(Don't) Blame Reagan

1983: The Brink of Apocalypse chronicles the story of what is considered to have nearly become a full-out nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. It lays the blame for the near-war at the feet of Ronald Reagan, the Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO's operation Able Archer (a war game exercise involving signal squads in West Germany).

The time has long come for contemporary liberals to stop letting the Soviet Union off of the hook for incidents such as the one chronicled in the film.

First off, if the Soviet Union really had enjoyed the kind of advantage described in the film -- it didn't, as the Soviet defense sector quickly proved to be unsustainable -- then the development of the SDI was actually entirely justified.

Soviet fears about a decapitation attack be damned. The United States had -- and still has -- every right to take any means necessary to protect themselves from nuclear weapons.

The nuclear threat once posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, and so SDI is no longer justified -- which is why George W Bush's decision to resume development of the missile shield was actually unjustified.

Moreover, one should remember that while the United States maintained a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, they did not maintain a policy of first strike. Conversely, the Soviet Union maintained a policy of first strike, if not first use of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the ancient complaint about Reagan's "evil empire" speech has become entirely passe. 80s-era Soviet officials may be as outraged about the speeches as they like, but they should have long ago been called to account for the oppressive nature of the USSR, and they'd have difficulty convincing anyone from then-Czechoslovakia or Hungary that the Soviet Union's foreign policy was not aggressive.

Moreover, the Soviet gunning down of a Korean airliner (ironically, flight 007) demonstrated a certain recklessness in Soviet defense policy.

It's time for the soft-on-communism portion of the left to stop offering the same old weak excuses for Soviet Communism, and stop casting the figer of blame at Ronald Reagan for cold war near-misses.

Definitely Not the Endorsement He Must Have Wanted

Tony Blair endorsed by Taliban-bribing Berlusconi

Tony Blair's campaign for the soon-to-be-created office of the President of the European Union received a significant boost today, as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi endorsed him for the job.

"Tony Blair has all the right credentials for becoming the first president of the European Council in the terms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, and to be appointed to that post as soon as it is legally and politically possible to give the go-ahead to the implementation of the clause renewing the union's governance," Berlusconi wrote in a letter to Il Foglio.

But this is one endorsement that Blair may want to distance himself from.

As it turns out, Berlusconi's government has been bribing the Taliban to keep their operations quiet in areas where Italian troops are operating.

When the Italians handed responsibility for Sarobi in 2008, the tranquil conditions in the province led the incoming French command to sorely misjudge the security situation in the region. 10 French soldiers were quickly killed in a single ambush when the Taliban, no longer receiving tens of thousands of dollars in bribes, retook the field of battle.

The French are understandably disappointed in their erstwhile allies. As Benedict Brogan notes, they'll likely get even with the Italians in their own time.

But considering the judgement of Berlusconi's government on how to discharge its duties to NATO -- an organization that Italy honestly ought to be expelled from over this episode -- Silvio Berlusconi's endorsement is one that Tony Blair should actually reject.

After all, Blair committed British troops to Afghanistan. It very well could have been British troops that came to harm over Italian duplicity.

Accepting Berlusconi's endorsement ought to be utterly toxic to Blair's Presidential campaign.

Calling All Internationalists

NATO chief wants Canada to stay in Afghanistan

With the 2011 date for withdrawal of Canada's forces in Afghanistan approaching, the newly-elected Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has called on Canada to continue its mission in the war-torn country.

"Of course I'm not going to interfere with domestic politics in individual allied nations, but seen from an alliance point of view, I would strongly regret if that became the final outcome of the Canadian considerations," said Rasmussen. "At the end of the day it is a question of our own security -- we cannot allow Afghanistan once again to become a safe haven for terrorists -- and I also think it is in Canada's interest to ensure a peaceful and stable Afghanistan."

As has become the general policy when Canadian forces are called upon to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2011, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon has already rebuked Rasmussen's appeal.

"However, our government is abiding by the motion passed in Parliament in 2008. That is: our combat forces will leave by 2011. We're staying the course," Cannon announced.

Defense Minister Peter MacKay has previously responded to suggestions that US President Barack Obama would like Canadian forces to remain in Afghanistan past 2011 as his own country prepares to commit additional troops to the crucial mission.

While it is true that Parliament decided in 2008 to end the Afghanistan mission in 2011, the persistent call from international leaders for Canada to stay committed to the combat mission very much does present a dilemma for Canadian foreign policy -- particularly in the minds of those who favour multi-lateralism.

The Afghanistan mission has long posed a challenge to NATO in regards to its ability to function effectively as an internationalist institution -- wherein various countries pool their political, economic, strategic and military capabilities in order to act constructively in regards to global challenges.

While Canada has long carried a disproportionate burden in Afghanistan. While other NATO countries have loafed by refusing to commit their troops to the combat mission against the Taliban, Canada has paid in blood and treasure for its commitment to international security.

But by the same token, Canada retreating from the field of battle at a time at which its troops may be needed most doesn't solve this particular problem. If anything, it likely makes it worse.

If the rest of NATO is prepared to match Canada's commitment to Afghanistan moving forward, the right thing to do may be to stay.

Parliament should, at the very least, reexamine its commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2011 based on the international appeals for our forces to stay. Not even taking the time to reexamine our commitment to the mission could represent a fatal blow to internationalism as a central tenet of Canadian foreign policy.

No Canadian in Brussels

Anders Fogh Rasmussen will be political head of NATO

If political opponents ever attempt to use his failure to win the office of NATO Secretary General against him, at least Peter MacKay can continue to insist that he was never pursuing the job to begin with.

Today current Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen will be his replacement.

The die was officially cast for MacKay yesterday, when Turkey retracted its objection to Rasmussen.

"I look very much forward to continuing the good job done by Secretary-General Scheffer in the transformation of NATO to manage the new challenges of the 21st century," Fogh announced.

MacKay is the second Canadian to come close to winning the job in recent history. Former Liberal deputy Prime Minister John Manley also came awfully close.

And while it is unfortunate that, once again, Canada's ambitions to lead in NATO was thwarted by mere European parochialism -- even after the offer of an important key structural compromise by US Vice President Joe Biden -- NATO's new leadership should be well-poised to move the alliance forward, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

There will be other times, and other offices for Peter MacKay. Some day, almost certainly, Prime Minister of Canada.

If anything, MacKay's failed bid for the NATO leadership has left him free to pursue the agenda that MacKay himself insisted came first -- his duties in Canada.


Other bloggers writing about this topic:

Can of Contemplation - "NATO Sticks With Old Europe"

MacKay's NATO Bid Not Over Yet?

Secretary General speculation continues

Despite Peter MacKay's numerous insistences that he isn't seeking the job, speculation about the Defense Minister's near-frontrunner status in the campaign continues.

Even putting his repeated announcements that he isn't pursuing the job aside, MacKay's chances of winning seemed dim after Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, was rejected by Turkey.

Turkey has reportedly decided to back MacKay.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, the strongest candidate aside from MacKay, also dropped out of the race recently.

Like Sikorski, however, MacKay's potential ascension to the office of Secretary General may be complicated by recent antagonisms with Russia.

All of this continues to rely on whether or not MacKay is seeking the office at all. MacKay may simply wait for other candidates to draw criticism from their potential rivals. Then again, at this point, only MacKay himself really knows.


Other bloggers writing about this topic:

Jeff Jedras - "Turkey and Poland: We'll Take Peter MacKay to Block

Rumours, Interrupted

MacKay not planning to run for NATO Secretary General

If speculation that Defense Minister Peter MacKay was gunning for the soon to be elected position of NATO Secretary General were based merely on rumours, MacKay seemed intent to lay them to rest this week.

"Rumours are just that," MacKay insists. "I have a tremendous amount of work on my plate right now as Canada’s defence minister."

"I’m focused on my role as minister of defence in Canada and building our capacity, which is something that we’ve worked very hard at."

"We have a 20-year predictable Canada-first defence strategy that is going to replace all of our core capabilities and grow the size of our infrastructure and improve upon our operational capacity. All of these things are very live files," MacKay explained.

"We have a tremendous number of procurements complete but more of them in the pipeline. That’s my focus right now, and obviously getting the equipment into our theatre of operations and protecting our men and women in uniform as they carry out their important work in Afghanistan."

MacKay has continued to be as good as his word, announcing $40 million in upgrades to military facilities in Alberta.

The results of MacKay's work have also become evident on the ground in Afghanistan, as Canadian forces conducted a helicopter-borne assault conducted with Canadian helicopters -- a historical first.

MacKay's insistence that he isn't campaigning to be NATO's new Secretary General may seem to defy other recent comments made on the matter.

Then again, it's important to remember that former Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley has also been rumoured as a potential candidate of the job. While direct speculation about Manley seeking the job has been scant, it's important to remember that he's come close before. Manley narrowly lost out to current Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in 2004.

And while MacKay is passing on a tremendous opportunity -- both to further establish himself as a future Conservative leader and Prime Minister and to solidify his party's internationalist credentials -- Manley would also represent Canada with distinction as NATO Secretary General.

Then again in politics it's remarkable how quickly things dismissed as mere rumours can blossom into reality. Politicians as savvy as MacKay has proven to be rarely turn down opportunities on the magnitude of the one that currently seems to have presented itself.

Quid Pro Quo On a Global Scale

Compromise could pave the way for MacKay

With the election of the replacement for NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoof Scheffer slowly approaching, a breakthrough that would allow Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay to win the job seems to be on the horizon.

“I don't think that traditions, in the sense of geography, should be a restriction on any position with NATO,” MacKay has recently said.

An unofficial NATO tradition is that a European will hold the office of Secretary General, while American commanders will maintain control of various military commands throughout the alliance.

American Vice President Joe Biden has reportedly offered a compromise to European leaders that may finally put this tradition to rest. Under Biden's compromise French commanders would assume control of several NATO commands in exchange for MacKay being elected Secretary General.

The likelihood that Biden's offer could be accepted is enhanced by the lack of a consensus amongst Europeans about which European candidate should be elected.

Polish Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski appears to be the strongest of the European candidates, but agitation between himself and Russia may undermine his candidacy.

Then again and by the same token, MacKay's recent verbal joust with Russia over bomber flights near Canadian airspace may make his own candidacy more questionable, considering that NATO is currently trying to strengthen its relationship with Russia.

MacKay has never lobbied Biden for his support. “I've never had a discussion with Vice-President Biden about this,” MacKay explained. “What I can tell you is that there is growing appreciation and I would even go so far as to say renewed respect for the role that Canada plays in NATO, not just in Afghanistan, but the fact that we have been an active participant and a founding nation for NATO in its 60 year history.”

Not to mention the direct leadership role Canada took in the creation of NATO.

With Biden's support -- knowing that Barack Obama isn't that far removed -- MacKay's candidacy for the job is far from a done deal, but it's become solidly within the realm of possibility.


Other bloggers writing about this topic:

James C Morton - "Peter MacKay as Secretary-General of NATO?"

Chucker Canuck - "Lefties: Here's a Chance to Show Europe Some Love"

Chris Tindal - "Sit Tight, Elizabeth"

Sizing Up the Competition

Peter MacKay faces formidable competition for the office of NATO Secretary General

If one considers history alone, Peter MacKay's chances of being elected as NATO's next Secretary General are very slim.

As some have previously noted, an unwritten agreement between the United States and European states guarantees European countries control over the Secretary General's office as long as the supreme military commander remains an American.

But even with such an unwritten policy in place it should be expected that whomever winds up winning the job should be capable of performing it.

As it stands, there are currently four other candidates for the job.

Poland has nominated its Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, for the job. Sikorski studied Politics, Economics and Philosophy at Oxford and covered the 1980s Afghanistan and Angola for the British Press.

Sikorski also served as Poland's Defence Minister between 2005 and 2007 before he resigned in order to become Foreign Minister. Sikorski also held a number of deputy minister portfolios throughout the 1990s.

Between 2002 and 2005 Sikorski was a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was also executive director of the New Atlantic Initiative, an organization committed to revitalizing relations between the Atlantic democracies.

Sikorski strongly supports both close relations between Poland the United States, as well as Poland's role within the European Union. Foremost among his goals is the modernization of the Polish military.

Radoslaw Sikorski is clearly a strong candidate for Secretary General. But he does face one serious hurdle.

Sikorski is the man who signed the Missile Defense treaty with the United States. As a result, Sikorski's election as Secretary General could jeopardize efforts to rebuild NATO's currently-fractious relationship with Russia.

Considering Russia's quite natural opposition to the Missile Defense Shield -- not only should such a countermeasure be unnecessary against a country that is technically still an American ally, but it also does risk upsetting the delicate balance of power established between the two countries over long and arduous non-proliferation negotiations.

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passi is also considred a strong candidate to become NATO Secretary General.

Passi's bid to become Secretary General was seemingly overshadowed by Irina Bakova's campaign to head UNESCO.

Passi achieved prominence in 1990 when he drafted a bill calling for Bulgaria to quit the Warsaw Pact and join NATO. He also drafted the bill that culminated with Bulgaria joining the EU.

Former British Defense Minister Des Browne has also been suggested as a candidate.

Browne has solid diplomatic credentials within Britain, having served on the Northern Ireland Select Committee in 1997.

However, Browne also faced a great deal of criticism when he allowed British soldiers taken prisoner by Iran in 2007 to publish their stories.

Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Jonas Gaer Stoere has also been proposed as a candidate. Stoere studied law at Harvard before serving as the Norwegian ambassador to the United Nations office in Geneva.

He has also served as the Executive Director of the World Health Organization and the Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross.

Along with MacKay, these individuals -- Stoere, Browne, Passi and Sikorski -- seem to be the front-runners for the role of Secretary General.

For their own part, the Americans aren't endorsing any of the candidates, instead merely naming the criterea by which they think a Secretary General would be successful.

"What's important from my standpoint is simply that we have somebody who has the broadest possible support across the alliance and frankly somebody who has the executive experience to run a very large and complex organisation," said US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Sikorski is almost certainly MacKay's most formidable rival for this job. Unfortuantely, he also has one key shortcoming: he already has a tenuous history with at least one country in which NATO would like to forge strong diplomatic ties. Sikorski as General Secretary would be a definite liability toward that end.

MacKay is as strong a candidate as Sikorski, and he doesn't have the same history with Russia.

Peter MacKay's bid to become the Secretary General of NATO may be more favourable than he's otherwise been credited.

The Case for a Canadian

Time is past due for a Canadian to be NATO Secretary General

When the next Secretary General of NATO is elected, there remains an opportunity that this office will be filled by a Canadian.

Defense Minister Peter MacKay is considered by many to be a strong candidate for the job.

Of course, things aren't nearly so simple as MacKay's qualifications.

In all of NATO's history, there has never been a Canadian Secretary General. Nor, for that matter, has there ever been an American Secretary General.

Every Secretary General in NATO history has been a European. For most of NATO's history there was actually a very good reason for this. NATO was formed with the purpose of defending the western bloc against the Soviet Union.

Any war fought against the Soviet Union would inevitably have been fought on European soil. No one could be better trusted to direct such a war in Europe's best interests than someone who is themselves a European.

Even in the immediate post-Soviet era NATO's primary theatre of operations remained European due to the ethnic conflicts which periodically broke out in Eastern Europe.

But now NATO's primary theatre of operations is no longer Europe. Now, NATO is most active in Afghanistan, a war in which Canada has played the disproportionately largest role.

According to Allan Pellerin, a retired long-time NATO officer, NATO has an unwritten rule that the Secretary General would remain European.

"There’s no written rule per se, but when NATO was formed what was agreed was that in order to provide a balance between America’s power and Europe, the senior military commander would be an American and the secretary general was always a European. And that does not change," Pellerin explains.

There are also rumours -- which some attribute to an unnamed European candidate's attempts to discredit MacKay -- that his campaign has been ill-conceived and clumsy.

But even if MacKay himself is unlikely to ascend to Secretary General, there is another Canadian reported to be in the running: former Liberal Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister John Manley.

In the previous Secretary General contest Manley was endorsed by Lord Robertson, the previous Secretary General.

This wasn't enough to overtune tradition in 2003, nor was the leading role Canada's been taking in Afghanistan.

The thing about unwritten rules is that because they're unwritten they're subject to change.

The time for a Canadian to become Secretary General of NATO is long past due.

A Backward Way to Prosecute a War

Benchmarks needed before a withdrawal date set, not after

Canada's role in Afghanistan is important.

It's important to our country's national security -- preventing a regime known for harboring terrorists from returning to power. It's important to internationalism -- proving that organizations like NATO can still work. It's important to the Afghan people -- bring them an opportunity to truly embrace the freedoms offered by a democratic government.

As such, Canada's role in the Afghanistan war is worth doing. But anything worth doing is worth doing right.

During his current visit to Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier stressed the importance of setting benchmarks for what we expect Canadian troops serving in Afghanistan to accomplish before the mission can be considered to be a success.

"We have to go back in Canada and will have a discussion about the future of our mission, so we will have to set benchmarks on the training of the ANA, the training of the ANP," Bernier said. "It was important to have a meeting with the general and other officials to understand pretty well what is the challenges that we face concerning the training of the national army and the national police."

And he's right. It is important to understand the challenges Canada faces in Afghanistan and also to understand how we will meet them.

But that was even more important before the establishment of a withdrawal date, not after.

What seems to be at play in this situation is a fundamental misunderstanding of how a country can be successful in a mission like Afghanistan.

Leaving Afghanistan before Canada's mission there is accomplished is a recipe for disaster. The Taliban returning to Afghanistan would certainly not be the passive-aggressive Taliban of pre-2001, content to merely harbor terrorists like Osama Bin Laden within its borders. Upon reclaiming power in Kabul, the Taliban could be expected to become even more aggressive, likely supporting terrorism much more directly than before.

But accomplishing the mission means meeting the goals. So one clearly can't set a withdrawl date before one fully understands what these goals are, and what needs to be done in order to accomplish them.

In, frankly, going too far to accommodate Liberal inconsistency Maxime Bernier and the Conservative party have succeeded in making Barack Obama's Iraq dilemma our own Afghanistan dilemma.

In order to meet the artificial goal of Canadian withdrawal by 2011, we run the very real risk of not meeting the goals that will make peaceful withdrawal possible in the first place.

In particular, Afghanistan remains 20,000 soldiers short of the target of 80,000 troops by 2011.

That's an awfully big gap to have to close.

The successes in Afghanistan -- whether opponents to the war want to acknowledge them or not -- to date remind us that the war in Afghanistan can be won. But setting timetables for withdrawal that will make it more difficult to achieve our goals isn't doing anyone -- the troops who actually have to worry about achieving those goals -- any favours.

If Maxime Bernier and the Conservatives really wanted to make it possible for Canada to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2011 they would have decided what the goals would be before setting that date.

To do otherwise -- as they have -- is a backward way to prosecute a war.

Future of NATO at Stake in Afghanistan

NATO unlikely to survive a defeat in Afghanistan

According to US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, NATO's viability as an alliance is very much at stake in Afghansitan.

"We must not -- we cannot -- become a two-tiered alliance of those willing to fight and those who are not," he said at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. "Such a development, with all its implications for collective security, would effectively destroy the alliance."

These remarks come as NATO scrambles to meet Canada's demands for increased support in Kandahar, as outlined in the Manley report. Even France has offered to step up to the plate, offering up to 700 additional paratroopers (in addition to Mirage fighter jets currently stationed in the region).

Naturally, this has left Defense Minister Peter MacKay feeling very confident about NATO's ability to support Canada properly in Kandahar.

"We believe the French responded quite positively and we're awaiting a further decision," announced MacKay, who recently has been discussing logistics with French defense staff.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has already announced Canada will not extend its Kandahar mission beyond 2009 unless 1,000 additional troops are committed. Clearly, the French commitment would go a long way toward meeting that demand, even if they arrive shortly after April 2009.

But there is still much more to do, and still more members of NATO who haven't done enough of it.

"In NATO, some allies ought not have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, forcing other allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying," Gates insisted.

"The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real -- and it is not going to go away," he added, reiterating the stakes of the mission. "It raises the question: What would happen if the false success they proclaim became real success? If they triumphed in Iraq or Afghanistan, or managed to topple the government of Pakistan? Or a major Middle Eastern government?"

"Aside from the chaos that would instantly be sown in the region, success there would beget success on many other fronts as the cancer metastasized further and more rapidly than it already has," Gates added.

Gates' remarks are really indicative of some of Michael Ignatieff's comments last week: "We don't know what success looks like in Afghanistan but we sure know what failure looks like."

"Victory is not clear. But losing this is pretty clear to me, and I don't think we want to lose."

Certainly not. Because if NATO is defeated in Afghanistan, it simply may not survive -- at least not in its present form. If Canada, the United States, Britain (and now France) are left alone in the lurch, there's no question that NATO's usefulness as an alliance will be called into question. If NATO is defeated in Afghanistan, there simply may be no reason for it to continue to exist.

Certainly, politicians like NDP leader Jack Layton -- whose party has repeatedly, throughout history, advocated for the dismantling of NATO -- certainly must be rubbing their hands in anticipation at this very thought.

NATO's credibility -- and future -- is very much at stake in Afghanistan. A success will prove the model works. A failure will be used by those who want to split the alliance apart as evidence that keeping it alive is simply a waste of effort.

If NATO's resident social loafers (hello, Germany) want to continue to enjoy the enhanced security they benefit from as a virtue of their NATO membership, they need to step up to the plate, accept their share of the burden, and make NATO work -- and they need to do it now.

Otherwise, NATO may become a thing of the past -- and that very enhanced security right along with it.

Iran/Afghanistan Border Needs Extra Attention

Border security remains a serious issue

As concern over whether or not Iran is supplying Afghan insurgents continues to accumulate, Canadian military officials are once again stressing that, while they have their suspicions, there is little solid evidence to support it.

"There were parts [of Improvised Explosive Devices] coming from Iran, there was parts also coming from other countries" says Brigadier-General Guy Laroche. "I cannot say from what I see on the ground that Iran is behind that."

Yet, NATO command staff do know that weapons and ammunition have crossed into Afghanistan from Iran. And while NATO commander General Dan McNeil has noted the lack of conclusive evidence, he has also expressed doubt -- very reasonably -- about whether or not the Iranian government can reasonably claim ignorance on the matter.

In short, what is at stake in this particular matter -- at the very least -- is actually border security.

"The border between Iran and Afghanistan is relatively porous and we have noticed that weaponry and ammunition does come across that border," says Antony McCord, a NATO spokesperson.

NATO countries must pressure Iran to properly secure its border with Afghanistan. If Iran declines to do so, it will certainly be up to NATO forces to secure that border -- at least on the Afghan side.

As for the suspicions being cast on the Iranian government, it would be easy to allow the matter to devolve into a rhetorical matter.

It would be easy to, like Iran's consul in Khandahar, dismiss these concerns as "American propaganda being repeated by Canada". In fact, some people have.

Yet the aforementioned Iranian consul in Khandahar claims that the presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan destabilizes the country (despite the fact that Afghanistan is currently no less stable than it ever has been -- perhaps even more so), and pose a threat to Iranian national security. Clearly, he feels it would be in Iran's best interest if NATO troops were driven out.

Furthermore, at least one Khandahar warlord admits to meeting Iranian emissaries who encouraged him to start a jihad against NATO troops.

Cutting off the supply of arms to Afghan insurgents will prove to be a key to victory in Afghanistan. Addressing the influx of weapons and IED components from Iran will be crucial in stemming the tide, as will be stemming the tide of arms and support from Pakistan.

Iranian Supply of Taliban Forces Finally Comes to Forefront

Like it or not, it's time to get tough on Iran

Those paying close attention to the Afghanistan conflict have long had their suspicions regarding where the Taliban is recieving its armaments from.

On Christmas Day, speaking in the midst of a visit to Canadian troops in Afghanistan, Canadian minister of defence Peter MacKay has finally decided to stop beind so quiet about it.

"We're very concerned that weapons are coming in from Iran," MacKay announced. "We're very concerned that these weapons are going to the insurgents and are keeping this issue alive. We've certainly made our views to the Iranian government about this known."

"It's so difficult to cut these supply lines when you have people from other countries giving out weapons that are being used against Canadian Forces and troops from other countries."

In the days since MacKay's comments some predictable people have made some predictable comments regarding them. Unfortuantely, all too many of these people are willfully out to lunch, and out of touch with the facts.

The fact that Iranian weapons have been ending up in the hands of the Taliban is well known. British military intelligence services have confirmed it.

In fact, on 5 September, British special forces intercepted trucks crossing into Afghanistan from Iran. They contained materiel to make Explosively Formed Penetrators, a form of roadside bomb used by the Taliban.

"It is difficult for me to conceive that this convoy could have originated in Iran and come to Afghanistan without at least the knowledge of the Iranian military," said General Dan McNeill, who noted that these discoveries suggest direct Iranian involvement. "These EFPs have caused me some anxiety. I would say whoever put these together had the benefit of not only knowledge, but also some technology and machines."

The Iranians have also been caught supplying such devices to Iraqi insurgents.

"This confirms our view that elements within Iran are supporting the Taliban," announced a spokesperson from the British embassy in Kabul. "We have previously raised the issue of arms to the Taliban with the Iranians and will continue to do so."

MacNeill and MacKay are far from the only ones to allege that Iran has been supplying insurgents in Afghanistan. In 2006, General Mohammad Ayub Safi, an Afghan officer charged with border security in Herat province, noted that "in only the first quarter of [2006], more than 10 Iranian officials have been arrested in Herat who were allegedly involved in illegal activities."

One caveat, however, should be raised: even General McNeill has been reluctant to accuse the Iranian government of explicit involvement in Afghanistan. Rather, the Iranians may merely be passively allowing shipments of weapons bound for Afghanistan to travel through their territory, and turning a willfully blind eye toward "rogue elements" within their military that are providing such training to Taliban fighters and other Afghan insurgents.

One must also remember that the diplomatic relationship between Tehran and Kabul has notably improved, although one also cannot rule out the interest Iranian officials have in seeing American troops, in particular, killed in combat, as well as the direct benefit they would recieve from undermining fledgling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It's in Iran's interests to undermine the emerging Afghan state, even if they empower a Sunni regime in the process.

One could raise the point that the Iranian theocracy and the Taliban have always shared a mutual hostility. Then again, those who raise this argument are clearly unaware of, or simply ignoring, the previously-hostile relationship between the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who is their principle ally in the war against the Karzai government and its NATO allies).

War makes for strange bedfellows. History reminds us of that time and time again.

Unfortunately, war against Iran is clearly not an option at this time. With American and British troops in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan stretched near their limit, the forces necessary to deal with definitively with Iran are simply unavailable. While Desert Storm-style air strikes could still concievably put the fear of western power into characteristically beligerent Iranian leaders, the necessary ground support to ensure that lesson takes simply is not available. Other options are necessary.

Deploying more troops along the Iranian border is clearly necessary. Beyond that, the Iranian government must be made to understand that allowing hostile forces to travel through their territory unmolested is an act that will carry repercussions.

If the Iranians want to continue supplying -- be it directly or indirectly -- insurgents in Afghanistan with arms, perhaps its time we start supplying Kurds in Northern Iran with weapons so they can get serious about resisting Iranian oppression. Perhaps the Lor, Bakhtiari and Qashqai tribes that have taken up arms against the Iranian state could use a little assistance.

What goes around comes around, and when it comes to getting tough on Iran, turnabout may yet be fair play.

Think Tank Offers Wise Advice fo Afghanistan Panel

Senlis Council offers sound advice for Afghanistan panel

In testimony before the federal government's Afghanistan Panel, Senlis Council president Norine MacDonald offered what the Senlis council feels would be a rudimentary roadmap to success in Afghanistan.

The council recommends the following:

-Shifting responsibility for delivering aid to civilians in Khandahar from the Canadian International Development Agency to the Canadian Armed Forces in the short term.

-Planning CIDA's role in Afghanistan over the medium- to long-term in order to boost the Agency's effectiveness in the region.

-Calling a NATO meeting to discuss sharing of the Afghanistan mission with non-NATO countries, and increasing the troop presence in Afghanistan to 80,000.

-Adoping a "zero civilian casualties" policy to ensure that any and all civilian casualties are prevented.

-Establishing clear objectives and bench marks for security, humanitarian and development work in Afghanistan.

-Lobbying against the chemical spraying of opium poppy crops in Afghanistan, and instead establishing a pilot project using said poppies for pharmaceuticals.

-The establishment of Canadian-Afghan professional exchange and development programs so Canadian civilians may share their expertise with their Afghan counterparts.

The Senlis council recommendations are mostly sound, although they are imperfect. That is, the principles are fundamentally sound, but practicality could become an issue if these policies are hastily implimented in the field.

"What I said to the Manley panel today was that we need a development and aid effort that will actually deliver development and aid when the military has promised that to the locals," MacDonald said. "What we have seen on the ground is really that CIDA is not being effective at all in delivering development and aid. They are not supporting the Canadian military in the way they should."

"CIDA's efforts in Kandahar are so minimal on the ground as to be nonexistent. It's a crisis. We are seeing starving babies and a hospital that is a nightmare. The military could do a better job. The young men and women from Canada would be more than happy to deliver aid to the Afghan people," she added.

While some would dispute the Council's assessment of CIDA's effectiveness -- most notably, the federal minister in charge of aid and development (one may make of this what they wish) -- transferring responsibility for short-term aid to the armed forces will add yet another task to the already-occupied Canadian Forces. Requiring Canadian troops to carry out humanitarian work in Khandahar may require a temporary boost in troop deployment -- think of it as a "humanitarian surge".

Adopting a zero civilian casualties policy in Afghanistan is actually quite important. However, we need to remember that civilian casualties during war are very much a part of fighting a war, and sometimes are unavoidable -- particularly in situations such as when Taxis refuse to stop at military checkpoints.

As a general operating principle, however, we simply must do everything we can to avoid such casualties whenever possible.

Other than these minor issues, the Senlis Council has offered some good ideas on changes that can be made to the approach to the Afghanistan mission in order to ensure its success.

"There's a lot things we could do differently that would have a really significant impact on the situation and the stability of the Karzai government and bring our troops home sooner," MacDonald announced.

The Canadian Forces would be well-served to follow the Senlis Council's advice in the new year.

Plenty of Room for Debate on Afghanistan

Honest dissent qualifies as an important form of dissent

In the increasingly politicized, polarized and partisan political climate surrounding Afghanistan, honest debate has indeed become a rare occurrence.

There can be such a thing.

Rory Stewart, a former British Diplomat and author of The Places in Between, doesn’t think so.

"If you point out that our state-building enterprise is not working, people will quite quickly accuse you of being a reactionary or even a racist,” Stewart complains. “They will try to suggest that if you raise problems, you're being denigrating towards Afghans, that you're not respecting the sacrifice of the troops.”

"Anybody engaged in this debate comes under a lot of pressure from the military, from diplomats and from the Afghan government itself to try to suggest that everything is going well when it's not,” he concludes.

To this sense, he may be right. Perhaps the pressure being applied by proponents of the Afghanistan has been a little intense, but to this end, the pressure being applied by opponents of the mission has been no less so.

The finger of blame, which actually must be shared equally, aside, we as Canadians need to make more room for honest debate on the Afghanistan issue. Fortunately, this is where people like Stewart come in.

For his part, Stewart feels that NATO is in over its head in Afghanistan.

"NATO has set itself up for failure by taking on far more than it could possibly achieve,'' he announced during a recent visit to Ottawa.

"Canada's great challenge,” according to Stewart, “is to identify three or four things that could realistically be done with the kind of resources, commitment and will that we have. And to make sure we achieve them in a way that leaves Canadian people feeling proud, NATO feeling that it's done something and, most important of all, the Afghans feeling that they've gotten something out of this intervention.''

Stewart has suggested that NATO resort to a tactic similar to that which the United States used in Vietnam: holding the major cities with conventional forces, while using special forces to hunt insurgent forces in the countryside.

When one considers the historical state of affairs in Afghanistan, this almost makes sense. Historically, Afghanistan has only ever been successfully governed via a strategy often referred to as “encapsulation”, whereby a government maintains control of the easily-governed cities, while conceding control of the countrysides to the tribal jurgas that essentially rule the smaller villages and rural areas.

It’s a model whereby sovereignty is claimed over these outlying areas only officially, but actually exercised by the jurgas in return for government deferral to their localized authority.

Yet, this governmental strategy is what has led to Afghanistan becoming what it was prior to the post-9/11 invasions, and to this day: a country, incompatible with central government, without ability to assert sovereignty throughout its territory, and with porous, uncontrolled borders. Really not so much a failed state as a non-state: one that, in the ways that we define modern states, has actually never existed, except as a portion of land drawn in and labeled on a map.

Stewart may be right when he suggests that NATO may have to focus on state-building efforts in the north of the country, while negotiating with the southern jurgas in order to allow them to govern Khandahar and Helmand as they will.

With a preference for the Pashtun tribal codes of justice (as opposed to the sharia the Taliban would prefer to impose) as well as secure in already possessing what they want, the jurgas would have little need for the Taliban, and may well ally with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who shares no great love of the Taliban) against them. (Then again all this is merely a visit to the specularium.)

In a mission that needs to be defined for the future, people like Rory Stewart are actually offering the most valuable form of support: an honest concern about the nature of the mission, and should be engaged on the basis of those opinions, not merely on empty demands for unconditional or absolute support of the mission.

Scheuer's Analysis Useful in Continuing Definition of Afghanistan Mission

Canada needs to adjust its goals in Afghanistan

Hindsight is always 20/20.

It’s in this sense that the sharp vision of Michael Scheuer, the author of In Our Enemies’ Eyes should be very much appreciated, even if his observations have come four years too late to make the important difference.

According to Sheuer, Canada and NATO have devoted too few forces to the war in Afghanistan, underequipped them, and given them too many tasks to accomplish.

"They (the soldiers) have to keep Karzai's government in power, they have to defeat the Taliban insurgency, they have to reconstruct the economy, they're supposed to build a democracy, they're assigned to eradicate the heroin industry, and in their spare time they can go after bin Laden,” Scheuer notes.

It’s fair comment.

Sheuer has a very strong point when he refers to what he describes as the lack of focus in the Afghanistan mission (though it may better be described as “overburdening”).

What eventually occurs is a further complication of the Afghanistan mission. Even if the Canadian public could be coaxed into a greater level of support for the mission, we as Canadians still need to continue to define what the mission in Afghanistan is going to be. In that sense, we need to address what our responsibilities in Afghanistan are, what our needs are, and what we are capable of accomplishing.

Expecting Canadian troops on the ground in Afghanistan to democratize that state we must reject as a goal of the mission. Only twice in all of human history has democracy effectively been imposed upon countries with no democratic tradition – in post-WWII Germany and Japan. As Benjamin Barber notes, the defining factor in the success of imposing Democracy on these two states had more to do with the exhaustion of having just exited a 50-year era of imperial warfare, coupled with the reality of possibly having to face it with no support from allies, and sharing only tense international relations with other countries.

Afghanistan does not share this in common with Germany and Japan. First off, the majority of Afghanistan’s struggles have always dealt with some form of internal dischord, be it struggling against unwelcome occupiers such as Britain or the Soviet Union (as opposed to the current state of affairs where non-Pashtun Afghans support the presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan), or civil struggles between Afghanistan’s Pashtun majority and its assorted minorities.

While Germany and Japan’s defeats were the defeat of while-defined countries at the hands of equally well-defined opponents, many Afghans cannot even agree on how to define their country in the first place. (This is one of the reasons why a naturally-occurring partition of Afghanistan along tribal lines may be inevitable).

One cannot impose democracy on a state that cannot define itself. Furthermore, as Barber would remind us, we cannot expect to impose on Afghanistan democratic institutions that have taken centuries in the rest of the world to develop it. It shouldn’t be considered Canada’s responsibility to build a functioning Afghan democracy, and we certainly can’t do that at the barrel of a gun.

What can be done at the barrel of a gun is provide Afghans an opportunity to either embrace democracy or reject it, by their own accord, rather than by the decree of an Islamic theocracy. Our troops should not be in Afghanistan to build a democracy, but rather to afford Afghans the opportunity to build their own.

Likewise, rebuilding the Afghan economy is not the responsibility of Canadian troops. That, also, should be considered the responsibility of Afghans themselves. Just as Barber would remind us that we can’t impose democracy by force, William Easterly would remind us that we cannot impose the free market on Afghanistan. The market institutions (banks, courts, etc) that organize our economy have, like our democratic institutions, taken centuries to develop. We cannot transplant those institutions into Afghanistan by force, but we can use force to afford them the opportunity to develop such institutions on their own.

Both of these tasks requires fighting the Taliban, and preventing them from imposing their theocratic rule over those Afghans who do not want it. (Although we may eventually have to accept the establishment of a theocracy over those Afghans who prefer it.)

There is no question that Canada is using force in Afghanistan. What we need to define is how and why we are using that force, and even while “aggression” remains an ill-defined explanation for that use of force, the belief that we will transform Afghanistan into the spitting image of a western democracy is not only out of touch with the on-the-ground realities in Afghanistan, but is the height of hubris: a form of postmodern imperialism.

It has long become an accepted fact among observers of the Afghanistan conflict that NATO has not placed enough troops on the ground to stabilize Afghanistan. Although we typically win when engaging the Taliban, there are not sufficient NATO troops on the ground to secure what has been won. The return of the Taliban to the previously-cleared Panjwar district is evidence enough of this.

More troops are needed on the ground in Afghanistan. Unfortuantely, the ill-advised and unnecessary war in Iraq (which has also served to poison the public opinion environment against Afghanistan) has severely stretched the military resources of the two premier countries wherein the political will to commit to the War on Terror exists. This being the United States and Britain.

This has become something of a catch .22 for supporters of the war in Afghanistan. Even if one rejects the war in Iraq (and there is much cause to do so), one must recognize that the danger argued to be present in Iraq before the 2003 invasion certainly exists there now.

Even though Iraq’s relationship to Al Qaida and other terrorist groups prior to the American invasion was close to non-existent (most Islamic terrorists despised Saddam Hussein as a socialist, and hated his brutal treatment of Shi’ite clergy), Iraq certainly is a breeding ground for terrorists now.

While it may be tempting to see an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq as a boon for the war in Afghanistan (making more forces available to fight the Taliban), one must remember that, unfortunately, an American defeat in Iraq would be as disastrous for the War on Terror as defeat in Afghanistan.

While the United States has certainly managed to turn Iraq into a threat vis a vis terrorism, this doesn’t undermine the fact that this threat exists nonetheless.

Perhaps the greatest failure of the Afgnaistan mission is the failure to properly equip our troops. Consider the case of the late delivery of anti-IED (improvised explosive device) multivehicle systems designed to locate and disarm roadside bombs. While IEDs have been killing Canadian troops at an unacceptable rate for more than a year, these systems will not be delivered to Canadian forces until later this year.

To point partisan fingers over this failure – as some are prone to do – would be improper: even though the Liberals sent Canadian troops into Khandahar without this equipment, the Conservatives certainly haven’t moved fast enough to get it into the field. No matter how many failures can be attributed to either of the parties that have contributed to Canada’s role in Afghanistan, there are failures that can be attributed to their opponents that are just as bad, or even worse.

Eliminating Afghanistan’s opium industry, while appearing to be a common-sense solution to a Afghan problem with street-level Canadian implications, would actually be a mistake. If anything, Afghanistan’s opium industry actually presents an opportunity in terms of manufacturing pharmaceutical drugs – particularly painkillers. While the transition between street narcotics and pharmaceutical drugs presents an excellent solution to this problem, we must remember that it remains the responsibility of the Afghan people themselves to make that transition. We can certainly provide help to this end, and encourage them to make this change, but the transition itself must be made by Afghans.

The definition of missions such as the war in Afghanistan rarely remain static. They change because the natural state of war is unpredictable, and requires such changes. As the scope of the Afghanistan mission changes, so much the Canadian approach.

Michael Scheuer’s recent comments should not discourage Canadians from staying the course in Afghanistan. They should, however, encourage us to accept this critical juncture in the war to adjust our approach in Afghanistan, address the problems as they appear, reassess our responsibilities in the matter, and approach them accordingly.

Scheuer's analysis would have been useful if rendered much sooner. Hindsight, however, is always 20/20. With a little foresight, we need not find ourselves in a position where we’re using that 20/20 vision in regret.

Lack of Parliamentary Consensus Need Not End Mission

Canada needs to define mission beyond 2009

Many opponents of Canada's mission in Afghanistan must feel as if they have won some sort of victory today, as Liberal Leader Stephane Dion has denied that the parliamentary consensus necessary for the mission to continue will never exist.

"The prime minister has said that he needs to have a consensus in order to extend the mission beyond February of 2009," Dion said. "This consensus will never exist."

While Dion may be forgetting the May 17, 2006 vote in which 24 Liberal MPs (led by Dion's deputy leader Michael Ignatieff) voted in favour of extending the mission to 2009, that lack of consensus may not be the end of the world -- or the mission.

In fact, it could serve as an opportunity to have an important debate about the definition of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan beyond 2009.

While the Afghanistan mission is pivotally important to the security of Canada and virtually all of its NATO allies, it is also important to continue to plan the mission for the future.

Stephen Harper's conceded "end of the mission in 2009" in the absence of parliamentary consensus may seem like an abandonment of the mission, and Canada's security interests in the region -- an abandonment perpetrated out of political motives. Fortunately, however, it is ambiguous enough to support continued Canadian involvement in the larger mission, even if Canada withdraws from the combat mission in Khandahar.

From a pragmatic sense, this is a sound move. Currently, Canadian and British troops are fighting the most dangerous mission in Khandahar and Helmand provinces. 2,500 Canadians have reportedly been charged with patrolling a 54,000 kilometer area. According to Major General (ret) Lewis Mackenzie, this has enabled a relatively small group of Taliban insurgents to stalk Canadian troops, largely at their leisure, due to the lack of ability to secure the countryside. According to McKenzie, NATO needs to increase its presence in Khandahar four-fold -- a far cry from immitation of George Bush's "surge" in Iraq.

Ideally, NATO countries should be taking turns alternating between combat engagements in the unsecured south, and relatively safe rebuilding efforts in the north. Unfortunately, it seems all too few countries are willing to pay the necessary price in terms of casualties.

"I'm really getting upset with an alliance that's supposed to be one for all and all for one. It doesn't look that way," fumed McKenzie.

NATO, and all the countries involved in it, need to make important decisions regarding the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. Canada, Britain and the United States cannot go it alone in southern Afghanistan.

Canada, for one, once had a reputation as a country that doesn't pull its weight in international missions. With its involvement in Afghanistan, Canada has boldly returned to prominence on the global stage. Whether or not our so-called allies will live up to their responsibilities in Afghanistan, or accept replacing Canada as the world's alleged social loafer has yet to be seen.

Canada has been pulling its weight in Afghanistan. But no country can remain on the offensive forever. Canadian troops need to withdraw from Khandahar in 2009, and return to the north. Canada needs the time to rearm, reequip and rest its soldiers. Afghans in the North need the extra help rebuilding.

For all of this to happen, NATO needs to step up to the plate.

Even if Canadian troops do withdraw into northern Afghanistan, a return to the south in case of an emergency should not be ruled out. In the absence of such an emergency, however, Canadian troops should be refocused on rebuilding efforts for a period of at least three years -- even the NDP would support that.

After that, however, Canada should be prepared to return to the combat mission for another three years, if necessary.

In the meantime, even a limited embrace of Jack Layton's diplomatic measures couldn't hurt. While this insistence that "a comprehensive peace process must include all combatants, all elements, all countries involved in the region with international leadership," falls well short of being an acceptable solution -- no talks should include the terrorist-harbouring Taliban regime -- making a greater effort to bring non-Taliban insurgents in from the metaphorical cold can only make important steps toward the success of the mission.

Canada cannot afford to withdraw from Afghanistan and allow the aforementioned terrorist-harbouring Taliban regime to return to power.

As such, victory in Afghanistan is still a long time -- and a lot of hard work -- away. Hopefully, victory for the "Canada out of Afghanistan now" crowd will be at least as far.