Showing posts with label Canadian History. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canadian History. Show all posts

Thursday, May 19, 2011

What David Davis and Tommy Douglas Have in Common

Workfare

On its face, a comparison between British Haltemprice and Howden MP David Davis and former NDP leader (the late) Tommy Douglas would seem entirely unreasonable.

One is a Conservative Tory MP, defeated by David Cameron in his bid to be Conservative leader. The other was, as leader of the NDP, the father of Canadian healthcare.

One is a former Shadow Deputy Prime Minister. The other is an icon of the Canadian left.

But as it turns out, they each have one thing in common: they both believe in workfare. (Or rather, Davis believes in workfare, and Douglas believed in workfare.)

Recently, Davis suggested that British welfare recipients should be put to work building rural broadband networks.

"A workforce of the unemployed should build the superfast network we need so urgently," Davis remarked. "Building a superfast rural broadband network is largely low-skill – digging trenches, laying pipes, filling them in. Only a small fraction of the cost is in high-tech materials."

Naturally, advocates for welfare recipients -- in both Britain and Canada -- would accuse Davis of barbarism; they would likely compare his proposal to advocating slavery.

When Douglas was the NDP Premier of Saskatchewan, his government implemented workfare. Able-bodied men who were beneficiaries of welfare were required to provide service to the state, often remarkably similar to what Davis has suggested.

It's something that the Canadian left will likely decline to mention when the British left rushes to condemn David Davis. Which makes it all the more worth mentioning.


Saturday, May 22, 2010

A Question of Clarity



In part three of The Champions, Pierre Trudeau's temporary retirement from, and sudden return to, politics quickly gives way to discussion regarding the question that would be asked during the 1980 referendum.

In the end, the question that emerged was not one explicitly about separation, but rather one that asked for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty accompanied by political and economic "association" with the rest of Canada. What emerged was not a notion of sovereignty, but rather the nebulous term of "sovereignty association".

Moreoever, the 1980 referendum promised a second one to ratify whatever agreement Rene Levesque's government could reach with the rest of Canada.

The necessity of such a referendum at all was questioned by many, and with good reason. Quebec's government already had the authority to negotiate nearly anything that it liked with the federal goernment, and with Canada's other provinces.

Pierre Trudeau, who had previously declared Quebec separatism to be dead, didn't intervene until late into the referendum campaign, when it became apparent that Quebec Liberal leader Claude Ryan proved incapable of leading the fight.

Ryan's rejection of political polling was particularly troubling, and led to future Prime Minister Jean Chretien -- who had experience in both federal and provincial politics -- was dispatched to attempt to save the day.

But the absense of Trudeau and his government from the matter of the referendum question was as much a tactical error as entrusting the campaign to Ryan, or Chretien's decision to stay out of the 1995 referendum campaign until late in the contest.

Allowing the referendum question to be decided largely without input from the federal government produced two very problematic questions, one that left many Quebeckers unsure of what they were voting on, and many more deceived.

Eventually, Stephane Dion, under Chretien's leadership, produced the Clarity Act in 1999 -- four years after an ambigious question nearly dismembered Canada during the 1995 referendum, and nearly twenty years after the government should have been involved in the first place.

Moreoever, even in passing the Clarity Act, the Liberals were too late even to that topic. The central ideas of the Clarity Act were effectively lifted out of a previous bill, defeated by the Liberals, introduced by then-Reform Party MP and now Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

While the Liberal Party has long awarded themselves credit for the defeat of the two referendums, they have long evaded the blame for how their complacency on the matter nearly destroyed Canada.

The clarity question could have decided the question of Quebec separatism long before it grew into a decisive theat to Canada.


Thursday, May 20, 2010

The Time to Release Tommy Douglas RCMP File is Now

CSIS refusal to relinquish Tommy Douglas files dubious at best

Writing for the National Post Full Comment, John Baglow -- whose knee-jerk defenses of the most vile indulgences of the far left -- writes about the refusal of CSIS to divulge the files the RCMP compiled on former (and original) NDP leader Tommy Douglas under a freedom of inormation request.

CSIS is refusing to release the files under the auspices of national security. This lacks credulity.

But those who believe the Douglas files will feature any shocking revelations will be sorely disappointed.

Regardless of what Douglas' RCMP file contains, one thing will be certain: it will be a product of its time.

Douglas rose to political prominence at a time when Soviet communism seemed to be an omnipresent threat. Although the Soviet Union would formally be Canada's ally during the war against Nazi Germany -- a war that Douglas, at odds with his pacifist colleagues in the CCF courageously supported -- Canadians of varying political stripes were aware of the threat communism posed.

This included the thousands of citizens of Saskatchewan of Ukrainian descent, many of whom immigrated to Saskatchewan fleeing from Soviet communism and the Holodomor perpetrated by Joseph Stalin the Soviet state.

Adherents to the Greek Orthodox Church proved to be as asiduously opposed to Douglas and the CCF agenda as the Catholic Church and Mennonites. Their suspicion of the CCF brand of socialism did not fester unaided.

The Liberal Party of James Garfield Gardiner exploited Canadian horror at Soviet communism by insisting that the CCF would impliment a similar system in Saskatchewan. The Gardiner Liberals insisted that the CCF would confiscate farms, homes, and the life savings of individuals. They also insisted the CCF would close pubs and churches.

After leaving provincial politics for federal politics -- joining William Lyon MacKenzie King's government as the Minister of Agriculture -- Gardiner worked for the federal Liberals as their Saskatchewan lieutenant. He continued to apply his bag of political tricks -- which reputed to include hiding prohibited alcohol in the homes of political opponents then calling the police -- as a member of King's cabinet, then as a member of St Laurent's government.

It isn't at all unthinkable to suspect that Gardiner may have had a hand in at least the RCMP's post-war attentions to Douglas. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if Douglas' CSIS file contains what could be the first substantial evidence of Gardiner's alleged trickery.

(Then again, considering how smooth an operator history reputes Gardiner to have been, it would be foolish to bank on it. And while John Diefenbaker would smile from beyond the grave, he'll have to save that smirk -- perhaps indefinitely.)

Looking back on Canadian history, it's easy to underestimate the urgency many Canadians felt in opposing communism. While the Communist Party of Canada only ever elected a single MP -- Fred Rose, whose tenure in Parliament was ended by a prison sentence for non-specific charges filed against him in the wake of the Gouzenko revelation.

The Gouzenko affair underscored for Canadians the breadth and depth of the Communist threat, and the pall of suspicion cast by the affair wasn't restricted to Fred Rose. It was also borne by Tommy Douglas and the CCF.

Whatever national security value the RCMP files on Douglas may hold would very likely be tenuous at best. If the files actually are so sensitive, CSIS will need to make its reasoning clear.

(It would be difficult to believe that the RCMP hasn't altered the methods by which it monitors suspected subversives -- be they suspected terrorists or suspected revolutionaries -- in more than 60 years. If the RCMP hasn't, that is a problem in and of itself.

Anyone intending to use the RCMP's Douglas files to retro-actively indict Canadian government or Canadian law enforcement will be sorely disappointed. The RCMP files on Tommy Douglas will inevitably reflect their day and age.

Using those documents to judge the Canada of the 1940s, 50s and 60s will prove untenable. One cannot reasonably judge a country under the threat of communist subversion by the standards of a time when the country is under no risk of it.




Saturday, May 15, 2010

Reconquete La Conquete



Part two of The Champions deals with the famed 1970 October Crisis, and how the actions of the FLQ challenged both Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque on deep politically existential levels.

For Levesque, he had to confront the reality that individuals willing to engage in terrorism existed within the Quebec separatist movement he had built. (They may exist within that movement still.)

For Trudeau, his invokation of the war measures act challenged the values his party allegedly stood for. In the eyes of some, invoking the war measures act was the right move. After all, Canada was facing a terrorist threat, and the government had to do what was necessary to deal with it. In the eyes of others, invoking the war measures act was an unacceptable contravention of civil liberties.

Domestic terrorism poses a deep challenge to any country that must deal with it. The prospect of citizens who don't respect the rule of law in their political maneuvers is deeply troubling not only to those associating with those individuals -- even if unwillingly, as Levesque was -- and to those who have to deal with them.

One can sense how deeply shaken Levesque was when dealing with the prospect of such terrorists within his movement. One can even sense a slight discomfort for Pierre Trudeau as he dismisses the "bleeding hearts" who worry about the prospects of soldiers with guns in Quebec's cities (a deployment approved not by Stephen Harper, but by Pierre Trudeau).

No citizen wants to believe that they should fear their fellow citizens. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why so many countries avoid dealing with domestic terrorist groups. While it struggles to gain any semblence of credibility, groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the Aryan Guard continue t exist in Canada.

While the FLQ doesn't share a common place in the Canadian imagination as the KKK and the Aryan Guard, these organizations have far more in common than they are usually given credit for.

While Canadian law can often be quite eager to designate foreign groups as a terrorist group, that designation is used all too sparingly against domestic groups.

This could be said to at least partially explain how the FLQ was able to survive even after it had committed its earlier criminal acts.

It wasn't until Pierre LaPorte was murdered, and James Cross was kidnapped, that the Canadian government began to really take the FLQ's bid to "reconquer the conquest" as seriously as the threat it posed merited.


Saturday, May 08, 2010

Trudeau, Levesque, and the Spectre of Fascism



The Champions presets the story of Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque, and of the paths that led them to their epic historical confrontation over the future of Quebec within Canada.

While Trudeau's and Levesque's paths periodically diverged and converged, each man had a common ideological denominator: early bruahes with European fascism.

As Max and Monique Nemni note in Young Trudeau, Trudeau wasn't always a federalist. In fact, he grew up admiring fascist leaders like Benito Mussolini and Phillipe Petain. His admiration for fascism was more than merely a passing appreciation of the uniforms, as The Champions seems to suggest.

According to the Nemnis, as a youth Trudeau favoured the creation of Quebec as a decentralized corporatist French-language Roman Catholic state. He even imagined himself returning to Quebec to lead a revolution in its favour.

A great many of the Canadians who have subscribed to the Trudeau political mythology can be quite resentful of this inconvenient truth -- that Canada's prototypical liberal would ever entertain fascist ideas. (One can expect that resentment to be particularly pronounced in certain individuals who loathe Jonah Goldberg's Liberal Fascism, despite not actually understanding it.)

But, as the film points out, Trudeau's flirtation with fascist ideas may have been the fancies of a youth who did not fully understand those ideas. As The Champions points out, his experiences in wartime Europe turned him off from the ideas of nationalism and corporatism -- ideas that had so captivated him in his youth.

Rene Levesque had his own run-in with European fascism. When Mussolini was hung in Milan, Levesque witnessed the dying gasps of Italian fascism.

It's on this note that it should be unsurprising that Trudeau and Levesque were brought together in the struggle against Maurice Duplessis' Union Nationale government -- the closest thing to fascism Canada has ever seen.

Trudeau and Levesque took differing paths in their struggle against Duplessis' government. They both started off using their legal skills in support of labour activism. Following that, Trudeau helped found Cite Libre and Levesque joined the Quebec Liberal Party.

Just as their methods of fighting Duplessis' government diverged, so did their views on Quebec's role within Canada. While Trudeau -- who had since run for and won election to the House of Commons -- chose the path of federalism, Levesque chose the path of separatism and nationalism.

Levesque's decision helped give birth to the modern form of Quebec separatism which has traversed a very thin line between democratic legitimacy and nationalist fascism.




Wednesday, January 06, 2010

Alas, The Arrogance of Fools

"Progressive" pushes outdated concept of Canadian politics

In yet another ill-conceived jab at anyone who dares disagree with her, Enormous Thriving Plants proprietor Audrey II evidently wishes to take issue with the ideas expressed in a not-so-recent video published here at the Nexus.

(Ironically, her true quarrel is with John Ibbitson, but we'll overlook that for the moment.)

Audrey apparently thinks it's amusing to suggest that Canadians vote for their Prime Minister, despite the fact that the realities of Canadian politics -- even if not the theory -- demonstrate it to be the case.

Audrey has a tendency to appeal to the theory of Responsible Government -- the notion that, in Canada, the Governor General, and not the people, decides who the government shall be. After an election, the Governor General invites a Member of Parliament to become Prime Minister, and form a government that can hold Parliament's confidence.

As it appears on paper, this is precisely how Canadian politics is said to function. But unfortunately for Audrey, it isn't the way Canadian politics has functioned in real life.

It's amazing that Audrey would evidently appeal to Canadian political theory as it appears on paper, and so blatantly ignore how it has actually worked in real life. In order to reveal how this is the case, one only requires a perfunctory examination of Canadian history. Moreover, one simply needs to ask themselves this question:

Of all the people who have served as Canadian Prime Minister, how many of them were not the leader of a political party?

The answer, as it turns out, is zero.

Certainly, Audrey could argue that, under the concept of responsible government, as it appears on paper, the Governor General could invite anyone he or she wished to become Prime Minister and lead the government of Canada -- even an Independent MP. Under the theoretical concept of responsible government, as it appears on paper, all that would be necessary is that this individual and their cabinet be able to maintain the confidence of Parliament.

Unfortunately for Audrey, the Parliament of Canada doesn't merely exist on paper. It has to exist and function in a place the rest of us like to call "the real world", and as it turns out, this is a place that Audrey is fundamentally unfamiliar with.

It's the functioning of Parliament and government within "the real world" that separates the realities of Canadian politics from its theoretical foundation, and Audrey's fantasies from that reality.

Seeing as how the long-standing tradition of Canadian politics has been for the Governor General to invite the party that wins a plurality of seats to form the government -- a tradition violated only once, and only briefly, in 1925, after then-Liberal leader William Lyon Mackenzie King and Progressive Party leader Robert Forke formed a coalition government immediately after the general election, and thus before then-Governor General Lord Bing had chosen Canada's Prime Minister -- Audrey has willfully overlooked a basic functional truth of Canada's political system.

Canadians vote for their Prime Minister through the parties they vote for. The marketplace-styled mode of Canadian politics -- especially in the modern era, in which the news media tends to direct voters' attention toward party leaders and a small band of elite personalities within each party -- drives Canadian voters toward choosing parties over local candidates.

In most cases, it requires a major misstep or political scandal for a local candidate to attract any significant national media attention. Except to the politically engaged, local candidates tend to toil in anonymity.

In many cases in Canada, most Canadians could not name any of their local candidates on the day before an election day, although they would be able to identify the party -- and party leader -- they intended to vote in favour of. This shouldn't be mistaken for an affirmative comment on the virtue of this state of affairs -- just a statement of reality.

In other words, most Canadians do not vote with their local candidates in mind. They vote with party brand identity and leadership in mind.

Canadians very much do vote for Prime Minister -- they merely do so indirectly.

Audrey appeals to long-outdated notions of Canadian politics in order to avoid admitting that:

1. As Canadians have nurtured a long tradition of plurality-winning parties forming the government, and

2. As Canadians tend to cast their votes with party brand identity and leadership in mind, and

3. As only party leaders are invited to become Prime Minister and form the government in Canada, therefore:

Canadians vote for their Prime Minister, even if indirectly. And thus the selection process for party leadership -- which John Ibbitson offers a brilliant critique of in Open and Shut -- decides who the candidates for Prime Minister will be.

It's a simple three-step self-indulgent failure in pragmatic political cognition that has led Audrey into a land of folly into which virtually any anti-democratic attitude can be justified -- including Stephane Dion's ill-fated Liberal-NDP-Bloc Quebecois coalition.

It's rather amusing that a so-called "progressive" wants to push a self-serving conceptualization of "responsible government" that not only appeals to long-outdated elements of the Canadian system, but also appeals to a manner in which the Canadian political system has not functioned, and likely never could function.

In being a "progressive", Audrey has evidently forgotten about the key functional word of that concept: notably, "progress".

Moreover, it's actually extremely amusing that Audrey would dare bandy about the very notion of "responsible government", considering what her idea of responsible is:

In Audrey's fantasy world, the Governor General could appoint anyone they personally wished as Prime Minister, regardless of how Canadians voted, or the expectations of Canadian citizens. There is nothing responsible about this, just like there is nothing responsible about mortgaging the Canadian government to a separatist party -- all while concealing the terms of the deal in question from the Canadian public.

In the real world, we have things we call "elections", and Canadians expect Canada's political parties -- not to mention the Governor General -- to respect them. If one needs proof of this, one needs look no further than the public response to Dion's coalition proposal.

A poll taken after Dion's proposal indicated that only 37% of Canadians favoured allowing that coalition to take power immediately. 32% of Canadians preferred holding a federal election, while 24% of Canadians were uncertain.

In other words, whatever Canadians wanted moving forward from the then-potential defeat of the Conservative government, the majority of Canadians did not want the coalition.

When one considers the argument that 63% of Canadians had voted for the Liberals, NDP, Bloc Quebecois and Green Party combined, it points to what should amount, for Audrey, to be a very startling reality: just short of half of the Canadians who voted for those three parties wouldn't support a coalition hastily implemented after a defeat of the sitting government.

In other words, Canadians recognized that the election had been contested, that the Conservative Party had won, that the Conservative Party formed the government of Canada, and expected that if that government were defeated, they would have the opportunity to vote on who will form the government -- again, even if indirectly -- in a new election.

Naturally, this notion offends Audrey's nostalgia for the pure concept of a political system formulated in the 19th century -- when women and non-property owning men couldn't vote, and Canada was still a Dominion of the British Empire. Britain is now a foreign country, and Canada is a sovereign state.

In the end, it's all terribly conservative of Audrey. Conservative in the most extreme. Conservative in the sense that it is less progressive, and more regressive.

Which is actually ironic from someone who so obviously hates conservatives, hates conservatism, and hates each to the extent that she's willing to ignore the realities of Canadian politics so that she may attack it.

But little details like this, amusingly enough, are lost on people who are so arrogant that they believe their willful ignorance of these realities is actually a virtue.



Wednesday, December 23, 2009

This Day in Canadian History

December 23, 1944 - HCMS Clayoquot torpedoed by U-Boat

On December 23, 1944, a German U-Boat torpedoed the HCMS Cloyoquot, a Canadian Navy minesweeper.

The ship was torpedoed by U-806, just outside the approaches to Halifax harbour. The ship's crew would struggle to save it for several hours before it finally sank. Eight Canadian sailors were lost. The remainder were eventually rescued by the HCMS Fennel.

The allied forces in Europe relied heavily on war materiel manufactured in Canada and the United States. As a result, the shipping lanes between Canada and Britain were of paramount importance, and a key factor in the winning of the European war were the efforts of the Canadian navy in staving off the menace of German U-Boats.

Strikes as far deep into Canadian waters as that which sunk the Cloyoquot were made possible by what today seems like an intuitive innovation -- that of the schnorkel, a tube that extended from the U-Boat up to the surface, which allowed it to take in oxygen and expel exhaust, allowing it to stay submerged for longer periods of time.

It seems surprising today that a snorkel was once considered so innovative.

But for such a simple innovation, it proved extremely effective. In some cases, U-Boats were able to embark upon extended voyages in which they remained submerged for up to 65% of the time.

Canadian ships had first encountered U-Boats during the First World War, and had proven unprepared for them. At the time Canada had only one cruiser, and was largely reliant on the British fleet. Broad portions of Canadian waters were designated as part of the Empire's North American and West Indies Station.

To make matters worse, Canada's lone cruiser was actually a relic of a bygone era, only serving to exacerbate Canada's dependence on British protection.

U-Boats operating in Canadian waters during that war were so successful that it was believed that Germany had actually established a secret submarine base somewhere on the Canadian coast.

Despite these successes -- and the hyesteria inspired by the notion of German bases and spies operating in Canada -- the threat of submarine warfare was underestimated, even as the spectre of war again began to stir in Europe.

During the early years of the war, the limited effective range of U-Boats allowed Canadian Frigates and Bangor-class minesweepers (like the Cloyoquot) to provide Canada with comparatively luxurious security against the U-Boat threat.

If the danger posed by the U-Boats wasn't firmly understood by Canadian military brass it was, if anything, possibly exaggerated by Canadian journalists, who made wartime icons of the Gillespie Children of Russel, Manitoba, who survived a U-Boat attack. They also made a martyr of Hamilton, Ontario's Margaret Hayworth, a child who did not. Seafaring Canadians would quickly begin to fear that they, too, could be victims of the heavily-moralized U-Boat threat.

As late as in 1939, it had been recognized that the Canadian navy had been remiss in declining to outfit Canadian ships with SONAR, and that it would have to quickly be acquired in the case of hostilities.

At this point, Canadian military brass had been aware of -- if not appreciative of -- the threat posed by U-Boats.

While Canadian sailors would fight valiantly -- and, in time, very effectively -- against U-Boats, the initial reluctance to recognize the threat cost Canada dearly in the early days of the war. It may not be unfair to posit that the failure of military and political leadership to respond to the U-Boat threat may have even extended the length of the war by months, or perhaps even years.



Thursday, December 17, 2009

This Day in Canadian History

December 17, 1953 - Vancouver's first TV station goes on the air

Television arrived in Vancouver in 1953 when CBUT Vancouver first went on the air.

The arrival of television in Canada would only serve to intensify the ongoing debate about the nature of broadcasting in Canada, and the role of government in the media.

The CBC had already been operating since 1932, when the government of Robert Bennet -- remembered best for the "Bennet Buggies", automobiles pulled by horses for lack of fuel, during the Great Depression -- enacted the recommendations of the Aird Commission. Originally formed as the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, the CBC would operate under the pretenses of ensuring Canadian cultural content would be broadcasted in Canada.

The CRCB built its network out of a collection of radio stations operated by the Canadian National Railway.

In time -- in fact, in just over a decade -- television supplanted radio as the premier source of in-home entertainment for Canadian families. However, television proved to complicate the question of how Canadian cultural content would continue to be guaranteed, as economics and market forcers compelled Canadian broadcasters to begin importing more and more television programs from the United States.

This process would particularly accelerate after the introduction of private broadcasters, such as CTV, operating alongside the publicly-broadcasted CBC. In time, cable and satellite would accelerate this process even faster.

Whether Canadian culture remains sufficient justification for maintaining the CBC is a matter of some question. Private broadcasters, such as CTV, Showcase and Bravo, have trumped the CBC in recent years, producing notable Canadian content like Billable Hours, Corner Gas and Trailer Park Boys, while perhaps the best-known recent CBC production has been Little Mosque on the Prairie.

But even if ensuring that Canadian cultural content remains on the air isn't sufficient justification for continuing to operate the CBC, ensuring that remote communities continue to enjoy the benefit of broadcasting -- especially news and information -- certainly is.



Wednesday, October 14, 2009

The Nobel No Prize

Nobel Peace Prize as much a burden as an honour for US President

As various leftist sychophants continue to preen over US President Barack Obama recently being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the lion's share of the commentary over the matter seems to revolve around whether or not Obama actually deserves the prize.

Almost certainly, he doesn't -- not yet, not even by the specious line of reasoning used by Rachel Maddow.

But even under the questionable reasons given for awarding the prize to Obama -- encouraging him to embrace diplomacy over American force -- the award committee hasn't truly done Obama any favours. In fact, as Andrew Cohen posits, the "promisary note" award may actually prove to be a millstone around Obama's neck.

In many ways, it turned out to be precisely that for Lester Pearson, who received his Nobel Peace Prize before ever becoming leader of the Liberal party, let alone Prime Minister:
"...The prize may have been the worst thing that ever happened to Mike Pearson. To many it turned him into a peacemaker and a pacifist. It conjured up an enduring image of a toga-clad high priest atop a stony mountain, uttering mystical mantras into the winds.

Pearson was just embarking on a feverish decade as Leader of the Opposition and Prime Minister. Twice, in both roles, the prize would come to haunt him.

In 1963, Pearson reversed his party's stand and agreed to accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Canada. It was a political master-stroke that helped split John Diefenbaker's Conservatives and propel the Liberals to power that spring.

But Pearson angered his party's left wing. His critics couldn't believe that a Nobel laureate could countenance nuclear weapons. An angry Pierre Trudeau famously called him 'the defrocked prince of peace' and refused to run as a Liberal that year.

In 1965, as prime minister, Pearson came under pressure to urge Lyndon Johnson to end the bombing of Vietnam. The question arose: how could our poster boy of peace remain silent during the greatest aerial bombardment in history?

Once again, Pearson acted as a conscientious, practical politician, not as a pacifist. He had long tried to contain 'thermo-nuclear weapons,' as he called them, but believed that Canada had to honour its commitment to accept them as a member of NATO, which he had helped conceive and shape in 1949.

He opposed the war in Vietnam and gave a contentious speech in Philadelphia proposing a halt in the bombing. For his trouble he was picked up and dressed down by LBJ the next day. Ever the pragmatist, Pearson then went silent in public, worried about damaging relations between the two countries.
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Pearson's experience demonstrates that the kind of expectations produced by a Nobel Peace Prize win can create expectations that would, if satisfied, permanently divorce that individual from realism. Moreover, observing diplomacy just for the sake of diplomacy can often paint a leader into a corner in which they can't criticize the actions of another country for fear of offending them.

For Barack Obama, the problems of living up to the expectations set for him by a Nobel Peace Prize are obvious. They are the same as the problems of living up to the expectations set for him by the progressive movement that so deftly delivered him to power in the first place.

If Obama continues -- as he must -- to prosecute either of the two wars his country is currently engaged in (and abandoning Afghanistan is simply not an option for him) he will certainly disappoint many members of the global "peace" movement who believe his Nobel Peace Prize should provide the impetus for retirement from the field of battle.

Obama is almost certain to disappoint and anger a great number of people no matter what he does from here on out.

At the very least, however, the Rachel Maddows of the world, suffering from the sycophantic strain of Derangement Syndrome, will still applaud no matter what.

Monday, October 05, 2009

The Achilles Heel of the Liberal Paty?

Jean Chretien's backroom leadership games hobbling party

Followers of Canadian politics as seasoned as Charles Lynch and Allan Fotheringham have long offered an interesting thesis explaining the tenure of the Liberal party as "Canada's natural governing party".

This thesis basically holds that longstanding tensions over the leadership of the Conservative party cost the party its key organizational impetus, allowing a united Liberal party to fill the void.

The machinations of Dalton Camp against John Diefenbaker, Brian Mulroney against Joe Clark, and practically everyone in the party against Richard Bennet is thus argued to continually undermine the party on a national basis -- and especially in terms of its organizational capabilities in Quebec.

This disunity resulted in decades-long periods in opposition for the party, with the Liberal party alternating between majority and minority governments.

Canadian history has now dawned on a new century, and the tables have essentially turned.

Writing in the Toronto Star, Angelo Persichilli suggests that the recent leadership woes of Michael Ignatieff -- particularly having to soothe bruised egos over the Martin Cauchon/Denis Coderre affair -- is actually the work of Jean Chretien, who is perpetually flexing his muscles behind the scenes.

Persichilli draws attention to what is actually a rather important fact: whatever unity the Liberal party has ever enjoyed has been a fragile one. Historically, there have been countless tensions at work within the party: young Liberals pitted against old Liberals and left-wing Liberals pitted against right-wing Liberals.

Over time, these competing dynamics settled into two camps that have quietly been at war within the party.

Persichilli's column suggests that the Liberal party hasn't been fully united since the 1980s when John Turner defeated Chretien for the Liberal leadership. The conflicts that have emerged since -- Chretien vs Martin, Dion vs Ignatieff, Ignatieff vs Rae -- have been reflections of the Turner vs Chretien divide.

This particular divide can actually be found to have deep roots in the Mitchell Sharp vs Walter Gordon rivalry of the 1960s and 70s.

Chretien's success in the 1990s may have led Liberals into the kind of false sense of security that kind precipitate this kind of inernecine tensions. After all, 11 years of uninterrupted majority government can be an extremely heady experience.

Perhaps they believe they've been in a strong enough position that they can afford to infight over leadership.

But Chretien also enjoyed the luxury of facing off against right-of-centre opposition that was divided and left-of-centre opposition that was vulnerable. The Liberal party no longer enjoys this position of comparative strength. The Conservative party is very much a united force (despite what those who choose to pimp reported tensions between Murloney and Stephen Harper would desire) and the NDP enjoys greater confidence and self-assurance than it has since Tommy Douglas retired.

It's in the face of these political conditions that the Liberal party needs to put its leadership question to bed for good.

But therein lies the problem. Michael Ignatieff came to the party leadership not as the result of a genuinely competitive leadership contest, but rather after his principal opponents, Dominic LeBlanc and Bob Rae, were pressured to jump behind Ignatieff.

It should be no great surprise that some Liberals may be covertly organizing their next leadership campaign.

That Jean Chretien would quietly work to undermine the party leadership, however, is and should be viewed as entirely inexcusable.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Antonia Zerbisias: Gun Nutty

Zerbisias has her facts -- and logic -- twisted in regards to gun registry

There's something special about guns in the hearts of Ontarian left-wingers.

Former Ontario Attorney General Michael Bryant famously made waves with his "No Gun, No Funeral" campaign -- which, if one were to argue the matter under the guise of specious hilarity, may have implied that people don't die of natural causes -- in support of a ban on handguns.

When the federal Conservative party declined to jump on board with Bryant's campaign, noting that legal ownership of handguns was already restricted to target shooters, collectors and those who need them for the purpose of their employment, Bryant lashed out rather predictably.

"The Conservatives have long been in the holster of the gun lobby," Bryant fumed. "I say `no gun, no funeral.'"

And he did -- very often.

Despite the fact that the No Gun, No Funeral campaign was operated out of Bryant's campaign office (something his staff had the temerity to deny when contacted), Bryant mustered likewise temerity in insisting that the campaign wasn't part of his reelection bid.

Moreoever than this, however, the No Gun No Funeral campaign was based largely on a very dubious version of the facts regarding handguns, handgun use, and guns in general.

In today's Toronto Star, Antonia Zerbisias took her own turn at offering up specious argumentation in favour of the Liberal party model of gun control.

"The one thing I will never understand about the Conservatives is how they say they can be so down on crime – and yet so up with guns. Some guns, anyway," Zerbisias writes in her op-ed column. "Guns such as that used to murder those four Mounties in Mayerthorpe, Alberta in 2005."

Zerbisias goes on to complain that the Conservative party has moved once again to scrap the federal long gun registry, which would exempt rifles and shotguns from the registry.

Full stop.

God knows that one will never stop Zerbisias from trying to portray the Conservative party as hicks and rednecks, riding in from the cowboy west to force their nefarious gun culture on the rest of the country. But one would think she could at least be a little more honest about the details.

Zerbisias tells Conservative MP Candice Hoeppner to tell the murdered mounties' families that "the long-gun registry unfairly targets our hard-working farmers, hunters and sport shooters, but not criminals."

The problem for Zerbisias is that the Mounties murdered outside of Mayerthorpe by James Roszko weren't murdered using a hunting rifle or a shotgun.

Roszko killed Constables Brock Myrol, Peter Schiemann, Leo Johnston and Anthony Gordon with an HK .308 semi-automatic assault rifle -- the kind of weapon that is already restricted under federal firearms legislation, and will remain restricted even after the long gun registry is repealed.

But if one thought that Zerbisias was being rather liberal about the facts, one just has to wait to see what she does with her logic, when she writes that "fact is, according to Canada's Coalition for Gun Control, one out of three women killed by their husbands is shot, 88 per cent of them by legally owned rifles and shotguns."

Zerbisias declines to note that registering those weapons in no way prevented the murder, lending skepticism to her next claim:

"Fact is, according to Statistics Canada, firearm spousal homicide is down drastically since the gun registry was enforced," seeing as how we've already seen that registration of firearms doesn't prevent them from being used to murder, there is absolutely no justification for parading this particular correlation as proof positive that the gun registry itself has reduced such crimes. The reduction is much more likely due to other forms of gun control introduced since the introduction of the registry, including enforcement tactics.

Antonia Zerbisias may be surprised to find out that many small-c and capital-c conservatives alike support gun control. But, unlike Ontario's power elite and would-be power elite, conservatives prefer methods of gun control that actually protect Canadians, as opposed to metely being a nuisance to law-abiding gun owners.

But don't ask Zerbisias about that. She's still too busy pretending that the Mayerthorpe Four were murdered with a hunting rifle.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

This Day in Canadian History

September 17, 1974 - Puck drops for Summit Series II

When Canada defeated the Soviet Union in the 1972 Summit Series, some notable Canadian players were missing from the lineup.

Team Canada 1972 was iced without Gordie Howe and Bobby Hull. Both were playing in the fledgling World Hockey Association. WHA players had been refused the opportunity to participate in the series.

Following the success of the '72 Series, WHA founder "Wild" Bill Hunter went to work on organizing a WHA version of the series. According to his autobiography, the '72 Series was originally his idea, but he was unable to organize the event until 1974.

In the meantime Alan Eagleson took the idea -- stole it, by Hunter's account -- and organized the '72 Series. Hunter would view Eagleson's refusal -- to the extent of denying Bobby Hull the opportunity to participate despite having been named to the team by Harry Sinden -- as a slap in the face not only to himself, but to his league.

By 1974, '72 series veterans Frank Mahovolich, Paul Henderson, and Pat Stapleton had also joined WHA teams -- Henderson and Mahovolich played with the Toronto Toros, and Stapleton represented Chicago Cougars.

The '72 edition of Team Canada was also the only version to unite Gordie Howe with his sons, Marty and Mark.

The series began inauspiciously for Canada, as they split their home games with the Soviets. They won a single game, lost one, and tied two.

The Soviets had proven to be less gracious guests than they were in 1972, as they raised a litany of complaints about their treatment at the hands of the Canadians -- including insisting their bus had "square wheels".

Upon returning to the Soviet Union the Soviets further ratcheted the psychological tactics against their Canadian opponents. Late-night phone calls were answered only to hear the sound of silence on the other end.

A game in Moscow nearly led to an international incident, as Bobby Hull signed autographs for Russian children. When a Soviet guard struck one of the children with the stock of his rifle, Hull lifted the guard off the ground by the neck. Only the soothing of Bill Hunter was able to stop Hull from harming the guard.

The Canadians also fell victim to extremely partisan officiating by the Soviet officials, as the Soviet Union won three of the games in Russia, winning the series decisively 4-1-3.

As far as a propaganda tool went, the Russians must have been disappointed with their win over a team scraped together from a few NHL stars, a group of seasoned WHA pros, and a collection of players who otherwise would be plying their trade in minor leagues.

In 1972, the Soviets had lost to a team that was not even Canada's best. In 1974, they defeated a team that was even further short of Canada's best.

The series, however, had greater implications than merely its potential to be used as propaganda. After their defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union, the WHA decided to embrace the European brand of hockey.

European players who would play in the WHA included Peter Stastny, Anders Hedberg and Ulf Nilsson. A European-styled player by the name of Wayne Gretzky would suit up for the Indianapolis Pacers and Edmonton Oilers of the WHA.

When the Oilers, Winnipeg Jets, and Quebec Nordiques of the WHA were absorbed into the NHL they revolutionized the stubborn, linear NHL style of play.

In the pages of hockey history, the 1974 Series may not stand as the touchstone the '72 triumph has become, but it was certainly more influential over the development of Canada's game, even if it would be fortunate play second fiddle in the hearts of Canadians.

Saturday, September 19, 2009

The Road to Universal Health Care Begins At the State



Speaking via ForaTV, TR Reid has a message for US President Barack Obama:

You're going about health care reform all wrong.

Reid uses the story of the evolution of Canadian health care as an example of how Obama should develop his own reforms.

As Reid notes, Canadian health care wasn't originally a child of the federal government -- it was a child of the Saskatchewan Provincial government of Tommy Douglas.

Beginning in Saskatchewan, Douglas' program was eventually implemented by the federal government.

Reid does make a few errors in his description of the evolution of Canadian health care. First off, doctors didn't flock from the other Provinces to Saskatchewan begause they "knew they'd get paid". Doctors flocked from other Provinces to Saskatchewan because doctors in Saskatchewan went on strike after Douglas introduced universal health care in that Province.

Nor did universal health care become implemented at the federal level because the other Provinces demanded it -- although the "demonstration effect" was almost certainly a factor. Rather, universal health care was implemented at the federal level because Lester Pearson needed Douglas' support to keep his minority government alive.

(Although Pearson dearly wanted a majority government, he never managed to secure one.)

Universal health care was implemented federally largely incrementally. Tommy Douglas can certainly take the lion's share of the credit, but policies instituted by Louis St Laurent, John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney (among many, many others) contributed to the slow evolution of Canadian health care into what it is today.

It started, however, with the successful implementation of the model in a single province. This is a lesson that US President Barack Obama should take to heart.

Instead of ramming a single 1000-page bill through both the House of Representatives and the Senate (a fool's errand in any case), Obama could instead make additional economic stimulus funds available to states that wish to implement their own form of health care reform.

As Reid notes, this could allow for something of a "policy laboratory" to emerge in various US States in order to find a package of reforms that works for the specific needs of the United States.

As TR Reid concludes, any governor that could plant that first seed of a successful health care reform program could some day be the United States' very own Tommy Douglas -- not only the father of universal health care, but perhaps even win a Greatest American poll someday.

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Navigating Canada's Way Out of Recession Redux

Preston Manning calls for post-recession roadmap

In an op/ed column appearing in the Globe and Mail, Preston Manning writes about the current federal deficit, and compares it to the 14-year quest to put an end to Canada's last deficit.

He argues that a lack of planning undermined efforts to control that deficit, and argues that a plan is needed to tackle the current federal deficit.

The best reason for doing this, he insists, is not necessarily the deficit itself, but some of the unconsidered consequences of accumulating debt:
"To combat the current recession, governments around the world have instituted economic recovery measures breathtaking in their magnitude and scope. These include dramatically expanding the money supply (printing money), taking significant ownership positions in key sectors of the economy and heavily engaging in deficit spending.

Such measures have other significant and long-lasting effects besides stimulating economic growth.

Rapid expansion of the money supply can lead to a tsunami of inflation. Government ownership of businesses can lead to unhealthy dependencies, unfair competition, corporate inefficiencies and serious conflicts of interest when governments must also regulate businesses in which they have an ownership stake. And heavy engagement in deficit spending leads invariably to increased public debt, increased interest payments and the necessity of cutting services and/or raising taxes in the future to rebalance the books.

So what must be done to recover from the adverse effects of these measures?

Let me focus particularly on what might be done to recover from the orgy of deficit spending in which virtually all governments in Canada are now engaged.
"
Manning notes that the 14-year struggle to end balance the budget and begin paying down debt stemmed from not a lack of a coherent plan:
"At the federal level, Canada's last big deficit-spending binge began in the Pierre Trudeau years. Fourteen federal deficits in 17 years eventually led to a national debt of $572-billion and annual interest payments of almost $40-billion in today's dollars (or stated in 1984 dollars, $250.5-billion debt and $21-billion in interest costs).

In 1984, the Liberals were replaced by the Brian Mulroney Conservatives, who promised a more responsible approach to public finances. But federal spending continued to soar, the annual deficit and national debt continued to rise, and the government resorted largely to increased taxation rather than spending reductions to try to tame the deficit dragon.
"
By the time the Jean Chretien Liberal party was in power and ready (however reluctantly) to start tackling the national deficit, all then-Finance Minister and future Prime Minister Paul Martin could think to do was slash spending on health care, education and transfers to the provinces -- something the Liberals only recently admitted was a mistake.

The skyrocketing public debt and debt service payments that Manning alludes to were thus only one consequence of the Trudeau-Mulroney deficit spending era.

As the '90s wore on, so did public anxiety about Canada's debt. That anxiety was also felt in financial markets, where there was speculation that Canada could potentially default on its foreign debts. This anxiety, however, was not born in the 1990s. Public concern about Canada's debt had begun to solidly take root in the 1989s:
"According to the pollsters, as early as 1984 there was significant public support for deficit reduction as a policy objective, including major cuts in public spending, but politicians were slow to recognize or respond vigorously to this shift in public attitudes. So the leadership of the deficit-reduction movement began largely outside the formal political arena.

Market-oriented think tanks such as the Fraser Institute and the CD Howe Institute provided much of the intellectual capital for the movement, hammering away on the problem's dangers and offering alternatives for alleviating it.

Interest groups such as the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the Canadian Chambers of Commerce, the Business Council on National Issues (as it was then called) and later the newly formed (1989) Canadian Taxpayers Federation added their voices, energy and resources to generate public and political support for budget balancing by governments at all levels.

Grassroots publications such as Ted Byfield's
Western Report and the radio talk shows gave media voice to the movement, and later several national newspapers joined the fray."
As Manning notes, it was only a matter of time before deficit-fighting arrived as the raison d'etre for a federal political party:
"And on the fringes of the political arena, the embryonic Reform Party (with Stephen Harper as its policy chief and fiscal critic) made budget balancing a central plank of its election platform and set out to prove that it was possible to elect candidates to Parliament on the pledge of saving taxpayers' dollars rather than spending more of them."
The Reform party contested its first federal election in 1988, the year Canadians bequeathed a second straight majority on then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Although he had inherited a structural deficit from Pierre Trudeau, history remembers (and will continue to remember) Mulroney as one of Canada's biggest deficit spenders.

But appearances could be decieving. Free Trade was the central issue in the 1988 election campaign, with Mulroney supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement, and his opponents opposing it. Mulroney won a majority on the back of the free trade issue. But at their earliest opportunity (which came later in 1988), Albertans sent Deborah Grey, their first Reform MP, to Ottawa. Stephen Harper (who will also be remembered as one oc Canada's biggest deficit spenders) went with her as her Parliamentary Assistant.

At a certain point, legislators couldn't ignore the signs the Canadian people were sending them -- get the debt under control. Now. Or else:
"As the movement for deficit reduction grew in public support, municipal and provincial politicians finally began to take notice. (Federal parties, because of their distance from grassroots voters and taxpayers, are usually the last, not the first, to respond to major shifts in public sentiment.)

Though rarely recognized for it, the first provincial government to commit itself seriously to the goal of budget balancing was the Conservative government of Gary Filmon in Manitoba. At the time (1988), the province was running a $500-million deficit on total revenues of about $4-billion and it took seven years to reduce the deficit to zero. Manitoba was also among the first to pass budget-balancing laws making it illegal to run deficits except in specifically defined emergency situations.

Next it was Alberta, where Ralph Klein made a similar commitment in 1993, eliminating that province's $3.5-billion deficit in two short years while at the same time decreasing revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product.

And then in Ontario, where the annual deficit was in excess of $10-billion, the Mike Harris government, elected in 1995, reduced it to zero in four years.
"
But, as Manning suggests, the federal government can often be the slowest to respond. It took the Reform Party and scathing criticisms from Andrew Coyne to convince Paul Martin that he needed to get Canada's fiscal house in order.

As Manning notes, the Reform party is still remembered as the only party in the 1993 election to present a credible plan for reducing the federal deficit:
"Meanwhile, in the federal arena, where the deficit was approaching $40-billion a year, the 1993 election saw the demise of the Mulroney Conservatives and the election of the Jean Chrétien government. But that election also resulted in the election of 52 Reformers committed to reducing the federal deficit to zero in three years. Eventually, the Liberals, though philosophically inclined to ever-increasing public spending, felt the political pressure to move in the opposite direction, and by 1998 the budget was finally balanced."
This was not nearly so simple for Paul Martin as some would have suggested it was.

The Chretien government, at the time, was also conducting a social services review under Lloyd Axworthy. It took considerable time and effort for Martin to out-maneuver Axworthy in order to impress the importance of his agenda upon Chretien.

Various political tensions -- both inter- and intra-party -- led to the exacerbation of Canada's deficit and hampered the best-intentioned efforts to get it back under control.

Manning seems to suggest that these kinds of tensions are characteristic of a political environment in which there is no real consensus on the matter, and what is needed to ensure Canada can efficiently shed its deficit once the recession is over is a policy similar to Reform's "zero in three" policy:
"The most disturbing aspect of this story is that it took 14 years (1984 to 1998), and an enormous effort at great expense by tens of thousands of people outside the formal political arena, before the federal government could be persuaded to take the self-evidently necessary actions required to balance its books.

Given this history, what will it take to tame the current deficit, the one being incurred in the name of economic stimulation? Political leadership, more likely to come from conservatives than liberals or social democrats, would certainly help. But no doubt another major effort outside the formal political arena – by think tanks, interest groups and media committed to fiscal responsibility – will be needed to create the public pressure required before politicians will act.

That effort would be greatly aided if someone – perhaps one of the think tanks or a respected academic institution – were to provide a definitive history of the last deficit-reduction movement. Most of us involved in that exercise have only partial knowledge of who did what, of what worked and what didn't, and of how the whole process might have been expedited. A road map to deficit elimination, based on a comprehensive analysis of past experience, will be extremely helpful to the deficit-fighters of the future. Hopefully, this time it will not take 14 years to get the job done.
"
If Canada's political leaders establish a deficit-busting concession now, as opposed to waiting until Canada faces the threat of a complete fiscal collapse, Canada will be able to navigate itself out of the recession fairly quickly -- and perhaps even without an additional five years of deficit spending.


From the archives:

August 5, 2009 - "Navigating Canada's Way Out of Recession (And Beyond)"

Sunday, August 16, 2009

The Continuing Legacy of John Diefenbaker

30 years ago today, John Diefenbaker, one of Canada's greatest Prime Ministers, passed away.

With Diefenbaker's passing, Canada lost the source of one of the most definitive visions of Canadian unity -- the "One Canada" philosophy after which he named his memoirs.

Diefenbaker's fingerprint on Canada is unmistakable. Among his accomplishments was the 1960 Bill of Rights, which Pierre Trudeau essentially entrenched in the Constitution as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the introduction of Canada's first non-racist immigration policy.



John Diefenbaker's commitment to Canada was unmistakable.

Through his "One Canada" policy, Diefenbaker favoured a fundamental cultural union of Canada's various cultural solitudes. To this day, the Conservative party continues to struggle between Diefenbaker's "One Canada" vision and other visions -- like Joe Clark's "community of communities" vision -- of the country.

Diefenbaker firmly believed that a Canadian's cultural background should matter very little in regards to what they could or could not accomplish as a Canadian. Diefenbaker was the first Canadian Prime Minister to originate from neither French nor English backgrounds. Despite the fact that his German last name -- which he had to change to minimize its Germanicness -- was often used against him by his political opponents, he found ways to triumph against this petty bigotry.



Diefenbaker's legacy also has a distinct dark side. Having survived two wives -- Olive and the later-neglected Edna -- Diefenbaker spent his last days planning his own funeral.

He would remain obsessed with outdoing his top partisan political rival, Lester Pearson, and with denigrating his political rivals within the Progressive Conservate party -- individuals such as Dalton Camp, who was so instrumental in manufacturing his ouster. Diefenbaker would write that Camp "was nothing", despite Dalton Camp's decisive role in his ouster as Conservative leader.

He would also take aim at Joe Clark. He had once remarked that Clark "had to have his wrist starched for his wedding night" with Maureen McTeer.



Diefenbaker had a transformative effect on the Conservative party. Despite his opposition to the party's John Bracken-enforced 1942 name change to the Progressive Conservative party, Diefenbaker introduced to the party a new-found concern for ordinary Canadians.

In 1961, Diefenbaker convened the 1961 Royal Commission on Health Services. At the time he had one of the largest majority governments in Canadian history -- his government's survival did not depend upon appointing the commission, nor on implementing any kind of publicly-funded health care system.

The Royal Commission on Health Services, chaired by Justice Emmett Hall, established under Diefenbaker's government, reported favourably about the prospect of establishing a public health care system in Canada.

Previously, in 1957, Diefenbaker passed the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Act (although he had a minority government at that particular time). Within a year Newfoundland, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia were on board with the cost-sharing program. In 1961 Quebec became the last province to join.

Lester Pearson and Tommy Douglas wound up sharing credit for Canadian health care. But a great number of Canadians forget that it was Diefenbaker who helped lay the groundwork.



Diefenbaker was a Prime Minister in the populist mold. After his reign as leader the party would no longer be viewed solely as a party for bankers and economic trusts.

While many political leaders prefer to speak to Canadians through press conferences and political rallies, Diefenbaker preferred to meet Canadians through farm house meetings, whistle-stop train tours, and "main streeting" -- a stroll through the main street of a city or town in which he would make a point of speaking with any local who wanted to speak with him.

Diefenbaker was as well known for his folksy stories as he was for his relentless and vitriolic attacks on his political opponents.

The mark John Diefenbaker left on Canada is indelible. 30 years after his passing, he is with us still.

Wednesday, July 01, 2009

Five More Reasons to Be Proud This Canada Day

On every July 1st since 1867, Canadians have paused to reflect upon our glorious country, appreciate its position in the world, and prepare to chart the way forward.

Every good Canadian should have countless reasons why they are proud to be Canadian. Today I offer just five of the innumerable reasons why every Canadian should be proud of their country.

1. Newfoundland - Of all Canada's provinces, Newfoundland may have been the most reluctant.

It took two referendums for Joey Smallwood to lead Newfoundland into joining Canadian Confederation in 1949. His success in doing so has enriched both Canada and Newfoundland to a magnificent degree.

Within Canada, Newfoundland has enjoyed a more prominent place in the world. Just as with Canada's other provinces, Newfoundland has been stronger with the rest of Canada than facing the world alone.

Nearly any Canadian who has ever met a Newfoundlander can attest to the tremendous generosity and wonder of their character. The heart and soul of Canada can be found in Newfoundland: a fiercely self-reliant spirit grounded in family and community.

2. The Snowbirds - Since their founding in 1954, the Snowbirds -- Canadian Forces Flying Training School Formation Team -- have consistently been judged as the best in the world.

Flying CT-114 Tutor aircraft in an era in which other teams, such as the United States' Thunderbirds fly far-more glamorous aircraft (the Thunderbirds fly F-16s), the Snowbirds have dazzled audiences across Canada and the world over with eye-popping performances of precision flying that have set the global standard of excellence.

3. Michaelle Jean - Since becoming Canada's Governor General, Michaelle Jean has come to dazzle international leaders.

Both French President Nikolas Sarkozay and US President Barack Obama have fallen under the spell of Canada's own marvelous Michaelle.

Jean and her family fled Haiti together in 1968, leaving the oppressive regime of "Papa Doc" Francois Duvalier behind them. Jean would eventually study at the University of Montreal before departing on an international regimen of study that included the University of Florence and the Catholic University of Milan.

She would eventually marry Jean-Daniel Lafront, a separatist, and would even be spied on camera toasting a sovereign Quebec with him.

Despite the initial outrage voiced by many Canadians that such a woman would be appointed Governor General, Jean proved her loyalty and commitment to Canada.

She has also proven to be incredibly resilient under controversy. She managed to escape not only the controversy over her alleged separatist sympathies and her decision to prorogue parliament rather than hand the seat of government over to a hastily- and ill-conceived Liberal/NDP coalition.

Michaelle Jean is a shining example of modern Canada: an immigrant, highly educated, highly accomplished, and graceful under fire. Michaelle Jean is proof that there is still hope for the noble experiment that is Canadian multiculturalism.

4. The Inuit - It may be odd that in a country like Canada, which is so often associated with ice and snow, even by its own citizens, that the arctic can so often be so distant in our imaginations.

According to political scientist Michael Byers, the Inuit people represent Canada's claim to sovereignty in the arctic region. Even more than this, however, there is something distinctly Canadian about the character of these rugged and honourable people. Their resiliency and generosity of spirit reflect the best things about Canada.

Canadians should be proud to share our great land with such wonderful people, but should also remember to temper that pride with the knowledge that the Inuit have often been neglected, and often been flat-out mistreated.

5. CFL Football - The constant speculation about the National Football League coming north has led to musing about the demise of the Canadian Football League.

One shouldn't count on it. Canadians have proven to have an apetite for football during the summer months, and many appreciate the unique nature of the Canadian game.

The rules of the CFL are designed to optimize the competitiveness of the game, not protect the NFL's highly-paid player assets. By comparison, the average CFL player is a blue collar player, working a job for the remainder of the year.

Highly-paid stars like Ricky Ray and Kerry Joseph are fewer and further between in the Canadian league.

Many University football stars who don't make it into the NFL and opt not to play arena football come north to play in the Canadian game. Some of the notable players who have come north include Mike "Pinball" Clemons, Warren Moon (who would later go on to star with the Green Bay Packers) and Doug Flutie.

Some star players return to the United States after leaving the Canadian game. Many American players, however, fall in love with Canada and decide to stay.

Each player who stays stands as a testament to the lure of our wonderful country.

As with last year's list, this is only part of what Canada means to me.

No number of items on any number of lists could ever encompass everything this country means to me.

Once again, have a happy and safe Canada Day.

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Michael Ignatieff: The Anti-Obama



While featuring an unfortunate partisan flourish in the opening seconds of this video -- a clip of the irresponsible "Just Visiting" campaign ads the Conservative party has recently deployed -- this video of Michael Ignatieff speaking to a Liberal party rally in Hamilton should remind many people that, while Michael Ignatieff is certainly a considerable step up from his predecessors of as leader of the Liberal party, he holds the same attitude that many Canadians find distressing about the Liberal party.

"We created the country you live in," Igatnieff says. "Never forget it."

For a party working so hard to emulate US President Barack Obama, this is the kind of thing that demonstrates that they simply don't get it. For anyone who's actually paid attention to Obama, to his rhetoric, and to the nature of his politics, this kind of language seems utterly alien to the political approach of the American President.

In insisting that the Liberal party created Canada -- at least in its modern-day form -- Ignatieff insists that the Liberal party is entitled to all the credit for the shape and form of modern-day Canada.

Within an argument like this no credit would be due, for example, to the NDP for Canada's public health care system. The NDP essentially forced Lester Pearson's government to implement public health care -- which Tommy Douglas had successfully introduced in Saskatchewan -- under risk of losing their government.

As someone who boasts about how he knocked on doors for "Mike" Pearson, Michael Ignatieff knows this full well.

With an argument like the one Ignatieff has used, John Diefenbaker would receive no credit for reforming immigration policies that had once been designed to minimize the influx of non-European migrants to Canada, nor would Diefenbaker receive any credit for writing the Bill of Rights.

Moreover -- and most seriously -- with an argument like the one Michael Ignatieff has used the Canadian people who be entitled to no credit for their own, day-to-day efforts in building Canada.

The doctor who healed patients within the universal health care program that the Liberals tried like hell to never create would receive no credit. The school teachers who educate Canadian citizens would receive no credit. The Canadian soldier who deploys to distant lands in support of the Canadian values of peace, order and good government would receive no credit.

Ignatieff's insistence that "we [the Liberal party] created the country you live in" is distinctly at odds with Barack Obama's empowering message of "yes we [together] can".

It speaks to an attitude of smug selfishness in which the Liberal party, as a "national institution" feels it's entitled as the "natural governing party" to forever dictate the direction of this country, and that even a ten degree change of political course should be considered intolerable simply because it upsets the Liberal party-approved status quo.

It is this attitude, if unchanged, that will permanently hobble the Liberal party and, so long as this party remains Canada's "natural governing party" will also hobble the country as a whole -- limiting the range of the actions that we as a country would consider, and maintaining one small elite group's belief that they are entitled to monopolize the marketplace of Canadian ideas.

One can say what they will about Barack Obama. One would never find him declaring that he, and he alone, is entitled to the credit for anything his administration may accomplish. One would never hear him echoing Michael Ignatieff, telling the American people, "we have built your country. Give us your votes, give us your tax dollars, and get out of our way so that we may set the stake of American politics."

Yet that is precisely how Ignatieff speaks to Canadians.

This is why, although the Liberal party will try, Michael Ignatieff could ever be Barack Obama.

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

This Day in Canadian History

May 26, 1969 - John Lennon records "Give Peace a Chance" in Montreal

If there is any one iconic image of John Lennon and Yoko Ono it probably should be Yoko breaking up the Beatles.

Yet, somehow, it isn't.

Rather, the iconic image of Lennon and Yoko Ono is actually the two of them in bed together, making music while photographers documented that event for posterity.

As it turned out, that event happened in a Montreal, Quebec hotel room. At the Queen Elizabeth Hotel Lennon and Ono staged their second "bed-in" for peace, and held court for dozens of celebrities.

It was during this Montreal bed-in that they recorded "Give Peace a Chance", easily one of the most iconic peace songs in the history of the genre.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

A Foolish Assumption

There's nothing rational about discrimination

Writing in an op/ed column in the Globe and Mail, Tom Flanagan attempts to make the case that the Canadian Human Rights Commission is, essentially, obsolete and should be abolished.

In many ways, as Flanagan notes, Canada's Human Rights Commissions are largely responsible for their own current predicament -- that of a lack of public credibility:
"For the first time in a long time, human-rights commissions are on the defensive. The Harper government is taking away pay equity from the Canadian commission and University of Windsor law professor Richard Moon's report has recommended repeal of the commission's right to interfere with free speech.

Both federal and provincial commissions are suffering blowback from their unsuccessful attempts to muzzle media gadflies Mark Steyn and Ezra Levant. Mr. Levant, in particular, has declared a jihad against the commissions, drawing attention to the one-sided nature of the legislation under which they operate. For example, commissions pay expenses for complainants but not respondents; successful respondents cannot sue complainants to recover costs; commissions allow complaints for the same alleged offence to be lodged in multiple jurisdictions, amounting to double jeopardy.
"
There's certainly a case to made for this. The extremely self-destructive behaviour of many of the CHRC's investigators, including the one who was unscrupulous enough to hack the wireless internet connection of a private citizen, has made the CHRC extremely suspect in the eyes of many Canadian citizens.

The toll taken on the commissions by Levant alone has left the CHRC struggling to maintain its public sense of credibility.

But continuing Flanagan's analysis of the predicament confronting the CHRC hits an incredibly fatal flaw, when he attempts to analyze the phenomenon of discrimination -- with the CHRC is meant to combat -- in the same manner as would an economist:
"In a competitive market, discrimination is costly to the discriminator. An employer who refuses to hire workers because of race, religion or ethnicity restricts his own choices and imposes a disadvantage on his firm. Meanwhile, his competitors gain by being able to hire from a larger pool. The same logic applies to restaurateurs turning away potential customers, or landlords refusing to lease to people of particular categories. (I'll never forget the experience of owning rental property in the recession of the 1980s; I would have rented to Martians if they had showed up with a damage deposit.)

The argument applies no matter how rampant prejudice and discrimination may be. Those who discriminate impose burdens on themselves and confer advantages on their competitors. Competitive markets don't immediately abolish discriminatory practices, but they tend to erode them, not by trying to enlighten bigoted people, but by making discrimination unprofitable.
"
Flanagan overlooks two basic truths: one of economics, and one of discrimination.

Economics proceeds from the assumption that most people make rational choices. In any particular situation, they will make the decision that benefits them most fully -- or at least believes will benefit them the most.

Discrimination, meanwhile, is not rational. And although Flanagan's argument that discrimination is self-defeating and thus unsustainable in a competitive environment is an elegant argument, it overlooks the fact that discrimination has often taken place in some extremely competitive environments.

In Canada, few things have ever been as competitive as the sport of hockey. Yet the disadvantage of discriminating against the most talented or hard-working players on the basis of race or ethnicity has often proven to be a less-than-convincing incentive to not discriminate.

Canadian hockey offers numerous examples of this.

Perhaps the most little-known is the discrimination against the Winnipeg Falcons, the Canadian team that won the first Olympic Hockey Championship in 1920. The Falcons had won the Allan Cup as the champions of a league in Winnipeg staffed entirely by players of Icelandic descent. Players of Icelandic descent in Winnipeg had to start this league because other leagues wouldn't allow them to play because of their Icelandic heritage.

Their triumph at the Olympics -- which also won them a World Championship, as the World Championship was awarded to the winner of the Olympic tournament -- eventually won them a warm, if uncomfortable, welcome back in Winnipeg.

Players like Herb Carnegie -- who played excellently in training camps for the New York Rangers but were never allowed an opportunity to play for the club -- were discriminated against for the colour of their skin. Carnegie won MVP honours in the Quebec Provincial League in 1946, '47 and '48. The New York Rangers had won a Stanley Cup in 1940, but could have well won another with a player like Carnegie, whose skills were often considered comparable to those of Canadiens legend Jean Beliveau.

If discrimination could be defeated by the self-interested rationality of those who need top-caliber talents to excel in highly competitive environments, as Flanagan insists, one would have to imagine that such historical episodes never would have happened.

The truth is that there is nothing rational about discrimination. It's predicated on emotional responses to evident differences between people, and in cases of racism doesn't even necessarily rely on differently-coloured skin.

Discrimination proves to be one of those instances where the free market isn't enough to ensure justice for those involved.

Flanagan is eager to argue that cases wherein discrimination turns out to be profitable are so because of government interference in the free market:
"Government can use its coercive powers, however, to protect discriminatory practices in the private sector from being undermined by competition.

There is a long and dishonourable history of propping up discrimination in the private sector - refusing to enforce laws against violence (lynching), passing discriminatory legislation (Jim Crow laws in the American South) and authorizing business cartels (sports leagues) and labour cartels (trade unions). Satchel Paige would have been pitching against Babe Ruth if professional baseball had been a competitive industry.

Government, using its monopoly of coercion, imposes the costs of discrimination on its hapless targets. Think of the episodes in our history that make Canadians feel ashamed and for which our governments have been busy apologizing: disregard of aboriginal property rights; sending Indian children to residential schools; closing the doors to Jewish refugees; keeping out Chinese and Sikh immigrants; relocating the Japanese during the Second World War; interning Ukrainians during the First World War and Italians during the Second World War; eugenic sterilization of the mentally and physically handicapped.

Every one of these was an exercise of governmental power. Political majorities undoubtedly approved at the time, but public opinion did not relocate the Japanese or send Indian children to residential schools. Governmental authority did, backed up by the coercive monopoly of the state. Authorizing a government agency to stamp out discrimination in the private sector is truly setting the fox to guard the henhouse.
"
Yet the Winnipeg Falcons were the victim of discrimination within an amateur league, unprotected by government legislation, and that Carnegie actually excelled within a Quebec league that was.

As Flanagan notes, discrimination in the private sector may well be self-liquidating over time, as those who very much do disadvantage themselves by discriminating against those with valuable talents inevitably lose out.

But that does absolutely nothing for those being discriminated against today. That is where Human Rights Commissions come in handy, and that is a valuable role that they fill.

While few Canadians will pretend that Human Rights Commissions are perfect, fewer still would pretend that those imperfections couldn't be rectified with a program of reform, not abolition.




Other bloggers writing about this topic:

George Young - "World According to Flanagan (And Harper)"

Cracked Crystal Ball - "Tom Flanagan: It's All About Social Darwinism"

Thursday, May 07, 2009

Canadian Feistiness is Nothing New


We just might be finding a new venue for it

A new poll conducted by the Association of Canadian Studies suggests that Canadians may be shifting their attitudes in regard to international issues.

According to the poll, a majority of Canadians are willing to risk conflict with other countries in the pursuit of Canada's goals on the international stage. By contrast, in 2003 a bare minority -- 49% as compared to 67% -- had agreed that Canada should pursue its goals even at risk of international friction.

The study notes that Canadians have "grown feistier when it comes to defending their interests on the international front."

While this may be true, the feistiness itself is actually nothing new.

Canadians have always been particularly feisty about the things they care about. While Canadians have historically tended to care little about the things that go on in the international community -- although the wars Canada have fought provide momentary exceptions to this general rule -- Canadians have always cared about hockey.

Incidents such as the famed Punch-Out in Piestany -- a bench-clearing brawl between Team Canada and the Soviet Union at the 1987 World Junior Hockey Championships -- demonstrate just how seriously Canadians have always taken hockey. When Team Canada decided they didn't like the way the Soviets were playing in a poorly-refereed game -- a surplus of stickwork by the Russian team continually ratcheted up tensions in the contest -- a line brawl on the ice quickly escalated into an all-out donnybrook between both teams.

The brawl wound up with both teams being disqualified from that year's tournament. But that same feistiness had previously emerged on numerous occasions, rarely more famously than in the 1972 Summit Series.

Canadian diplomatic officials in Moscow helped negotiate the Summit Series as part of their "hockey diplomacy" program. This unofficial diplomatic policy had, until that point, mostly entailed teams of Canadian diplomats -- sometimes with their rosters rounded out by American and European diplomats -- playing against their Russian counterparts. This team would eventually become known (although not well known) as the Moscow Maple Leafs.

These officials' plans to use the Summit Series as a goodwill-building exercise between Canada and the Soviet Union didn't go as well as they had hoped. On-ice tensions often spilled off the ice, including one incident in which Alan Eagleson was nearly arrested by a Soviet guard who didn't know who he was.

Phil Esposito would pose a particular problem for Canadian diplomats. Esposito, perhaps more than any other player, took the politically ideological undertones of the series to heart. His fierce on-ice play was matched by his confrontational attitude toward Soviet officials -- at one point even blowing Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin a kiss.

The behaviour of Canadian hockey fans particularly vexed diplomats. The Canadian cheering section made it difficult for Soviet officials to make use of the series for propaganda purposes. Soviet officials even attempted to spread Canadian fans out across the arena, believing isolating them from one another would temper their enthusiasm and boisterousness.

Instead, the invidual Canadians only cheered louder. In game seven, when Soviet officiating seemed to threaten the series, Canadian fans filled the arena with a chant of "let's go home".

One Canadian fan even managed to be arrested by Soviet guards and wound up having his foot tattooed with the markings usually used to identify Soviet prisoners. Quick work by Canadian diplomats secured his release, and he wound up expelled from the country will little more than his new tattoo.

This "hockey diplomacy" program was certainly less than a rousing success with Soviet officials. But in many other Soviet-bloc countries the matter was very different.

Canadian teams were immensely popular at tournaments played in other countries behind the Iron Curtain. Canada was viewed as the one country that could defeat the Soviet team, and as such enjoyed tremendous goodwill in countries where Soviet oppression had been especially harsh -- countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

When Team Canada locked horns with the Soviets in Piestany, the Czech fans whistled raucously in support of the Canadian squad.

Canadian feistiness toward hockey has certainly has its dark side in the past as well. It's hard to forget what Bobby Clarke was willing to do to Valeri Kharlamov in order to win the '72 Summit Series.

Canadian disinterest in foreign affairs certainly has yet to completely dissipate -- Romeo Dallaire noted this much during the 2008 election, but there have been signs that more and more Canadians are becoming interested in foreign affairs, as more and more Canadians support intervention in the Sudan, or demand intervention in Sri Lanka.

Once Canadians become interested in foreign policy it's likely only natural that they would become feisty about it. Doing anything less than whole-heartedly simply isn't in the Canadian character.