Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 06, 2011
Total War... It's Hard on the Kids
Apparently "young adult invasion" is actually considered a literary genre in some corners.
Written by John Marsden, Tomorrow: When the War Began is a novel, set in Australia, pitting a band of teenagers against professional soldiers for the control of Australia.
The film opens in very WB-esque fashion, with Ellie Linton (Caitlin Stasey) and six firends camping in a secluded corner of Australia. Upon returning to their homes, they find their families missing, the power shut off, and the phone lines dead.
In time, they learn the harrowing truth: Australia has been invaded by "the Coalition", a group of Asian countries (which may or may not include China). Their families are being held in internment camps.
They eventually learn via radio broadcasts that the Coalition has invaded Australia for its territory. They eventually conclude they really have only one option: fight back.
It's a remarkably similar scenario to that presented in Red Dawn: one in which an ordinary day at school is suddenly interrupted by the landing of Soviet paratroopers in the schoolyard. The mid-western United States has been overrun by a communist invasion.
Former football hero Jed (Patrick Swayze) lead a rag-tag collection of teenagers to become a battle-hardened guerilla unit.
Throughout each film, the horrors of the war take a deep psychological toll on the youths. In Tomorrow, Ellie nearly kills stoner Chris Lang (Andy Ryan) when he falls asleep while he's supposed to be keeping watch for Coalition patrols. In Red Dawn, Robert (C Thomas Howell) sends the surviving members of their unit -- those not killed by enemy action or killed for betraying their friends -- back across allied lines without himself and Jed, noting that the two of them are "all used up".
In Tomorrow and Red Dawn each group has at least enjoyed the benefit of ever having had the opportunity to be kids. Many of the youths involved in total wars today are not nearly so fortunate.
Total war, of course, is the condition of all-encompassing warfare between two groups. Throughout Africa, many ongoing civil wars -- including the ongoing conflict in Libya -- are total wars. There is no real distinction between combatants and non-combatants: everyone is a target.
The psychological effect of total war on children is undeniably striking. But if the west thinks that total war is only an issue in the most remote reaches of Africa, they're wrong.
There are forces waging total war against the western world today, and they very much are recruiting their own children in their war against the west. Al Qaida and the Taliban have press-ganged young girls into cells of suicide bombers. In Pakistan, "suicide bomber" has become a children's game.
These cells of child terrorists can't strike at the west in our backyards -- just yet. In the meantime, Al Qaida and the Taliban have settled for using these suicide bombers to target and intimidate their own people.
Just imagine what the total war Al Qaida and the Taliban are waging against civilized values are doing to those children.
Regardless of whether the war would actually be fought on US soil, Australian soil, in Africa, or in Afghanistan and Pakistan, total war is always hard on the kids.
Thursday, November 04, 2010
Creating the Monster?
Released in 1988, Rambo III was a statement.
There's a brazen Cold War character to the film: set in Afghanistan, it was filmed while the Soviet occupation was still ongoing. The production of the film amounted to Americans rubbing salt in wounds that the Soviets were still suffering -- it's tantamount to the Soviet Film Ministry producing a film about the Vietnam war during the early 1970s.
Rambo III finds John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) completely adrift, reduced to using skills, honed fighting the Vietnamese, as a pit fighter in Thailand.
Colonel Samuel Trautman (Richard Crenna) approaches Rambo with another mission: to travel into Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and help the Mujahideen drive out the Soviet occupiers.
At first Rambo declines until Trautman is captured by the Soviets. Rambo must reprise his mission to rescue his last remaining friend.
Rambo travels alone to Peshawar where he makes contact with the Muhajideen and leads them in their fight against the brutal Colonel Zaysen (Marc de Jonge). At first the Mujahideen doubt him, but his skills help them put the Soviets on their heels.
By the film's end, Rambo has rescued Trautman and returns with him to the United States, leaving the Afghans to continue their fight. History knows how the war ended -- with the Soviet Union retreating from Afghanistan. However, the film ends with a tributary message to the people of Afghanistan.
Many have looked to Rambo III as evidentiary either of western naivete toward Afghanistan now, or western naivete toward Afghanistan in the 1980s. Take your pick.
Of course, the argument that American support for the Mujahideen helped create the Taliban is categorically false. The Taliban didn't exist as a political or paramilitary force until later in the 1990s. Moreover, the Taliban originated in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.
This isn't to say that the abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal -- leaving the country destitute and desperate -- didn't help foster an environment that allowed the Taliban to come to power, and Al Qaeda to flourish.
So did the United States create the monster of Talib Afghanistan? It seems that the answer is a combination of yes and no.
This doesn't necessarily provide the answer as to whether or not western troops belong in Afghanistan right now. However, it does point to important considerations moving forward.
NATO must not lose its appetite to help defeat the Taliban. Equally important is not to slack off on nation-building after the Taliban is finally gone.
Otherwise, we simply risk creating another monster.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Al Qaeda,
Movies,
Osama Bin Laden,
Rambo III,
Taliban
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Medal of Honor: Digital Dilemma
With Medal of Honor set for release in less than two months, the most recent edition of the game is becoming more and more controversial -- and for good reason.
The game is set in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. More shockingly, the game's multi-player mode allows players to assume the role of the Taliban and fight NATO troops.
It's a provocative and challenging element of the game, and has naturally elicited some strong reactions from political leaders in countries currently involved in the war.
"The men and women of the Canadian Forces, our allies, aid workers, and innocent Afghans are being shot at, and sometimes killed, by the Taliban," fumed Defence Minister Peter MacKay. "This is reality. I find it wrong to have anyone, children in particular, playing the role of the Taliban. I'm sure most Canadians are uncomfortable and angry about this."
Britain's Minsiter of Defence, Liam Fox, took an even stronger stand; he wants the game banned, or at least boycotted.
"At the hands of the Taliban, children have lost fathers and wives have lost husbands," Fox spat. "I am disgusted and angry. It's hard to believe any citizen of our country would wish to buy such a thoroughly un-British game.
"I would urge retailers to show their support for our armed forces and ban this tasteless product," he concluded.
A certain level of disgust with Medal of Honor may well be warranted.
Call of Duty: Worlds at War has already taken the nearly-unprecedented step of allowing players to play as Nazi Germany during its multi-player mode. It goes without saying, however, that it's no longer the 1940s, and that Canada is no longer at war with Nazi Germany.
(Thanks to Canada and its World War II allies, Nazi Germany no longer exists.)
In an electronic medium that has already allowed players to play as the most evil regime of the 20th century, it was only a matter of time before they had the opportunity to fill the shoes of the some of the runners-up.
Banning or boycotting Medal of Honour isn't really the answer.
For one thing, if the game presents an honest depiction of the Taliban and its tactics, the game could remind those who play it of exactly what is currently being fought in Afghanistan: theocratic tyranny at its most savage.
A suitably honest depiction of the Taliban will make it difficult for even today's tuned-out generation of video gamers to turn a blind eye to their true nature.
It's worth repeating that in the storyline mode of gameplay, the Taliban will remain the villain. Left-wing peacenik fantasies don't translate very profitably into combat-oriented video games.
Playing as the Taliban in multi-player mode wouldn't symbolize any sympathy for the Taliban or its goals. And for the prospect of turning video gamers on to the resolute evil of the Taliban, it's well worth the perversity.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Censorship,
Liam Fox,
Medal of Honor,
Peter MacKay,
Taliban,
Terrorism,
Video Games
Monday, August 16, 2010
Don't Forget Iran, but the Real Nuclear Threat Will Be Pakistan
In 1995, Crimson Tide presented a scenario to the world that seemed alarmingly possible.
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia had done a poor job of securing its nuclear arsenal. With Boris Yeltsin, occupying the Russian Presidency, no strong leadership existed to contain the threat of rogue elements within the Russian military seizing control of nuclear arms and using it for their own ends.
As a conflict with separatist Chechens stoked nationalist fires in Russia, the threat seemed to continually grow until Vladimir Putin ascended to the Presidency.
Putin has critically undermined the fragile Russian democracy. But he brought stability and cohesion to the Russian military.
In the film, Lieutenant Commander Ron Hunter (Denzel Washington) is chosen by Captain Frank Ramsey (Gene Hackman) to be the executive officer of the USS Alabama, a nuclear submarine being deployed to act as a preemtive strike force in the event that a rogue Russian general attempts to launch nuclear weapons he has seized control of.
The secnario deteriorates while the Alabama is at sea, and they receive orders they would otherwise consider unthinkable: they are to launch their missiles to preemptively destroy missiles which reports have indicated are being fuelled for launch.
However, in the midst of an encounter with a Russian attack sub, an Emergency Action Message to the Alabama. They are left with a message fragment that could indicate an order to fire at different targets, or to abort launch.
Hunter insists that the Alabama must reestablish radio contact to confirm its orders. Ramsey is adamant that, in absence of new orders, the orders to launch stand.
Each man is weighing different sides of a nuclear holocaust. If Ramsey is right, Russian rebels are preparing to fire nuclear weapons at the United States, and must be stopped. If Hunter is right, the Alabama risks setting off a nuclear war that otherwise won't happen.
The chances of such a scenario playing out in Russia today are coparatively remote.
While increasing tension surrounding Iran's nuclear program have stoked fires of nuclear conflict, the more likely scenario is that Pakistani nuclear weapons fall into the hands of the increasingly-active Pakistani Taliban, or perhaps even by rogue elements of the Pakistani military itself.
In the Crimson Tide secnario, it's inferred that the rebel general is leaked nuclear launch codes from within the Kremlin itself.
In a Pakistani scenario, it's most likely that, if leaked to the Taliban, any codes necessary to launch nuclear weapons would be handed over directly by the ISI.
As the security climate in Pakistan continues to deteriorate, it's more and more likely that the Crimson Tide scenario will be played out in Pakistan rather than Iran or Russia.
While Iran's nuclear program very much does pose a theat to global peace, it's the weapons that Pakistan already possesses that may pose the greatest threat to global peace and security.
No one in their right mind likes it. But so long as any prospect, whatsoever, remains of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of malevolent forces, the capacity to launch preemptive nuclear strikes will remain necessary.
Labels:
Crimson Tide,
Movies,
Nuclear Weapons,
Pakistan,
Taliban,
Terrorism
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Olympic Ceasefire a Nice, But Unfeasible, Idea
Taliban would stand to gain from spoiling Canada's Olympic party
As much as they are said to be a symbol of peace, the Olympics have actually had an uneasy relationship with war for much of the past century.
In 1936, the Summer Olympics were held in Berlin. At the time it was widely known that Nazi Germany was preparing for war. In 1980, the Soviet Union hosted the Summer Games while attempting to stamp out an Islamic uprising in Afghanistan. In 2002, Salt Lake City hosted the Winter Olympics while the United States was already fighting in Afghanistan, and preparing to invade Iraq.
In 1972, terrorists murdered Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympics in Munich. In 1996, the Atlanta games were marred by a bomb explosion that killed two people in Centennial Olympic Park.
Yet despite this uncomfortable relationship with various forms of armed conflict, the Olympic Ceasefire has become something of an Olympic tradition.
The organizers of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics seem to have embraced this particular notion, as an Olympic ceasfire resolution is set to be presented before the United Nations.
Certainly, nobody expects Canadian soldiers to lay down their arms so Taliban insurgents can have their way with them. But this is one time when Canada actually may be better off following the example of former US President George W Bush, who refused to seriously entertain the notion of an Olympic ceasefire in 2002.
In fact, Canadians can expect the Taliban to redouble their efforts to harm NATO soldiers (and Canadians in particular) during the 2010 Olympics, just as they did during the recent Afghan elections.
To cast a dark cloud over the Olympics would be nothing short of a propaganda triumph for the Taliban.
Some may recall the story of Mehboba Ahdyar, the Afghan sprinter who was scheduled to participate in the Beijing games. Despite the numerous social obstacles she had to overcome in order to compete in the Olympics -- obstacles not limited to the Taliban alone -- Ahdyar promised to be a powerful symbol of the progress being made in Afghanistan on issues such as women's rights.
Even though the Afghan Parliament frequently kowtows to the regressive attitudes of many Afghans -- various outrageous pieces of legislation have threatened to legalize rape within marriage, among other atrocities -- Ahdyar was already a symbol of how far Afghan women had come since the removal of the Taliban from power, as she had participated in and won several competitions in Afghanistan. Such competitions were entirely unheard of under the Taliban, who forbade women from participating in athletic competition.
Ahdyar's story, however, took a disappointing turn when she fled to Norway to seek asylum.
Ahdyar's story failed to turn out to be the feel-good tale about the advancement of women's rights in Afghanistan that it could have been. However, it continues to teach lessons about precisely how regressive the Taliban truly is, and why it cannot be allowed to re-assume power in Afghanistan.
Having already marred one Olympic story with death threats and intimidation, the Taliban will certainly be eager to seize the opportunity to further marr an event that stands for everything they stand against.
But as powerful as the symbolism of killing a mass of Canadian soldiers during the Vancouver Olympics could be for the Taliban, continuing to fight the Taliban in the name of democratic freedom and human rights would be a much, much stronger symbol for Canadians.
That alone makes the idea of an Olympic ceasefire a little absurd. As nice as the idea is, one simply doesn't extent courtesies to an enemy that they know the enemy will not return.
"Basically, I think it's ridiculous - if there were any sense of self-respect or realism, [Defence Minister Peter MacKay] would say, 'Don't be absurd,'" says University of Calgary Political Scientist Barry Cooper. "It's the sort of thing that only a bureaucrat would think was meaningful."
It's a nice enough idea in practice. But Canada stands to gain too much by continuing to fight the Taliban during the Olympics, and stands to lose too much by relenting.
As much as they are said to be a symbol of peace, the Olympics have actually had an uneasy relationship with war for much of the past century.
In 1936, the Summer Olympics were held in Berlin. At the time it was widely known that Nazi Germany was preparing for war. In 1980, the Soviet Union hosted the Summer Games while attempting to stamp out an Islamic uprising in Afghanistan. In 2002, Salt Lake City hosted the Winter Olympics while the United States was already fighting in Afghanistan, and preparing to invade Iraq.
In 1972, terrorists murdered Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympics in Munich. In 1996, the Atlanta games were marred by a bomb explosion that killed two people in Centennial Olympic Park.
Yet despite this uncomfortable relationship with various forms of armed conflict, the Olympic Ceasefire has become something of an Olympic tradition.
The organizers of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics seem to have embraced this particular notion, as an Olympic ceasfire resolution is set to be presented before the United Nations.
Certainly, nobody expects Canadian soldiers to lay down their arms so Taliban insurgents can have their way with them. But this is one time when Canada actually may be better off following the example of former US President George W Bush, who refused to seriously entertain the notion of an Olympic ceasefire in 2002.
In fact, Canadians can expect the Taliban to redouble their efforts to harm NATO soldiers (and Canadians in particular) during the 2010 Olympics, just as they did during the recent Afghan elections.
To cast a dark cloud over the Olympics would be nothing short of a propaganda triumph for the Taliban.
Some may recall the story of Mehboba Ahdyar, the Afghan sprinter who was scheduled to participate in the Beijing games. Despite the numerous social obstacles she had to overcome in order to compete in the Olympics -- obstacles not limited to the Taliban alone -- Ahdyar promised to be a powerful symbol of the progress being made in Afghanistan on issues such as women's rights.
Even though the Afghan Parliament frequently kowtows to the regressive attitudes of many Afghans -- various outrageous pieces of legislation have threatened to legalize rape within marriage, among other atrocities -- Ahdyar was already a symbol of how far Afghan women had come since the removal of the Taliban from power, as she had participated in and won several competitions in Afghanistan. Such competitions were entirely unheard of under the Taliban, who forbade women from participating in athletic competition.
Ahdyar's story, however, took a disappointing turn when she fled to Norway to seek asylum.
Ahdyar's story failed to turn out to be the feel-good tale about the advancement of women's rights in Afghanistan that it could have been. However, it continues to teach lessons about precisely how regressive the Taliban truly is, and why it cannot be allowed to re-assume power in Afghanistan.
Having already marred one Olympic story with death threats and intimidation, the Taliban will certainly be eager to seize the opportunity to further marr an event that stands for everything they stand against.
But as powerful as the symbolism of killing a mass of Canadian soldiers during the Vancouver Olympics could be for the Taliban, continuing to fight the Taliban in the name of democratic freedom and human rights would be a much, much stronger symbol for Canadians.
That alone makes the idea of an Olympic ceasefire a little absurd. As nice as the idea is, one simply doesn't extent courtesies to an enemy that they know the enemy will not return.
"Basically, I think it's ridiculous - if there were any sense of self-respect or realism, [Defence Minister Peter MacKay] would say, 'Don't be absurd,'" says University of Calgary Political Scientist Barry Cooper. "It's the sort of thing that only a bureaucrat would think was meaningful."
It's a nice enough idea in practice. But Canada stands to gain too much by continuing to fight the Taliban during the Olympics, and stands to lose too much by relenting.
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
The Deadliest Terrorist
Taliban judged second best to IRA
For a show that was expected to generate an overwhelming wave of controversy, Spike TV's recent episode of The Deadliest Warrior pitting the Taliban against the Irish Republican Army has actually resulted in a rather meager response.
In a show that compared the training and weaponry of the two organizations -- comparing the AR-18 assault rifle to the AK-47, a flame thrower to an RPG rocket launcher, a landmine to a nail bomb and a slingshot to a bayonet -- the conclusion drawn, via computer simulation, was that the IRA was the superior terrorist force.
The show's analysts judged the AR-18, the RPG rocket, the nail bomb and the bayonet to be the superior weapons.
The results of the show leads one to even more deeply suspect that one of the key mistakes in NATO's prosecution of the war in Afghanistan was the American and British decisions to draw their focus away from Afghanistan and apply it to Iraq. In particular, British forces who had experience dealing with the IRA "troubles" in Ireland would have made for a tremendous asset to NATO operations in Afghanistan.
Then again, there are obvious questions about whether the desert theatre of warfare -- as opposed to the mostly-urban theatre in Ireland -- would have minimized the benefit of the lessons the British learned fighting the IRA.
All the same, the season finale of The Deadliest Warrior leads one to conclude that one of the worst errors made in Afghanistan was getting too ambitious in opening another front in the War on Terror.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Foreign Policy,
IRA,
Taliban,
Terrorism,
The Deadliest Warrior,
TV
Sunday, March 08, 2009
There's the "Taliban", Then There's the Taliban
It's important to know the difference
Ever since Canadian troops began the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the notion of negotiating with the Taliban has been a controversial topic.
Yesterday US President Barack Obama mused that his administration may consider negotiations with the Taliban.
Today Afghan President Hamid Karzai made public his approval with this development.
Considering that it's only a matter of time until certain individuals begin to harp on the subject, it's important to understand precisely what is actually being proposed by this.
While Taliban as become a pervasive blanket term for the entire insurgency in Afghanistan, it's important to understand that there are actually numerous groups that together make up the Taliban.
One of those groups is Hisb-I-Islami, a group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
While Hekmatyar is currently an ally of the Taliban he has, in the past, also been an opponent of the Taliban.
Hekmatyar first rose to prominence during the Afghan-Soviet war. With support from the CIA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Hekmatyar led thousands of Mujahideen against the Soviet Union. However, Hisb-I-Islami had split into two factions at this point, with Khalis leaving to form a rival group.
After the formerly Soviet-backed Kabul government began to collapse in 1992 Hekmatyar attracted the support of most of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. He then seized control of Afghanistan until he and Hisb-I-Islami were driven out.
In 1993 Hekmatyar was invited to be Prime Minister under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. In 1994, however, Hekmatyar left the government and aligned with Abdul Rashid Dostum. An impassed ensued in which Hekmatyar's forces got bogged down outside of Kabul and in frustration shelled the city.
The bitter civil war continued until 1996, when Hekmatyar and Rabbani again agreed to form a government together. Hekmatyar was to be Prime Minister.
The Taliban would sieze control of much of Afghanistan later in 1996. Hekmatyar would flee to Iran, then later return to fight the Taliban.
Hekmatyar has proven a strangely reliable track record in which he continually demonstrates that he is reliably unreliable as an ally. Basically, he fights with any one particular group until another offers him a better deal, then he switches sides.
The deal the Karzai government is offering Hekmatyar right now would offer him an opportunity to go into asylum in Saudi Arabia, then later return to Afghanistan to join the government.
Whether or not this is a better deal than the one Hekmatyar currently has with the Taliban is essentially best known by Hekmatyar and the Taliban.
But one thing is nearly certain: which ever side Hekmatyar decides to align with he will wind up fighting them sooner or later -- much likely more sooner than later. His previous record has shown this.
That being said, having Hekmatyar as part of the government would at least take him off the field of battle for a span of anywhere from a couple of months to a couple of years. One can only imagine what Afghan and NATO troops could do with Hekmatyar's Hisb-I-Islami off of their radar screens for that period of time.
Friday, December 12, 2008
The Need to Know
India, Pakistan need to share intelligence
With the Mumbai attacks clearly dragging India into the War on Terror, cooperation between all of those participating in the war on terror is as important as ever before.
Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay has a special message for India: share your intelligence, particularly as it pertains to the activities of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Eastern Pakistan.
"We'd like to know the extent of their intelligence about Taliban and Al Qaeda activities inside Pakistan," MacKay recently announced, and noted that India now clearly shares this concern. "They [India] are clearly concerned that their own country is vulnerable. We have Canadians on the ground in Afghanistan that have encountered a very determined insurgency."
MacKay noted that India is poised to collect and share such intelligence due to its "proximity to Pakistan, which we know is still very much the home of much of the insurgency inside Afghanistan, and a place where al-Qaeda are making their mark."
This comes as Nalin Surie, India's Secretary of External Affairs, met with MacKay and other Canadian officials to discuss the Mumbai attacks.
India suspects Lashkar-i-Taiba for orchestrating the attacks. Lashikar-i-Taiba is a group that demands the withdrawal of Indian security forces from Kashmir and Jammu. They wish to establish an Islamic caliphate in the two regions.
MacKay noted that India's cultural familiarity with the increasingly tumultuous South Asian region could prove to be incredibly valuable.
"The Indians grasp better than we ever could the tribal nature of Afghanistan, and how that factors into the fighting, some of the allegiances ... in Kandahar, the Pashtun people in particular," he noted.
India would prove to be a pivotal ally in helping secure the region. However, a tripartite security arrangement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India faces challenges deeper than simply getting all three to the table. The challenges also involve establishing an agreement regarding the policing of the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan -- one rendered more difficult considering the disputed nature of that border.
"Quite frankly, that's going to be an enormous diplomatic challenge, given the tribal nature of that area and the fact that neither side recognizes the Durand Line as the actual geographic border," MacKay said.
While tremendously challenging, that particular issue is merely another reason why the security situation in Southern Asia offers an opportunity for Canadian-styled mission diplomacy to yield positive results in establishing a workable security arrangement in the region.
Clearly, firmly establishing a formal border and a policing arrangement for that border is one important feature of that agreement. Intelligence sharing, both between the immediate partners of such an agreement and with NATO, is another.
Helping negotiate such an agreement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India should be considered a top priority of Canada's Defense and Foreign Affairs deparment.
With the Mumbai attacks clearly dragging India into the War on Terror, cooperation between all of those participating in the war on terror is as important as ever before.
Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay has a special message for India: share your intelligence, particularly as it pertains to the activities of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Eastern Pakistan.
"We'd like to know the extent of their intelligence about Taliban and Al Qaeda activities inside Pakistan," MacKay recently announced, and noted that India now clearly shares this concern. "They [India] are clearly concerned that their own country is vulnerable. We have Canadians on the ground in Afghanistan that have encountered a very determined insurgency."
MacKay noted that India is poised to collect and share such intelligence due to its "proximity to Pakistan, which we know is still very much the home of much of the insurgency inside Afghanistan, and a place where al-Qaeda are making their mark."
This comes as Nalin Surie, India's Secretary of External Affairs, met with MacKay and other Canadian officials to discuss the Mumbai attacks.
India suspects Lashkar-i-Taiba for orchestrating the attacks. Lashikar-i-Taiba is a group that demands the withdrawal of Indian security forces from Kashmir and Jammu. They wish to establish an Islamic caliphate in the two regions.
MacKay noted that India's cultural familiarity with the increasingly tumultuous South Asian region could prove to be incredibly valuable.
"The Indians grasp better than we ever could the tribal nature of Afghanistan, and how that factors into the fighting, some of the allegiances ... in Kandahar, the Pashtun people in particular," he noted.
India would prove to be a pivotal ally in helping secure the region. However, a tripartite security arrangement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India faces challenges deeper than simply getting all three to the table. The challenges also involve establishing an agreement regarding the policing of the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan -- one rendered more difficult considering the disputed nature of that border.
"Quite frankly, that's going to be an enormous diplomatic challenge, given the tribal nature of that area and the fact that neither side recognizes the Durand Line as the actual geographic border," MacKay said.
While tremendously challenging, that particular issue is merely another reason why the security situation in Southern Asia offers an opportunity for Canadian-styled mission diplomacy to yield positive results in establishing a workable security arrangement in the region.
Clearly, firmly establishing a formal border and a policing arrangement for that border is one important feature of that agreement. Intelligence sharing, both between the immediate partners of such an agreement and with NATO, is another.
Helping negotiate such an agreement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India should be considered a top priority of Canada's Defense and Foreign Affairs deparment.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Al Qaeda,
Foreign Policy,
India,
Nalin Surie,
Pakistan,
Peter MacKay,
Taliban
Tuesday, September 09, 2008
Taliban Eager to Exercise Its Vote
Taliban ready to support any party willing to accept its endorsement
General Rick Hillier was fond of saying "The enemy has a vote."
As Canada enters its first wartime election in more than 60 years, the Taliban is eager to be the first enemy of Canada to exercise that unofficial and ill-gotten franchise.
In a statement released yesterday, Qari Muhammad Yussef confirmed Defense Minister Peter MacKay's fear that the Taliban would take the federal election as an opportunity to step up attacks on Canadian troops. "Yes, I know that the election is being held in Canada. That is why our attacks on Canadians are increased."
Yussef insisted that a withdrawal from Afghanistan "good for that party and for their nation and for the Canadian people."
"My suggestion for the next prime minister is to withdraw Canadians from Afghanistan," he added. "When any of these party leaders come to power, the first thing they must do is ask the Canadians to come from Afghanistan to Canada."
Certainly, one can expect that Canada's mainstream political parties will unequivocally reject the Taliban's endorsement. Unfortunately, one can't quite put it past the Green party -- proving itself to be nuttier and nuttier as this 2008 election progresses -- to accept the Taliban's support.
Certainly, they would be contradicting their own stated values in order to do so, but -- as previously said -- fringe political parties tend to embrace fringe politics.
Then, meanwhile, there are Canadians such as the craven individual who wrote this.
Unfortunately, there are Canadians among us who are prepared to cave in to the demands of the Taliban, and are willing to abandon their own values in order to do so.
In one sense, it's hard to blame them -- no proper-thinking Canadian likes the prospect of war, and no proper-thinking Canadian is anything other than saddened to see Canadian soldiers killed or injured. Nor is any proper-thinking Canadian anything other than saddened by the civilian casualties that inevitably come with modern warfare.
But one can safely assume that Canadian soldiers will not be voting with the Taliban in their effort to elect a government that will turn its back on Canada's responsibilities to the Afghan people and to the international community.
There is one other thing to be thankful for.
Fortunately, the Taliban's vote doesn't really count.
General Rick Hillier was fond of saying "The enemy has a vote."
As Canada enters its first wartime election in more than 60 years, the Taliban is eager to be the first enemy of Canada to exercise that unofficial and ill-gotten franchise.
Yussef insisted that a withdrawal from Afghanistan "good for that party and for their nation and for the Canadian people."
"My suggestion for the next prime minister is to withdraw Canadians from Afghanistan," he added. "When any of these party leaders come to power, the first thing they must do is ask the Canadians to come from Afghanistan to Canada."
Certainly, one can expect that Canada's mainstream political parties will unequivocally reject the Taliban's endorsement. Unfortunately, one can't quite put it past the Green party -- proving itself to be nuttier and nuttier as this 2008 election progresses -- to accept the Taliban's support.
Certainly, they would be contradicting their own stated values in order to do so, but -- as previously said -- fringe political parties tend to embrace fringe politics.
Then, meanwhile, there are Canadians such as the craven individual who wrote this.
Unfortunately, there are Canadians among us who are prepared to cave in to the demands of the Taliban, and are willing to abandon their own values in order to do so.
In one sense, it's hard to blame them -- no proper-thinking Canadian likes the prospect of war, and no proper-thinking Canadian is anything other than saddened to see Canadian soldiers killed or injured. Nor is any proper-thinking Canadian anything other than saddened by the civilian casualties that inevitably come with modern warfare.
But one can safely assume that Canadian soldiers will not be voting with the Taliban in their effort to elect a government that will turn its back on Canada's responsibilities to the Afghan people and to the international community.
There is one other thing to be thankful for.
Fortunately, the Taliban's vote doesn't really count.
Sunday, August 17, 2008
Open Letter to the Taliban
Taliban issues "open letter" to Canadians
On August 15, the Taliban issued an open letter to Canadians urging them to pressure their government to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
In the letter, the Taliban promises more attacks on Canadians:
It was rather "thoughtful" of the Taliban to send us this letter. Frankly, it would be rude not to write them back.
As such, here is the Nexus' response to the Taliban letter:
On August 15, the Taliban issued an open letter to Canadians urging them to pressure their government to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
In the letter, the Taliban promises more attacks on Canadians:
"Afghanistan has to try to have good relations with you, but if your government continues a reversed policy, the Afghans will be obliged to kill your nationals, in revenge for their brothers, their sisters, and their children. Events such as Logar will happen again, because occupied Afghanistan looks at all actors that are established in the interest of America with an eye of hostility.The letter mentions the deplorable Logar incident in which three female aid workers were ambushed and brutally executed by Taliban fighters.
Therefore, you have to convince your government to put an end to the occupation of Afghanistan, so that the Afghans are not killed with your hands and so that you are not killed with the hands of the Afghans.
The Canadian people have to realize if their sisters, their brothers, and their children are being killed in Afghanistan, it is because of the wrong policy of the government of Canada and their falling under the influence of others when they sent occupation soldiers to Afghanistan.
The Canadian people, when they express condolences for the death of two Canadian women in Logar in Afghanistan, and consider themselves grieved, they have to know that the Canadian forces, under American command, handicap tens among the Afghan people every day to this kind of condolence, and they kill, in addition to men, numbers of women and children, as well.
The Afghans did not go to Canada to kill the Canadians. Rather, it is the Canadians who came to Afghanistan to kill and torture the Afghan, to please the fascist regime of America. Your government did not take into account the national interests of Canada, and did not follow a neutral policy. It sacrificed its national and international respect and standing in service of the interests of America.”
It was rather "thoughtful" of the Taliban to send us this letter. Frankly, it would be rude not to write them back.
As such, here is the Nexus' response to the Taliban letter:
Dear Taliban,
Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter of 15 August.
But upon reviewing the contents of said letter, many Canadians simply have no choice but to say "thank you, but no thank you" to your "generous" advice.
If anything could demonstrate precisely why you cannot be allowed to return to power in Afghanistan, your letter has certainly done so.
First off, given the history of your regime, one has to question your definition of "good relations". Are we to believe that you were maintaining good relations with Canada when you allowed Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to plot the 9/11 attacks which, along with 2,974 other people, took the lives of 24 Canadians?
At best, that was an act of astounding irresponsibility on your part. At worst, it was purely an act of passive-aggression.
Either way, Canadians cannot trust a Taliban regime, and certainly not to maintain "good relations" with us.
We also sincerely appreciated your disingenuous envokation of the Logar incident. If Canadians needed any more proof of what the Taliban thinks of both women and the Afghan people, it would be hard to imagine how. After all, not only do you apparently not understand the difference between aid workers and combatants, not only do you not seem to differentiate between men and women, but you also don't seem to feel any compunctions about assassinating people who have come to Afghanistan in order to help your fellow Afghans.
Not only did you not make an honest effort to fight poverty within your own country, but you're now apparently willing to kill those who've come to help them.
Which, believe it or not, is actually a step down from killing them your yourselves.
Few Canadians will pretend that no civilians have ever been killed in the course of the Afghanistan conflict. But we also recognize that there's a huge difference between accidentally killing Afghan civilians in the course of pursuing the Taliban (or when they fail to respect the rules established to ensure the mutual safety of Afghan civilians and NATO troops) and deliberately targetting them for terrorist attacks.
In fact, if the brothers, sisters, parents and children of those killed in Spin Boldak ever decide they want to take revenge for the deaths of their loved ones, odds are they're going to come after you.
You might want to stop and think about that.
Many Canadians will also remind you that our brothers, sisters and children whom you are killing in Afghanistan volunteered for that job and overwhelmingly support it. The families of our service men and women have also tended to overwhelmingly support the mission.
In short, Canadians are willing to pay the price for ensuring your brutal regime never returns to power in Afghanistan. Appealing to our grief for the loss of those you kill as a motive for capitulation is a poor gamble indeed.
We Canadians who support the mission will honour the sacrifice of our service men and women by continuing to support the cause they believed in -- namely, ensuring that you cannot return to power so you can continue to brutalize, terrorize and denigrate the Afghan population.
Canadians did not go into Afghanistan in order to kowtow to the American regime. Rather, Canadians have gone into Afghanistan because we have recognized a severe threat to global peace and security in your previous regime, and in the potential reestablishment of another.
We do not intent do withdraw from Afghanistan until we've assured that you cannot return to power there.
But we appreciate you taking time out of your busy schedule -- spent devising new ways to kill Canadian troops as well as Afghan civilians -- to talk to us.
But there really isn't much to talk to you about.
In the meantime, you may want to spend your time wondering how many of your allies you can really trust. After all, should NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan tomorrow, who do you think Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is going to look at next?
Just think about that.
Sincerely,
-Patrick Ross
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Al Qaeda,
Foreign Policy,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Taliban
Saturday, March 15, 2008
More Proof That They Just Don't Get It
Let's define "illegal" and "unjust", if we may
If their previous rounds of sparsely-attended protests against the War in Afghanistan weren't embarrassing enough, Canada's "Peace" movement is at it again today, staging protests in 20 cities across Canada.
"This war has nothing to do with the defense of democracy or women's rights in Afghanistan and everything to do with advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region," wrote the Canadian Peace Alliance in a news release. "We reject sending our youth to serve as cannon fodder in Afghanistan, where 78 Canadians soldiers have now died, with hundreds wounded, and even more psychologically damaged in an unjust, illegal war."
But let's define, if we may, the words "unjust" and "illegal".
First off, let's define "illegal". One the principle complaints against the war in Iraq is that it's illegal.
According to Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, use of force against another country is legal if its perpetrated in self-defense or if authorized by the UN Security Council.
The war in Iraq was launched under dubious self-defense claims, and was not authorized by the United Nations. As such, the case for arguing that Iraq is an illegal war is actually fairly strong.
Meanwhile, however, the security and assistance mission in Afghanistan -- in which Canada is participating -- is approved by the United Nations. Thus, under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, the war in Afghanistan is legal.
Of course, it's unsurprising that the "peace" movement can't seem to tell the difference between the two wars.
The other claim made by the Canadian Peace Alliance is that the war is "unjust". Sadly, these people seem to have a very skewed idea of justice.
In the current state of Afghanistan, its armed forces and government, if NATO troops were to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Taliban would almost certainly return to power. Is this really the "just" result that the Canadian Peace Alliance wants in Afghanistan?
The same Taliban who denied education and medical care to women? The same Taliban who engaged in ethnic cleansing? The same Taliban who destroyed priceless Buddhist artifacts in the country? The same Taliban who imposed brutal theocratic government on the people of Afghanistan?
A return to power for the Taliban in Afghanistan is the last thing that would resemble justice for that beleaguered country.
Not only does the Canadian Peace Alliance have a convoluted sense of the legality of the war in Afghanistan, but they have a very bizarre sense of justice.
Which is appropriate enough, considering that their idea of peace is also to allow regimes like the Taliban to continue harbouring terrorists with impunity, allowing them save haven from which to plan their attacks.
The "peace" movement just doesn't get it. They hold the most bizarre and untenable beliefs on legality, justice, and peace imaginable.
If their previous rounds of sparsely-attended protests against the War in Afghanistan weren't embarrassing enough, Canada's "Peace" movement is at it again today, staging protests in 20 cities across Canada.
"This war has nothing to do with the defense of democracy or women's rights in Afghanistan and everything to do with advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region," wrote the Canadian Peace Alliance in a news release. "We reject sending our youth to serve as cannon fodder in Afghanistan, where 78 Canadians soldiers have now died, with hundreds wounded, and even more psychologically damaged in an unjust, illegal war."
But let's define, if we may, the words "unjust" and "illegal".
First off, let's define "illegal". One the principle complaints against the war in Iraq is that it's illegal.
According to Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, use of force against another country is legal if its perpetrated in self-defense or if authorized by the UN Security Council.
The war in Iraq was launched under dubious self-defense claims, and was not authorized by the United Nations. As such, the case for arguing that Iraq is an illegal war is actually fairly strong.
Meanwhile, however, the security and assistance mission in Afghanistan -- in which Canada is participating -- is approved by the United Nations. Thus, under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, the war in Afghanistan is legal.
Of course, it's unsurprising that the "peace" movement can't seem to tell the difference between the two wars.
The other claim made by the Canadian Peace Alliance is that the war is "unjust". Sadly, these people seem to have a very skewed idea of justice.
In the current state of Afghanistan, its armed forces and government, if NATO troops were to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Taliban would almost certainly return to power. Is this really the "just" result that the Canadian Peace Alliance wants in Afghanistan?
The same Taliban who denied education and medical care to women? The same Taliban who engaged in ethnic cleansing? The same Taliban who destroyed priceless Buddhist artifacts in the country? The same Taliban who imposed brutal theocratic government on the people of Afghanistan?
A return to power for the Taliban in Afghanistan is the last thing that would resemble justice for that beleaguered country.
Not only does the Canadian Peace Alliance have a convoluted sense of the legality of the war in Afghanistan, but they have a very bizarre sense of justice.
Which is appropriate enough, considering that their idea of peace is also to allow regimes like the Taliban to continue harbouring terrorists with impunity, allowing them save haven from which to plan their attacks.
The "peace" movement just doesn't get it. They hold the most bizarre and untenable beliefs on legality, justice, and peace imaginable.
Labels:
"Peace" Movement,
Afghanistan,
CPA,
Foreign Policy,
Taliban
Monday, February 18, 2008
Why We Fight
Because the Taliban clearly don't give a shit about the people of Afghanistan
The war on terror is largely about winning the hearts and minds of people in terrorist hot spots around the world.
But as Raphael Alexander points out, the Taliban in Afghanistan need to win hearts and minds too -- although they're going about it in an entirely different manner.
Today, the Taliban targeted a convoy of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan with a car bomb. While wounding several Canadian soldiers, they killed 38 Afghan civilians.
This attack comes one day after a Taliban suicide bomber killed 80 when he detonated himself at a dog fight just outside of Kandahar city.
While today's attack seems to uncover a lack of cooperation between NATO forces and Afghan security operating in the area -- Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid claims that he warned NATO about the known suicide bomb plot and asked them to steer clear of the area -- one thing becomes immediately apparent.
The Taliban doesn't give a flying fuck about the people of Afghanistan. The startling regularity with which they attack their own people is only one more reason to remain in Afghanistan and ensure they don't return to power.
An Islamic extremist's belief that cavorting with Westerners is spiritual pain worse than death is one thing entirely: but if the Taliban cared about the people of Afghanistan, they wouldn't put them at risk unnecessarily, and sure as hell wouldn't attack them directly.
The two attacks -- claiming 118 civilian lives between the two of them -- does underscore a key difference in the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan: our NATO forces have to win their respect and loyalty. The Taliban will settle for fear.
The Taliban don't merely harbour terrorists when they're in power -- they are terrorists when they aren't. It's one of the most important reasons why they must be defeated.
It's another reason why we fight.
The war on terror is largely about winning the hearts and minds of people in terrorist hot spots around the world.
But as Raphael Alexander points out, the Taliban in Afghanistan need to win hearts and minds too -- although they're going about it in an entirely different manner.
Today, the Taliban targeted a convoy of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan with a car bomb. While wounding several Canadian soldiers, they killed 38 Afghan civilians.
This attack comes one day after a Taliban suicide bomber killed 80 when he detonated himself at a dog fight just outside of Kandahar city.
While today's attack seems to uncover a lack of cooperation between NATO forces and Afghan security operating in the area -- Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid claims that he warned NATO about the known suicide bomb plot and asked them to steer clear of the area -- one thing becomes immediately apparent.
The Taliban doesn't give a flying fuck about the people of Afghanistan. The startling regularity with which they attack their own people is only one more reason to remain in Afghanistan and ensure they don't return to power.
An Islamic extremist's belief that cavorting with Westerners is spiritual pain worse than death is one thing entirely: but if the Taliban cared about the people of Afghanistan, they wouldn't put them at risk unnecessarily, and sure as hell wouldn't attack them directly.
The two attacks -- claiming 118 civilian lives between the two of them -- does underscore a key difference in the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan: our NATO forces have to win their respect and loyalty. The Taliban will settle for fear.
The Taliban don't merely harbour terrorists when they're in power -- they are terrorists when they aren't. It's one of the most important reasons why they must be defeated.
It's another reason why we fight.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Plenty of Room for Debate on Afghanistan
Honest dissent qualifies as an important form of dissent
In the increasingly politicized, polarized and partisan political climate surrounding Afghanistan, honest debate has indeed become a rare occurrence.
There can be such a thing.
Rory Stewart, a former British Diplomat and author of The Places in Between, doesn’t think so.
"If you point out that our state-building enterprise is not working, people will quite quickly accuse you of being a reactionary or even a racist,” Stewart complains. “They will try to suggest that if you raise problems, you're being denigrating towards Afghans, that you're not respecting the sacrifice of the troops.”
"Anybody engaged in this debate comes under a lot of pressure from the military, from diplomats and from the Afghan government itself to try to suggest that everything is going well when it's not,” he concludes.
To this sense, he may be right. Perhaps the pressure being applied by proponents of the Afghanistan has been a little intense, but to this end, the pressure being applied by opponents of the mission has been no less so.
The finger of blame, which actually must be shared equally, aside, we as Canadians need to make more room for honest debate on the Afghanistan issue. Fortunately, this is where people like Stewart come in.
For his part, Stewart feels that NATO is in over its head in Afghanistan.
"NATO has set itself up for failure by taking on far more than it could possibly achieve,'' he announced during a recent visit to Ottawa.
"Canada's great challenge,” according to Stewart, “is to identify three or four things that could realistically be done with the kind of resources, commitment and will that we have. And to make sure we achieve them in a way that leaves Canadian people feeling proud, NATO feeling that it's done something and, most important of all, the Afghans feeling that they've gotten something out of this intervention.''
Stewart has suggested that NATO resort to a tactic similar to that which the United States used in Vietnam: holding the major cities with conventional forces, while using special forces to hunt insurgent forces in the countryside.
When one considers the historical state of affairs in Afghanistan, this almost makes sense. Historically, Afghanistan has only ever been successfully governed via a strategy often referred to as “encapsulation”, whereby a government maintains control of the easily-governed cities, while conceding control of the countrysides to the tribal jurgas that essentially rule the smaller villages and rural areas.
It’s a model whereby sovereignty is claimed over these outlying areas only officially, but actually exercised by the jurgas in return for government deferral to their localized authority.
Yet, this governmental strategy is what has led to Afghanistan becoming what it was prior to the post-9/11 invasions, and to this day: a country, incompatible with central government, without ability to assert sovereignty throughout its territory, and with porous, uncontrolled borders. Really not so much a failed state as a non-state: one that, in the ways that we define modern states, has actually never existed, except as a portion of land drawn in and labeled on a map.
Stewart may be right when he suggests that NATO may have to focus on state-building efforts in the north of the country, while negotiating with the southern jurgas in order to allow them to govern Khandahar and Helmand as they will.
With a preference for the Pashtun tribal codes of justice (as opposed to the sharia the Taliban would prefer to impose) as well as secure in already possessing what they want, the jurgas would have little need for the Taliban, and may well ally with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who shares no great love of the Taliban) against them. (Then again all this is merely a visit to the specularium.)
In a mission that needs to be defined for the future, people like Rory Stewart are actually offering the most valuable form of support: an honest concern about the nature of the mission, and should be engaged on the basis of those opinions, not merely on empty demands for unconditional or absolute support of the mission.
In the increasingly politicized, polarized and partisan political climate surrounding Afghanistan, honest debate has indeed become a rare occurrence.
There can be such a thing.
Rory Stewart, a former British Diplomat and author of The Places in Between, doesn’t think so.
"If you point out that our state-building enterprise is not working, people will quite quickly accuse you of being a reactionary or even a racist,” Stewart complains. “They will try to suggest that if you raise problems, you're being denigrating towards Afghans, that you're not respecting the sacrifice of the troops.”
"Anybody engaged in this debate comes under a lot of pressure from the military, from diplomats and from the Afghan government itself to try to suggest that everything is going well when it's not,” he concludes.
To this sense, he may be right. Perhaps the pressure being applied by proponents of the Afghanistan has been a little intense, but to this end, the pressure being applied by opponents of the mission has been no less so.
The finger of blame, which actually must be shared equally, aside, we as Canadians need to make more room for honest debate on the Afghanistan issue. Fortunately, this is where people like Stewart come in.
For his part, Stewart feels that NATO is in over its head in Afghanistan.
"NATO has set itself up for failure by taking on far more than it could possibly achieve,'' he announced during a recent visit to Ottawa.
"Canada's great challenge,” according to Stewart, “is to identify three or four things that could realistically be done with the kind of resources, commitment and will that we have. And to make sure we achieve them in a way that leaves Canadian people feeling proud, NATO feeling that it's done something and, most important of all, the Afghans feeling that they've gotten something out of this intervention.''
Stewart has suggested that NATO resort to a tactic similar to that which the United States used in Vietnam: holding the major cities with conventional forces, while using special forces to hunt insurgent forces in the countryside.
When one considers the historical state of affairs in Afghanistan, this almost makes sense. Historically, Afghanistan has only ever been successfully governed via a strategy often referred to as “encapsulation”, whereby a government maintains control of the easily-governed cities, while conceding control of the countrysides to the tribal jurgas that essentially rule the smaller villages and rural areas.
It’s a model whereby sovereignty is claimed over these outlying areas only officially, but actually exercised by the jurgas in return for government deferral to their localized authority.
Yet, this governmental strategy is what has led to Afghanistan becoming what it was prior to the post-9/11 invasions, and to this day: a country, incompatible with central government, without ability to assert sovereignty throughout its territory, and with porous, uncontrolled borders. Really not so much a failed state as a non-state: one that, in the ways that we define modern states, has actually never existed, except as a portion of land drawn in and labeled on a map.
Stewart may be right when he suggests that NATO may have to focus on state-building efforts in the north of the country, while negotiating with the southern jurgas in order to allow them to govern Khandahar and Helmand as they will.
With a preference for the Pashtun tribal codes of justice (as opposed to the sharia the Taliban would prefer to impose) as well as secure in already possessing what they want, the jurgas would have little need for the Taliban, and may well ally with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who shares no great love of the Taliban) against them. (Then again all this is merely a visit to the specularium.)
In a mission that needs to be defined for the future, people like Rory Stewart are actually offering the most valuable form of support: an honest concern about the nature of the mission, and should be engaged on the basis of those opinions, not merely on empty demands for unconditional or absolute support of the mission.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Foreign Policy,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
NATO,
Rory Stewart,
Taliban
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Fight Against Child Soldiers in Afghanistan Critical to Mission's Success
Camp Okutta campaign underscores critical Afghan issue
“Camp Okutta does not exist.”
“But camps like it exist all over the world.”
This is the tagline for War Child Canada’s newest campaign to raise awareness for the critically important issue of child soldiers.
Using several striking ads as well as the Camp Okutta website, War Child is using this brilliantly-conceived viral ad campaign to attract attention to the issue of child soldiers around the world.
The child soldier issue also has implications for Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan.
In late 2004, UNICEF reported they had demobilized up to 4,000 of Afghanistan’s 8,000 known child soldiers. UNICEF and several other organizations continue to work in Afghanistan helping former child soldiers through education and therapy.
The Taliban has been known to use children as recently as April 2007, when a child was used to behead a suspected traitor.
“Part of the Taliban's strategy is to make Afghan civilians afraid and their attempts to show that everybody is unified against the occupation of Afghanistan as they call it,” says Human Rights Watch commentator John Sifton. “They may have decided that it would be intelligent to use children to somehow show a kind of solidarity with the Afghan people.”
The use of child soldiers in Afghanistan, by both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, has a long history, basically spanning at least the last 30 years of the country’s civil conflict.
While reports of Taliban use of child soldiers (whether as front-line fighters, executioners or merely as indentured support staff) continue, it has been suggested that the participation of NATO troops in the training of the Afghan National Army has prevented the recruitment of child soldiers into its ranks. In 2003, Afghan president Hammad Karzai issued a presidential decree forbidding the recruitment of anyone 22 years old or younger into the ANA.
It should, however, be noted that the Northern Alliance – a group integrated within the current government – has used child soldiers before, sometimes as young as 11 years old. “Our cause is so great that even our children want to join us in fighting the enemy,” one Northern Alliance commander is noted to have once claimed.
Clearly, if Canadian efforts to help demobilize Afghanistan’s child soldiers and keep them demobilized are to be successful, we’ll have to ensure the Afghan government doesn’t regress in its policies regarding recruitment.
One of the most important, factors involved, however, will be the ever-present fight against Afghan poverty. As of 2007, Afghanistan remains the seventh poorest country in the world.
Economic hardship drives children out of schools and into the work force, and military work tends to be most abundant in a war zone like Afghanistan. Pairing micro-economic foreign aid programs with a push toward attracting private sector business into Afghanistan will go a long way toward ensuring Afghan families don’t feel the need to send their children to war.
But it isn’t only Afghan children who have been recruited to the Afghan battlefield as child soldiers. Consider that Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen was only 15 years old when he was arrested while fighting in Afghanistan.
He’s currently being held in Guantanamo Bay.
Cutting off the supply of child soldiers can also go a long way toward defeating the Taliban, making it harder for them to replace their lost fighters on the battlefield. To that end, perhaps the search for – and subsequent demobilization of – child soldiers needs to continue on Canadian soil as well as in Afghanistan.
Whatever the future nature of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan – be it a combat mission or otherwise -- helping to demobilize and rehabilitate child soldiers will be a key factor toward ensuring a successful disengagement.
Even beyond that, it’s just the right thing to do.
Camp Okutta doesn’t exist. Canada needs to ensure camps like it don’t exist in Afghanistan.
“Camp Okutta does not exist.”
“But camps like it exist all over the world.”
This is the tagline for War Child Canada’s newest campaign to raise awareness for the critically important issue of child soldiers.
Using several striking ads as well as the Camp Okutta website, War Child is using this brilliantly-conceived viral ad campaign to attract attention to the issue of child soldiers around the world.
The child soldier issue also has implications for Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan.
In late 2004, UNICEF reported they had demobilized up to 4,000 of Afghanistan’s 8,000 known child soldiers. UNICEF and several other organizations continue to work in Afghanistan helping former child soldiers through education and therapy.
The Taliban has been known to use children as recently as April 2007, when a child was used to behead a suspected traitor.
“Part of the Taliban's strategy is to make Afghan civilians afraid and their attempts to show that everybody is unified against the occupation of Afghanistan as they call it,” says Human Rights Watch commentator John Sifton. “They may have decided that it would be intelligent to use children to somehow show a kind of solidarity with the Afghan people.”
The use of child soldiers in Afghanistan, by both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, has a long history, basically spanning at least the last 30 years of the country’s civil conflict.
While reports of Taliban use of child soldiers (whether as front-line fighters, executioners or merely as indentured support staff) continue, it has been suggested that the participation of NATO troops in the training of the Afghan National Army has prevented the recruitment of child soldiers into its ranks. In 2003, Afghan president Hammad Karzai issued a presidential decree forbidding the recruitment of anyone 22 years old or younger into the ANA.
It should, however, be noted that the Northern Alliance – a group integrated within the current government – has used child soldiers before, sometimes as young as 11 years old. “Our cause is so great that even our children want to join us in fighting the enemy,” one Northern Alliance commander is noted to have once claimed.
Clearly, if Canadian efforts to help demobilize Afghanistan’s child soldiers and keep them demobilized are to be successful, we’ll have to ensure the Afghan government doesn’t regress in its policies regarding recruitment.
One of the most important, factors involved, however, will be the ever-present fight against Afghan poverty. As of 2007, Afghanistan remains the seventh poorest country in the world.
Economic hardship drives children out of schools and into the work force, and military work tends to be most abundant in a war zone like Afghanistan. Pairing micro-economic foreign aid programs with a push toward attracting private sector business into Afghanistan will go a long way toward ensuring Afghan families don’t feel the need to send their children to war.
But it isn’t only Afghan children who have been recruited to the Afghan battlefield as child soldiers. Consider that Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen was only 15 years old when he was arrested while fighting in Afghanistan.
He’s currently being held in Guantanamo Bay.
Cutting off the supply of child soldiers can also go a long way toward defeating the Taliban, making it harder for them to replace their lost fighters on the battlefield. To that end, perhaps the search for – and subsequent demobilization of – child soldiers needs to continue on Canadian soil as well as in Afghanistan.
Whatever the future nature of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan – be it a combat mission or otherwise -- helping to demobilize and rehabilitate child soldiers will be a key factor toward ensuring a successful disengagement.
Even beyond that, it’s just the right thing to do.
Camp Okutta doesn’t exist. Canada needs to ensure camps like it don’t exist in Afghanistan.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Camp Okutta,
Child Soldiers,
Foreign Policy,
Omar Khadr,
Taliban,
UNICEF,
War Child
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