties -- post-Soviet Russian politics have been marked by the spread of tiny political parties supported by wealthy sponsors -- into the formidable United Russia party. While never formally becoming a member of the party, he did take full advantage of it.

With support of individuals such as Dmitri Medvedev, Putin wielded Presidential and legislative power with an iron fist. Political rivals and critics in the business world were ruthlessly marginalized.

When the Russian Constitution disqualified Putin from continuing his reign as President (the Russian Constitution limits Presidents to serving two consecutive terms), Putin hand-picked Medvedev to succeed him.

Underlying the Medvedev/Putin regime is an ideology that has come to be described as Sovereign Democracy.

This ideology of "sovereign democracy" is built on a foundation of historical revisonism, xenophobia, anti-westernism, Russian exceptionalism, and political relativism.

Vladimir Putin is widely famed for his comments describing the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geo-political disaster of the 20th century. Political and historical relativism have been at the heart of Putin's efforts to rehabilitate the reputation of the Soviet Union, comparing historical atrocities committed in the Soviet Union with historical deeds of other countries that often have little or no equivalence.

The idea is rather simple: whereas the governments of other countries have encouraged citizens to address past wrongdoings, Putin has insisted that Russia will never be made to feel ashamed of its past.

Putin's political organization has kept an arm's length distance from organizations that treat many of Russia's geographically closer adversaries -- such as Georgia -- in a xenophobic manner. Racial tensions are routinely stirred up by youth organizations that have come to be widely referred to as the Putin Youth -- an obvious, if sensational, play on the Hitler youth of Nazi Germany.

Putin has also consolidated his power by forever portraying Western countries as belligerent hypocrites. Putin and his party have interpreted the expansion of NATO into the former Eastern Bloc as an act of aggression against Russia, and they have not hesitated to share this idea with the Russian people.

The ideology of "Sovereign democracy" also stands on a notion of Russian exceptionalism that predates the Russian Czars. This notion is the ancient belief that Moscow is the "third Rome" that will stand as the last outpost and defender of the message of Jesus Christ. This idea permeated the Czarist period of Russian history. In fact, "Czar" is actually Russian shorthand for "Caesar".

Like with American foreign policy, this idea of Russian exceptionalism -- like American exceptionalism heavily influenced by religion, in this case the Russian Orthodox Church -- has led to an aggressive foreign policy. However, while the purpose of the aggressive American foreign policy tends to be the promotion of Americanized democracy, the purpose of an aggressive foreign policy is to eliminate the threats posed to Russia.

The Russian ideology of "sovereign democracy" has strengthened a political environment in which political processes exist not to decide who holds power, but to maintain incumbent's grip on power, and justify it.

Russia is not the only country in which this idea of "sovereign democracy" is being used to horde political power.

Leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez have also adapted this notion of "sovereign democracy" within their own countries, and countries like Iran seem to be moving in the same direction.

As authors such as Edward Lucas have noted, Russia's economic and military strong-arm tactics are increasingly posing a potential threat to the Western World. He isn't alone in issuing this warning.

Gary Kasparov has also issued a dire warning about Vladimir Putin's iron grip on Russia. It is a warning that should not be ignored.

Obama Must Not Repeat Bush's Mistake

Barack Obama has an opportunity to support democracy in Russia

At the end of his first visit to Russia, Barack Obama must certainly understand the opportunity that lays before him.

Perhaps more than anything else, Obama has the opportunity to not make the same mistake that George W Bush did.

Bush made the mistake of failing to make the same pro-democracy stand in Russia as he claimed he was making in Iraq. In his extremely soft approach to then-President (and now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, Bush played directly into Putin's hands.

"Putin is immune unless he hears a firm reaction from the top man," former World Chess champion and Soldarinost leader Gary Kasparov told Playboy Magazine in 2008. "He doesn't care about clerks, even Condoleezza Rice. Only a message from the top counts. Everything else is a game. When Putin made some of the statements that implied he could stay in office for a third term, he didn't hear anything from Bush. President Bush, you stuck up for him; you looked into his eyes. Why are you silent now? Instead, what does Putin hear? Condoleezza Rice says, 'we'd rather have him inside than outside the tent.'"

"This philosophy has never worked before," Kasparov continued. "Churchill said 'no matter how beautiful the strategy, occasionally you must check the results.' For seven years, with engagement by the West and with the influx of capitalism, Putin destroyed all democratic institutions in Russia. So we all remember that Bush said he looked into Putin's eyes. Putin looked into Bush's eyes as well. He saw he could push Bush's limits. Every time he pushes he tests the waters. He pushes and Bush does nothing."

The challenge for Obama is evident: he must not allow Putin to push his limits.

Obama has the advantage of having to deal not directly with Putin, but rather through Dmitri Medvedev.

But even amidst some seeming efforts by Medvedev to wield Presidential power himself, as opposed to merely being a lackey for the former President, Putin will remain a factor in dealings between the two leaders.

But Obama seemed to be alluding to Putin in many of his reflective comments after his visit. The allusions were far less than flattering.

"I think that Americans and Russians share an interest in strengthening the rule of law, democracy and human rights," Obama explained. "To quote my inaugural speech: ‘To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.’ Later, speaking in Cairo, I said: ‘I have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights.’"

Obama may, however, be underestimating the Russian leadership's commitment to these values.

"These ideas are shared by your President and your people," Obama continued. "I agree with President Medvedev when he says that ’some freedom is better than no freedom.’ I therefore see no reason why the ‘reset’ in relations cannot include the common desire to strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law."

For his own part Gary Kasparov is unimpressed by Obama's sentiments.

"Abandon the policy of double standards and call a spade a spade," Kasparov said. "Stop pretending that the current regime under Putin is democratic and thus give it a carte blanche for further abuses."

Obama's stance on Russia is a definitive improvement over George W Bush's, but some improvements clearly need to be made. Obama cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor.

Trouble Bubbling in Russia?

Gary Kasparov predicts Russian uprising

With Russians increasingly feeling the pinch of the economic crisis, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin may be set to face some unexpected opposition.

But that opposition may not necessarily come from the Russian people -- the United Russia party has enjoyed spectacularly strong support from Russians ever since Putin helped engineer its genesis by uniting hundreds of smaller right-of-centre parties. Instead, that opposition may come from the most unlikely source imaginable -- from Putin's own hand-picked President, Dmitri Medvedev.

A worsening economic situation in Russia -- one that has Russia's oil oligarchs hemoraging money -- may be making Putin particularly vulnerable.

"It's a very fragile system, and Putin could well become a scapegoat for a lot of people inside the elites," muses Solidarinost leader Gary Kasparov. "Whether or not he genuinely wants to, we could see Medvedev emerge as a sort of perestroika leader."

Signs of a rift between Putin and Medvedev have been creeping into public view recently.

Medvedev recently questioned many of Putin's accomplishments during his time as President.

"It's easy to work when there are high revenues, above all from oil and gas exports," Medvedev recently said. "It's like you're not doing anything yourself, yet the profit just keeps coming in. That's great. But now it's important, first, to show that we can learn to spend money – budget money – rationally, and second, to be competent managers."

Of course Putin didn't always benefit from sky-high oil and gas revenues. He first came to office in 1999 when the Russian ruble had collapsed and the Russian economy was at an all-time low.

But Medvedev has been criticizing Putin an awful lot lately. He may be eyeing his Prime Minister as particularly vulnerable.

Medvedev has even ordered revision of a bill that would define treason in a manner that could cast political opposition as treasonous. This was one of Putin's bills.

"This was a key piece of Putinist legislation," says Kasparov. "It would've meant that people like me could easily be rounded up and arrested for treason. It's very significant that Medvedev and his allies have blocked it."

This is a significant change from less than two months ago when Medvedev helped push changes to Russia's Presidential term that would clearly pave the way for Putin to re-take the Presidency and hold it for another twelve years.

Putin's own role within the United Russia party -- he's always kept the party at arms length as much as possible -- could even turn out to be a serious liability for him if a power struggle with Medvedev really does materialize.

For his own part, Kasparov doesn't rule out the possibility of a mass revolt against Putin and Medvedev.

"People have had a stable life and still think that things will get better again," says Kasparov. "I expect the first waves of protests to start in earnest in March or April."

If Medvedev catches signs of such a revolt ahead of time, one can imagine that it would only hasten any machinations against Putin. But by the same token, Putin is known to be an extremely savvy political operator. There's no way he'll allow himself to be scapegoated without a fight.

Whether the Russian people turn on Medvedev and Putin or the two of them turn on each other, it's certain that the real winner will be Gary Kasparov and Solidarinost.

One can count on the Chess Grandmaster being prepared to take advantage.

Putin's Hands in the Honeypot?

Kasparov: Putin may be planning to stir the Middle Eastern pot

In a column published in yesterday's Wall Street Journal, Gary Kasparov issues a stern warning about the machinations of "petrodictators" -- authoritarian regimes that rely on oil revenue to sustain themselves.

As usual, Kasparov's target is Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. "Russia and its fellow petrodictatorships are in dire need of a way to ratchet up global tensions to inflate the sagging price of oil," Kasparov writes. "Petrodictators, after all, need petrodollars to stay in power. The war in Gaza and the otherwise inexplicable skirmish with Ukraine over natural gas have helped the Kremlin in this regard, but $50 a barrel isn't going to be nearly enough. It will have to reach at least $100 and it will have to happen soon."

Kasparov writes that the current financial crisis has hit Russia extremely hard. With the memory of 1999's Ruble collapse fresh in the minds of most Russians, a mixture of fear of a recurrence is mixing with state controls on dissent -- complete with "anti-extremism" laws -- to create what could be a very unstable and dangerous political situation in Russia.

"Russians are ready to take to the streets," Kasparov writes. He also notes that if they do they'll likely be met by the paramilitary police forces controlled by Russia's interior ministry.

Kasparov worries that Putin may be attempting to engineer tension between Iran and Israel. "Open hostilities between Iran and Israel would lift the price of oil back to a level that would allow Mr Putin and his gang to keep funding the crackdown," Kasparov writes. "Israel's anxiety over Iran's nuclear-weapon ambitions is the most vulnerable link in a very weak chain."

Iran and Israel have never needed Russia to engineer tension between the two states. In fact, Iran's support of terrorism and Islamic militancy in the Middle East is very much at the heart of the current Israeli operations in Gaza. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has provided Islamic militant groups with funds and weapons, and even helped supervise Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel in 2006.

Under such circumstances, it may only be a matter of time before Israel decides to deal decisively with Iran.

While Iran was busy helping Hezbollah incite a war in Lebanon, Russia was busy in the region, too -- discussing the sales of military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers to Hamas.

Russia has also been involved with the Iranian nuclear program, helping the Iranians build a nuclear reactor that could, in future, be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

This is certainly at odds with the stance of the United States and the European Union -- the countries that had imagined Russia would be a good post-Cold War ally -- on this issue.

Russia's track record in dealing with rogue states should not be considered encouraging. Yet many western leaders foolishly continue to look to Russia to take the lead in dealing with these states.

"There persists a very damaging myth in the West, spouted by politicians and the press, that says Russia's assistance is needed with Iran and other rogue states," Kasparov explains. "In fact, the Kremlin has been stirring this pot for years and has a vested interest in further increasing turmoil in the region. The Hamas/Hezbollah rockets, based on the Russian Katyusha and Grad, are not delivered via DHL from Allah. It doesn't require the guile of a KGB man like Mr. Putin to imagine a way to accelerate Iran's nuclear program, which has been aided by Russian technology and protected by the Kremlin from meaningful international action."

"It is time to bury the failed model of dealing with the world's antidemocratic and bloodthirsty regimes," Kasparov writes. "The real change we must effect in 2009 is toward a new global emphasis on the value of human life. Anything less confirms to the enemies of democratic civilization that everything is negotiable. For Mr Putin that means democracy; for Hamas it means Israel's existence. The Free World must take those chips off the table."

Kasparov also notes a significant difference between Israel and Hamas.

"Israel has the capability to annihilate Gaza to secure the safety of its people, but it chooses not to do so because the Israelis value human life," Kasparov continues. "Does anyone doubt for a moment what Hamas would do if it had the power to wipe out every one of the five-and-a-half million Jews in Israel? Hamas should not be considered less a villain simply because it does not as yet possess the means to fulfill its genocidal agenda."

Yet the indecisive agenda pursued by many western leaders undermines their own ability to insist they respect human life and revere human rights.

"The leaders of Europe and the U.S. are hoping that the tyrants and autocrats of the world will just disappear," Kasparov writes. "But dinosaurs like Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chávez and Iran's ayatollahs are not going to fade away by natural causes. They survive because the leaders of the Free World are afraid to take a stand."

In fact, the shameful and well-established -- places such as Rwanda -- method of waiting for genocides to be effectively over and then picking up the pieces afterward is only further proof of this.

"Years from now, when Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe is either dead or deposed, his legacy will lead to another genocide trial in The Hague. Why don't Western powers, many of whom are condemning Israel's action in Gaza, take action now to stop the extermination in Zimbabwe instead of waiting a decade for a trial?" Kasparov asks. "Criticizing Israel is easy while rescuing Zimbabwe is hard. Choosing the path of least resistance is moral cowardice. It does not avoid difficult decisions, it only postpones them."

While Kasparov is right to urge action these issues -- and would be right to urge action on many others, such as Darfur -- on this particular note Kasparov has made a key logical fallacy.

With the United States engaged in Iraq and NATO as a whole engaged in Afghanistan, western leaders haven't consistently chosen the path of least resistance. The easy thing to do in Afghanistan, for example, would have been to drive the Taliban out of Kabul then let them fight it our with the Northern Alliance over who would control the country.

Choosing to rebuild Afghanistan was not the path of least resistance. In making this decision, western leaders knew full well they were choosing a very difficult path.

Russia has proven to be a valuable ally to NATO in Afghanistan. Then again, there is no question that Russia considers solving the Afghan dilemma to be crucial to their national security.

But some may argue that the litmus test of a state's foreign policy intentions isn't what they do when their national security is at stake, but rather what they do when their national security isn't at stake.

Russia's interests in the Middle East could be considered fairly modest by the standards of oil-importing countries. As an oil-exporting country, however, Russia has a tremendous economic interest in the Middle East.

There's little question that tension in the Middle East -- and the accompanying high oil prices -- is very much in Russia's economic interest. Having few national security-related interests in the region allows them to dabble there at the west's expense.

Gary Kasparov is right about the overall point of his column: it's time for western leaders to stop giving Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev a free ride.

From Russia With Hope

As a relatively young and inexperienced American President (47 years), Barack Obama can expect to face many challenges on the foreign policy front.

One of the premier challenges Obama will face may not necessarily be rounding up additional support for the war in Afghanistan, but in dealing with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

As Ray McGovern, a retired CIA analyst, tells the Real News Network, Obama would be well served by embracing a Glastnost regarding relations between the United States and Russia.

As McGovern notes, one thing that is certain to appear on the agenda between the two are American radar and missile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. McGovern insists that these sites are unnecessary, and that they are part of the "old thinking" vis a vis the United States and Russia.

McGovern suggests that those missile sites, as well as the prospects of Georgian and Ukranian membership in NATO, should be traded for concessions from Putin.

McGovern may well be right about missile sites in Eastern Europe (although not necessarily about the radar sites). With nuclear disarmament clearly returning to the global agenda, the dismantling of those sites would go a long way toward convincing Russia to dismantle more of its own considerable remaining nuclear stocks.

Ukraine and Georgia's proposed membership in NATO is a little less negotiable. While both the United States and Russia clearly have an interest in having each country within their particular geopolitical camps, Georgia and the Ukraine are both sovereign states, and have the right to make such decisions on their own.

Considering that each country is seeking NATO membership, there are clearly limits to the extent to which each country wishes to associate with Russia. Attempting to force them to associate more closely with Russia does no one any favours.

One thing that Obama absolutely cannot compromise on is the internal state of Russian democracy. Russian authorities have responded to the emergence of Gary Kasparov's Solidarnost movement by clamping down on their demonstrations, arresting up to 150 of their members, including some of its leaders.

Obama will face an increasingly complicated situation in Europe, as the New Europe, exemplified by Russia, will seek to build influence in what McGovern describes as the Old Europe -- France, Germany and Italy. With Vladimir Putin increasingly equating Russia as a European, rather than Asian, state it may also be a matter of time before Russia seeks to attain membership in the European Union.

Of course, Russia will only join the European Union under what it deems favourable positions, which for Russia entails a position of dominance.

Either way, many people will be looking to Barack Obama to provide new leadership on the Russian front.

Gary Kasparov Revives Solidarity

Kasparov's opposition party may be the last chance to defeat Putin

Historical mythology holds that Ronald Reagan was the man who won the Cold War. Even if this is the case -- a matter of some debate -- for many historical scholars, Reagan was not the man who ended it.

In the minds of some, that distinction belongs to Lech Wealsea, the leader of Solidary. In 1989, Walsea led Solidarity to leadership of a coalition government in Poland in the first free elections held in that country since the end of the Second World War.

When asked what the Soviet government planned to do about it, then-President Mikhail Gorbachev said it would do nothing. To many, Gorbachev's acceptance of a non-communist labour union/political party winning an election in the eastern European bloc marked the formal conclusion of the Cold War, the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.

One has to imagine that legacy is on Gary Kasparov's mind as he's taken Solidarity as the name for a bold new effort to defeat the United Russia party of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev.

Kasparov is no newcomer to such efforts. He attempted to run in the most recent Russian Presidential elections, but was prevented from doing so through some rather unsavoury machinations by the Russian state.

"We are fighting for victory because we have something to say to our people and something to offer them," Kasparov announced. "On this very day, we are in a position to take stock of past mistakes and act differently."

"One of the tasks of the Solidarity movement is to rehabilitate those basic principles that, unfortunately, for a significant or even overwhelming portion of our fellow citizens, have become associated with failure, misery or reduction of freedom," he added.

Unfortuantely, Kasparov has an uphill battle to wage. With no seats in the Duma and the Russian government currently making it more difficult for opposition parties to win representation, it will prove excessively difficult for Solidarity to have the effect that Kasparov so desires.

Kasparov isn't alone in his predicament of being outside the Duma looking in. Yaklobo and the SPS (roughly translated as Union of Right Forces) were both weeded out of the Duma when the 5% rule that had set the lower limit for receiving seats in the proportionately-elected Duma at 5% of the vote was abolished in favour of a 7% rule -- only one recent move intended to increase United Russia's dominance in that chamber.

Another item on United Russia's agenda is a move to change the length of Presidential tenures from four to six years. With well over two-thirds of the Duma -- a Russian constitutional majority that allows United Russia to pass amendments to the Russian constitution -- there's little hope of derailing this process.

According to Russian law, Vladimir Putin will become eligible for the Presidency again once he's finished his brief time out as Russian Prime Minister. Upon winning the Presidency, Putin could serve for another 12 years.

In forming Solidarity, Kasparov is turning Putin's own tactics against him. While never officially associating with United Russia, Putin was instrumental in the uniting of hundreds of small conservative parties into the electoral powerhouse. Now, Kasparov is trying to do the same with Russia's numerous liberal parties.

Even if they understand the essence of time in restoring Russian democracies, other leaders in the new Solidarity movement seem to have abandoned any hope of accomplishing their goals expediently.

"We might not be able to launch an Orange Revolution right now, but we can certainly create an orange organization," mused Valeriya Novodvorskaya. The Orange Revolution, as most should recall, resulted in the ascension of Ukranian president Viktor Yushchenko.

While no electoral coalition capable of defeating United Russia can be built over night, Kasparov, Novodvorskaya and company need to come to terms quickly with the realities facing them. If allowed to reassume the Presidency under the proposed conditions, Vladimir Putin could conceivably serve for the remainder of his life.

Kasparov must make his case to the Russian people as quickly as possible. As Al Jazeera reports, Russian political culture, traditionally authoritarian in nature, may be taking an even starker despotic turn as Russians seem set to vote Joseph Stalin as one of the greatest Russians of all time.

Even more disturbingly, while Putin and Medvedev's efforts to eliminate the political threat posed by Kasparov will almost certainly be enshrined as legendary examples of political oppression, the Russian government seems to feel few compunctions about allowing Neo Nazi parties to march publicly.

Gary Kasparov has an uphill battle ahead of him. Hopefully, the wits of this Chess Grand Master are up to the challenge.

Murray Dobbin on Canadian Foreign Policy

Dobbin waxes eloquent about mythical Canada

Coming once again via the Real News Network, Murray Dobbin insists that Canada's engagement in Afghanistan somehow imperils Canadian culture.

Dobbin recites all the tired left-wing rhetoric surrounding Afghanistan: that the combat mission was accepted to appease the United States, that Canadian forces are "occupying" Afghanistan, and Canada is becoming too "American".

But Dobbin makes a serious misstep when he insists that the "military is being integrated into what has been a strictly non-military culture."

Dobbin is either a tremendously poor student of Canadian history, or has simply allowed his reading of Canadian history to be distorted beyond recognition by his personal ideological preferences.

Canadian culture has never been "strictly non-military". Historians are in general agreement that notions of Canada as a sovereign state -- as opposed to merely a British colony -- came out of a military engagement: the Second World War. Historians agree that Canadians -- like the citizens of many British colonies -- came out of WWII believing that Canada had earned its sovereignty by playing a critical role in winning the European conflict.

Canadians have always taken pride in our military. Canadians have been known to boast about the "make-do" ingenuity of Canadian service men and women, who perform amazing feats with equipment many others would be considered ill-suited to the task.

We come together as Canadians every 11th of November to honour the sacrifices of our service men and women. Those sacrifices were predominantly made during times of war -- mostly during the First World War, Second World War and Korean War, although various Peacekeeping missions and the Afghan war have also added to the ranks of the remembered dead.

One of Canada's great national symbols, the Snowbirds, is made up of Air Force pilots specially trained to perform aerial stunts. They are world-renowned for their skill and artistry.

Even the Peacekeeping that Dobbin and his ideological stalwarts laud is carried out not by civilians, but by military personell. It was the labours of such military personell that helped Prime Minister Lester Pearson secure his Nobel Peace Prize -- again, a symbol of pride for Canadians.

Dobbin clearly misunderstands the role of the military in Canadian history. There is nothing un-Canadian about the military.

Dobbin also trots out a conspiracy theory suggesting that the engagement in Afghanistan is being fought primarily to secure a proposed pipeline through Afghanistan. The pipeline would carry natural gas from Turkmenistan to foreign markets.

However, Dobbin should be interested to learn that the pipeline in question would not be carrying natural gas to American or European markets, but rather to India and Pakistan. Furthermore, no war effort would have ever been needed to secure that pipeline, considering that the Taliban was in favour of building the pipeline.

Dobbin also accuses Stephen Harper and the Conservatives of being in league with George W Bush in allegedly trying to surround Russia with NATO states friendly to the United States.

But Dobbin should also keep in mind that Georgia and the Ukraine applied to NATO for membership, and that membership has still not yet been granted. It seems illogical for NATO to drag its feet on granting full membership -- as opposed to their current associate membership -- if their goal is to encircle Russia.

Dobbin argues that Harper and the Conservatives are backing American foreign policy despite it being against Canada's interests. But he may want to double-check what Canada's interests really are.

To begin with, Central and Eastern Canada remain energy importers. Thus, Canada has an interest in helping to break Russian dominance over east European and west Asian energy markets.

Furthermore, Canada has a very real interest in helping to corral states that harbour terrorists -- not to mention interests in promoting human rights by ensuring that one of the world's worst abusers of human rights does not return to power in Afghanistan.

In the end, Dobbin engages in some base defeatism. Canada cannot win in Afghanistan, he insists, although he, like his ideological stalwarts, have made a habit of overlooking successes in Afghanistan so that they may focus on the failures and challenges there.

Unfortunately, it isn't at all unlike Murray Dobbin to be narrowly ideological. His Michael Byers-esque turn on Canadian Foreign Policy is really little more than another drop in the bucket.

Could The West Be Ignoring the Next Major Threat?

In the pages of Playboy magazine, Gary Kasparov muses about Vladimir Putin

When Russians go to the polls on 2 March, 2008, Other Russia party leader and former Chess World Champion Gary Kasparov won't be on the ballot.

Neither will current Russian president Vladimir Putin, although (depending upon whom you ask) he will have a proxy on the ballot.

Yet, in the course of his Playboy interview, Kasparov raises a number of serious concerns about Putin, and hints that US President George W Bush just might be ignoring the next major threat to global security, just as he initially ignored Al Qaida.

Among the failures of Bush's foreign policy toward Putin's Russia, in Kasparov's view, is the failure to support Russian democracy. Furthermore, Kasparov surmises that Bush's undermining of democracy in his own country has helped to further the undermining of democracy abroad, and advanced the spread of cynicism.

"[Bush's] arrogant actions in the past few years convinced [Putin] that... the war on terror, the war in Iraq, the Halliburton story, torture -- they prove all these [democratic] values are a cover-up," Kasparov says. "They prove to Putin and his people that the West doesn't really care about them, either. It's a big joke."

"Bush talks about promoting democracy in Iraq, but in Russia we see he doesn't really care about democracy," Kasparov declares. "He undermines it, betrays it. So it's easy for people in Russia to be cynical. 'Yes, we're as democratic as you are' -- Russians say it with a wink."

"I'm not a big fan of President Bush, as you can guess," Kasparov admits. "But it's not only him. Look at Gerhard Schroeder, Jacques Chirac, Silvio Berlusconi -- unlike Bush and Tony Blair, they were Putin's business partners. They all supported him. But Bush and the others turn a blind eye, and meanwhile this strongman has thrived."

"[Bush] says nothing about most of the assaults on democracy in Russia. He says nothing to Putin and continues to do business with him," Kasparov adds. "Putin is allowed to come to the G8. It should be renamed the G7+1. Again and again no one says anything against Putin."

"Putin is immune unless he hears a firm reaction from the top man," Kasparov insists. "He doesn't care about clerks, even Condoleezza Rice. Only a message from the top counts. Everything else is a game. When Putin made some of the statements that implied he could stay in office for a third term, he didn't hear anything from Bush. President Bush, you stuck up for him; you looked into his eyes. Why are you silent now? Instead, what does Putin hear? Condoleezza Rice says, "we'd rather have him inside than outside the tent."

"This philosophy has never worked before," he continues. "Churchill said 'no matter how beautiful the strategy, occasionally you must check the results.' For seven years, with engagement by the West and with the influx of capitalism, Putin destroyed all democratic institutions in Russia. So we all remember that Bush said he looked into Putin's eyes. Putin looked into Bush's eyes as well. He saw he could push Bush's limits. Every time he pushes he tests the waters. He pushes and Bush does nothing."

"Putin is a psychologist," Kasparov -- a man himself familiar with psychology -- notes.

Of course, a foreign policy realist would note that the state of democratic health within Russia is actually of little consequence to American (or Canadian) foreign policy.

"[Putin] is on all sides," Kasparov says, "The West and Iran and Hezbollah."

Kasparov goes so far as to suggest that Putin is willfully sowing tension in the Middle East, and is doing so by supporting regimes and organizations that have declared themselves to be implacable enemies of the west.

"Putin needs high oil prices," Kasparov insists. "If oil goes down, his regime collapses. It's why he sells weapons to Syria and Hezbollah and Hamas."

"This past year Putin seemed to increase his ties to the US and the West," Kasparov notes, then continues with an unspoken "but", "He has bee supplying Hamas in Palestine and selling military equipment to Sudan, Myanmar and Venezuala, and missile technology to North Korea. Why?"

Kasparov answers his own question.

"It's two ways of making profit," he continues. "One is cash. These industries are all controlled by his guys, so there's lots of cash."

"But he also backs these regimes to create tension in oil-rich regions," Kasparov adds. "The more tension, the higher the oil prices. He needs tension because it muddies the waters, and he thrives in muddy waters."

"If you look at the places of instability around the world, you'll always find Putin's traces," Kasparov insists. "Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Hugo Chavez -- they keep the Middle East boiling. It's a very rational policy if you need high oil prices."

"Putin is a KGB guy," Kasparov says. "He looks at your eyes and smells whether he can move further or if he should go back. Now, he thinks, we have so much money, we can dictate our terms. For his attacks on the values of the West and democracy, he has been rewarded with polite commitments and now the Sochi Olympics. It's the triumph of Russian corruption over international institutions."

Kasparov notes that particularly problematic, in his view, is the difference between the two men. "See, Putin is a psychologist," Kasparov reiterates, "and much smarter than Bush. Putin realized all these big guys were not as strong, not as smart -- he could easily outplay them. Basically he does what he wants, manipulates them and does more of what he wants. He keeps oil prices high, keeps tension in the Middle East, becomes a necessary ally but on his own terms."

But, as Kasparov notes, Putin is particularly vulnerable to rebukes from world leaders.

"Putin's biggest disappointments were in October of last year, a day or two after [Anna] Politkovskaya was murdered. He was in Germany and offered a big deal to German Chancellor Angela Merkel: Russia has gas, and Germany would be the distributor," Kasparov says. "Responding to the murder, Merkel said no. Putin was devastated. Next there was a meeting in Finland, and the European countries turned down a similar proposal. He was stunned because he believes that everything and everyone has a price. The EU's Organization for Security and Cooperation refused to come to Russia to monitor this past December's parliamentary elections because Putin was not cooperation with visas and they would have been restricted. This shocked Putin."

"These are very good signs," Putin declares. "Finally some of the Western leadership is showing they have reached their limits and won't play his game."

Putin's supply of weapons to some of the most turbulent regions in the world has clear implications for foreign policy -- even among those who consider themselves realists. And given that Putin is using the proceeds of these funds, both directly and indirectly, to fund his continuing stranglehold on Russian democracy, the state of Russian democracy is an issue that should be addressed in the foreign policy of all Western states.

Putin may well be pliable to the influence of world leaders. But the limits of this pliability have yet to be tested. If we in the West are truly interested in pacifying the Middle East, the Sudan, Myanmar and other global trouble spots, it's clearly time for western leaders to turn the tables on Vladimir Putin, and see how far he can be pushed until he mends his ways -- both domestically and internationally.