All Eyes on Elections Canada

How Broadbent Institute treated in wake of scandal will speak to impartiality, credibility of EC

Eventually, Elections Canada was bound to get it right.

In the wake of an appeal by the NDP, to its followers, to donate money to the fledgling Broadbent Institute -- a think-tank which is so fledgling that it hasn't even been incorporated yet, which prevents it from accepting donations.

The NDP came up with a very simple solution: accept the donations, made in the memory of the late Jack Layton, on the think tank's behalf, and hold it until the institute is incorporated.

This turned out to be contrary to the Elections Act. Not only was it illegal for the NDP to accept these donations on the Broadbent Institute's behalf, it was actually illegal for them to solicit the information in the first place.

To its credit, Elections Canada, which turned a blind eye to the electoral fraud committed by the Ruth-Ellen Brosseau campaign -- they submitted nomination papers to the Elections Canada featuring signatures that had been falsified -- got this one right. They advised the NDP that it was unlawful for them to accept these donations.

However, there is still much to be seen about how well Elections Canada can be trusted to treat the Broadbent Institute impartially. The NDP has very clearly demonstrated a direct relationship between itself and the Broadbent Institute.

This should prohibit the Broadbent Institute from registering as a third party at election time -- acting essentially as an extension of the party, and potentially allowing it to exceed election spending limits either at the national level, or in individual constituencies.

The NDP may wish to pretend that the Broadbent Institute is completely separate from the party itself. These recent events have exposed that notion for precisely what it is: pure bullshit.

It's with this in mind that Elections Canada would be required to reject any third-party application from the Broadbent Institute come the 2015 federal election.

Whether or not they actually will seems far from certain, and remains to be seen. Elections Canada can expect to be watched very closely when it comes time to make that decision.

The Turning of Peter Stoffer

NDP MP under fire in riding over LGR vote

With debate in Canada continuing to simmer following the vote to kill Conservative MP Candice Hoeppner's long-gun registry bill, it seems that some of the rural MPs who voted in favour of that motion may not be as safe as they thought they would be.

Following his decision to about-face on the registry, Sackville-Eastern Shore MP (representing the NDP) Peter Stoffer's office was deluged with angry phone calls from constituents. Reportedly, he's still sorting through all the calls.

“I don’t use the Internet so I called every single person back,” Stoffer said. “There is no question a fair number of people have expressed their severe disappointment in me.”

Stoffer's riding has now been added to the list of rural ridings effectively on a watch-list of constituencies that have just become vulnerable.

“I can’t tell how it’s going to go. I’ll put my name on the ballot and the people will determine if I’m worthy or not,” he continued. “When you reverse a decision, a lot of people think you’ve let them down. That’s a fair comment to make.”

Interestingly, as one examines some of the other details to emerge in regard to Stoffer's strange change of heart, one wonders if perhaps that's what Stoffer's vote was actually about: keeping his name on the ballot.

Reportedly, Stoffer received calls from former NDP leaders Ed Broadbent and Alexa McDonough in the days preceding his decision.

"They did call me and offer me advice," Stoffer explained. "They basically said you should really consider what the leader is trying to do, which is find common ground. They both said that."

Stoffer insists that NDP leader Jack Layton put no pressure on him to change his vote.

"There’s no question about that, but at the same time, there’s other people who you have huge respect for saying something completely different, and that is taken into account as well," Stoffer continued.

Then again, whether or not one actually believes such an account is another matter altogether.

The public assumption when dealing with the NDP has classically been to assume that they are the "nice guys" of Canadian politics; that no one in the NDP would offer thinly-veiled suggestions that if Stoffer declined to support the long-gun registry he might find himself losing his nomination for the NDP in Sackville-Eastern Shore.

This would cost him his seat just as easily as upsetting any non-NDP-affiliated constituents who may have supported him in the last election, and may not support him the next time out.

"There are some people that have indicated they will do everything they can to defeat me," Stoffer admitted. "There is no question that personal friends that I had before may not be friends anymore. I understand that."

At least Stoffer seems content to take whatever lumps may be coming his way in the next election.

"It’s fair to say I’ve reversed my position. I’m not hiding from that," Stoffer said. "The people in my riding, in the next election, which is going to come soon, are going to determine whether they accept that or not."

It's a laudable democratic sentiment from someone who made an extremely un-laudable decision.

Serving Canada's Interest in Human Rights

W2I a realistic upgrade on R2P

When the Responsibility to Protect (also known as R2P) was released, it promised to revolutionize the foreign policy debate on human rights and the manner in which failed states would be handled by the international community.

The doctrine simply stated that countries have the responsibility to protect their citizenry and respect their human rights. If any state failed to live up to this responsibility, the stable and wealthy nations of the world had a responsibility to step in and protect their citizens, whether that protection was from the forces of another state, militant groups within the country or from the state itself.

In some cases the western world exercised its responsibility in these matters -- in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

In other cases -- such as Rwanda and the Sudan -- this responsibility was not exercised.

The Will to Intervene, a foreign policy strategy developed by retired diplomat Robert Fowler, former International Association of Genocide Scholars President Dr Frank Chalk, Senators Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal, and former NDP leader Ed Broadbent, will hopefully fill in the missing blanks of R2P.

The report addresses numerous issues that tend to emerge around genocide and other crimes against humanity, including refugee camps (which they rightly note can help to spread various diseases, including potential pandemics).

"One of the most surprising discoveries we made ... is how vulnerable we are here in Canada to the indirect consequences of events like the Rwanda genocide," Dr Chalk noted. "These things will come back and invade the soft, quiet, safe, comfortable lives that we live in these parts of the world."

The report argues that "The chaos resulting from these atrocities poses credible danger to Canadian and American national interests at home and abroad."

"We need to redefine our national interest more broadly, not only to help failing states, but also to help and protect ourselves," the report adds. It notes that Canada should be prepared to use military force when necessary (and possible) in places where violence threatens the lives of civilians.

"If you're a leading middle power in the world and you have in the entrails of your ethos the belief of human rights and the belief in humanity and the moral strength to back up all those conventions you've signed, then you've also got to be prepared to not just throw cash at it afterwards, which usually ends up costing a lot more than preventing, but also sweat, tears and sometimes the blood of some of our youth," Dallaire insists.

"If we in fact move into a realm where we proactively intervene with the soft power elements of increasing our diplomatic capabilities, our international development capabilities, of going in and assisting to diffusing the frictions, that is peanuts compared to the billions (of dollars) ... of trying to pick up and sustain millions of people who are suffering."

Ed Broadbent elaborated on the depth of the human suffering that can be prevented if Canada acts sooner, as opposed to later.

"If the government of Canada had done the right thing when they had that information, perhaps the atrocious situation that confronted General Dallaire and the world community a year later could have been headed off," he noted.

The report recommends the establishment of a government ministry responsible for the global prevention of genocide -- clearly sharing responsibilities with the Ministers of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation -- to plan and coordinate early responses wherever crimes against humanity are taking place, as well as a Commons standing committee on preventing genocide.

The report also calls for Canada to act with its allies in preventing these atrocities.

"We should not be doing it alone," Dr Chalk announced. "But before we can co-operate with allies and a coalition of the willing, we have to improve our own domestic capacity to co-operate. That means we need more infantry, that means we need new doctrines for the Canadian military so that they're being trained to protect civilians and can interface with other armies doing the same if necessary."

Dr Chalk boldly notes that Canada may even have to circumvent the UN Security Council and plan missions without the Security Council's authorization.

Hugh Segal noted that part of Canada's strategy toward genocide requires taking decision-making power out of the hands of bureaucrats. Segal noted that they must be denied the "flexibility to avoid" the responsibility to act.

Fowler recounted the story of a foreign affairs bureaucrat writing "not in Canada's interest" on a memo his office had issued about the genocide in Rwanda.

"That is, as far as I'm concerned, a simply unacceptable reaction," Fowler fumed. “What we are talking about here is the moral imperative of engaging when truly appalling, unspeakable and unacceptable things are occurring.”

"It's about what I would call coalitions of the relevant ... acting when there is no other choice," added Segal.

As valuable a document as Responsibility to Protect was, it suffered from one fatal flaw: that many governments, including Canada's often fail to find the Will to Intervene.

W2I sends a powerful message to the world: Canada will intervene whereever possible, whenever possible, and by whatever means possible. If Canada's allies don't want to be embarrassed by inaction, they'd better prepared to muster the same will.

Five very wise men -- Robert Fowler, Dr Robert Chalk, Romeo Dallaire, Hugh Segal and Ed Broadbent -- have spoken. Now it's the responsibility of the government to do the right thing with the recommendations in this report: implement them.

The Politics of Panic

Dion, Broadbent try to obscure their deal with separatist Bloc Quebecois

With polls showing that Canadians are less than comfortable with the proposed Liberal/NDP/Bloc Quebecois coalition government, there should certainly be a deflation of enthusiasm regarding the proposal.

A key snag in the entire affair is the involvement of the Bloc in the deal. The Conservatives have pressed on this detail relentlessly, and it's a detail that clearly has resonated with Canadians.

Stephane Dion and Ed Broadbent seem to have anticipated this, and attempted to write criticism of those details off as "lies".

Speaking with CBC this week, Broadbent insisted that Harper is not up to the standard of previous Conservative leaders. "I've never seen the leader of a Conservative party, certainly not Bob Stanfield, certainly not Joe Clark, lie — I choose the word deliberately — the way Mr. Harper has," Broadbent fumed.

Broadbent accused Harper of lying when he criticized the opposition for signing the deal in absence of a Canadian flag. While this was an awfully silly detail to try and criticize in the first place, it's almost certain that Harper wasn't present for the signing of the deal. Considering the number of photographs taken at the event with no flag visible, the evidence of malevolence on Harper's behalf is rather scant.

Harper made himself look ridiculous by jumping to a poor conclusion. But there's a difference between lying and simply being wrong.

Broadbent also insists that any criticism that treats the Bloc as part of the coalition is a lie, despite the fact that the BQ formally pledged their support to the coalition in the same agreement that formalized the coalition. Whether officially or not, the Bloc Quebecois very much is party to this coalition.

But as self-serving and dishonest as Broadbent's accusations are, Stephane Dion actually managed to one-up him during Question period. Wailing at the top of his lungs, Dion lamented that, "he say that we Liberals have sold out Canada to the separatists and that the separatists have sold their souls to the Liberals. He needs to choose between these two lies. I'm getting about fed up with his lies!"

This, however, is all a matter of perspective: to those who understand the extent of the demands that the Bloc Quebecois will be in a position to make of Dion's proposed coalition, these "lies" (as Dion insists they are) resemble the truth very closely.

Mostly because it is the truth.

It's reflective of the tenuous position that Dion finds himself in -- the former separatist fighter now cozying up to separatists in exchange for political power -- that Dion would resort to trying to re-cast the truth as lies.

This tactic -- one that Dion also resorted to during the recent federal election -- is one used by many politicians being confronted by inconvenient truths. Instead of confronting the truth head-on, they instead denounce those speaking these truths as liars, and hope that it sticks.

It's the politics of panic -- a political tactic that Stephane Dion and Ed Broadbent have both embraced.

A Debate To Be Remembered

Even if the leaders aren't up to snuff, the stakes in the 2008 federal election are historic in nature

Stephen Harper is no John Diefenbaker. Nor is he even Joe Clark.

Stephane Dion is no Lester Pearson, and he certainly isn't Pierre Trudeau.

Diefenbaker possessed the ability to rail vocally against outrage and injustice in a manner so intensely that he could make believers out of even cold-hearted listeners.

Lester Pearson, for his notorious lack of oratorical skills, always tended to know a good idea when he saw it. If one were to ask Diefenbaker himself, peacekeeping was one of those very ideas, deftly snatched by the Chief by Pearson.

Joe Clark had a broad-sweeping vision for Canada: his decentralized "communitiy of communities" that was so idyllic that it was almost utopian.

Pierre Trudeau was a mericless debater and oratorical master without compare. For his own part, he didn't merely adopt the great ideas of others. He also came up with a few of his own, evenif he could never be bothered to actually implement them.

Diefenbaker vs. Pearson and Clark vs. Trudeau stand among Canada's most historical and defining electoral contests. In each case, each man exchanged electoral victories over the issues that defined their times.

For Pearson and Diefenbaker it was Canada's role in the Cold War vis a vis nuclear weapons. For Trudeau and Clark, it was Canada's economic course in a post-OPEC petro-economy.

Harper is no Diefenbaker. His speeches may be elctrifying to the most partisan of his supporters, but they still fail to impress his political opponents. Nor is he a Joe Clark. Whether Conservative voters are comfortable enough to admit it or not, he has no grand vision for Canada. He barely has a vision at all, aside from "tightening the screws" of government via budget and tax cuts.

Dion is no Pearson. His Green Shift economic policy, as championed by Scott Brison and Green party leader Elizabeth May, is so ill-concieved that it can't seem to drive voters away from his party quickly enough. Nor is he a Trudeau. The man seems like he couldn't muster a believable ounce of passion is his life depended on it, nor is he resolute enough to stand by his policies no matter how unpopular they may seem. Pierre Trudeau would never have been caught dead tailoring a policy like the Green Shift to the likes of farmers. Not only were they too far out of the urban elite circle he prided himself on travelling in, but they were unlikely to vote for him regardless.

Yet Harper and Dion, like Trudeau and Clark and Diefenbaker and Pearson before them, do have a historical matter that will be decided in the course of this federal election: namely, the issue of climate change.

Canadians have a historical choice before them: a choice between the frugal, cautious economic environmentalism of Stephen Harper, sprinkled with a healthy dose of skepticism, or the risky approach of Stephane Dion, tearing up Canada's taxation regime in the name of leftist apocalypticism.

Harper's approach, stretching reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over a period longer than 40 years, or Stephane Dion's imaginings that, given what he feels is the proper economic incentive, Canada's biggest polluters will pull off the feat in time to comply with the Kyoto protocol.

As was the case with Trudeau/Clark and Diefenbaker/Pearson, the outcome of this election likely won't be up to the contestants alone. While the Presidential election in the United States may keep individuals such as Al Gore and Barack Obama too busy to attempt an intervention in the Canadian campaign, the individual gaffes offered up by each campaign -- there have already been many, and there will likely be many more still -- may yet prove to be decisive by the time this election concludes.

Then, of course, there's always the NDP. The "conscience of the nation", as it were, may yet prove to tip the scales in this election. Jack Layton holds a very powerful position in the country right now, as did Tommy Douglas and Ed Broadbent before him.

And as with Trudeau/Clark and Diefenbaker/Pearson, the next 20 years of Canadian history may be charted by the outcome of this election.

One way or another, this federal election will be one for Canadians to remember. Canadians may remember the outcome -- and, no matter how one slices it, the potential consequences -- for longer still.

Viral Politics 101

With the advent of web 2.0, viral politics has been all the rage for a good long time now.

Yet with many attempts by presumedly younger (predumedly hipper) individuals attempting to take their political messages to the internet, it's probably ironic that a 72-year-old man can do it better.

The Broadbent video above is everything a viral video should be: captivating, and worht passing around through word-of-mouth.

Quite unlike the Conservative alternative below.

In the above ad, Broadbent manages to successfully brand himself as hip by accepting his inevitable un-hipness. The ad is a classic throwback to the terminally un-hip ads of the early 1990s when rap and hip hop were only becoming household words. Its campiness -- and clearly intentionally poor production value -- carries it a long way.

(Admit it. You can't stop watching this bloody thing, can you? -Ed.)

If only Canada's current political leaders could manage something this brilliant, they'd really be in business.

Think Twice, Stephen

Conservatives seem set to trample their own fixed election dates law

Upon taking office as Prime Minister, one of the first things Stephen Harper did was declare his intent to set a fixed date for the next federal election (naturally precluding the possibility of a governmental defeat).

"Fixed election dates stop leaders from trying to manipulate the calendar," Harper announced. "They level the playing field for all parties."

However, if recent developments represent anything more than mere rumour, innuendo and sabre-rattling it seems that Harper may not be comfortable with a playing field that's a little too level.

"The only way we can have justice is to have a fixed election date, because an election without a fixed election date is a tremendous advantage for the party in power," Harper insisted.

Apparently, his previous comments to the contrary, Harper is intent on reserving that "tremendous advantage" for himself and going to the polls in defiance of his own party's legislation.

Despite having expressed his intent to meet with his fellow party leaders -- Liberal Stephane Dion, New Democrat Jack Layton and the Bloc Quebecois' Gilles Duceppe -- before making such a decision, word circulating South of the Queensway is that Harper very well may pull the plug on Parliament before it reconvenes on September 15.

Parliament could be dissolved shortly after Labour Day.

Naturally, a great many people are up in arms over this turn of events. It seems that a considerable loophole was written into the legislation in question which renders it effectively meaningless. In other words, this legislation was rather disingenuous in first place.

It seems that if Harper wants to go ahead and call a federal election, the ball is entirely in his court -- his previously-expressed sentiments and own legislation to the contrary.

But if he goes ahead and does it, he'd better be ready to pay the political price.

If Harper is truly counting on the Liberals' ill-concieved Green Shift to sway undecided voters toward his party, he may want to think twice. A recent study conducted by the University of Western Ontario and the University of Padova has suggested that even reportedly undecided voters have deeply-held biases that may serve to swing their decision.

Considering that polls have determined that most Canadians prefer the Liberals to the Conservatives on environmental issues, this study should give Harper pause to calling an election in which environmental policy will surely be front-and-centre.

The political price in question may very well wind up being the loss of his own government.

Even if Harper emerges victorious from an election, he has to consider what this would do to his credibility. After all, the fixed election date legislation was at least partially an olive branch offered to the NDP's Ed Broadbent, considered by many to be Canada's top expert on electoral reform.

Such an olive branch would be needed in the nearly certain event of a minority parliament.

Although Harper may know something the rest of us don't -- or at least have confidence in his party's ability to pull out another electoral victory -- calling an election before October 2009 is almost certainly a no-win scenario for Harper.

So he'd better think twice before doing it. Then think again.

Uniting the Left Untenable

But Don't Ask the CBC

Anyone who tuned into CBC's The National on May 10, 2007, was treated to a unique postulation on behalf of the CBC about the possibility of a united left. In the piece, "The Divided Left", Leslie McKinnon explores the idea of a united left, compares it to the united right, and wonders just why they can't seem to "get the job done".

McKinnon points to the recent non-competitive pact between Stephane Dion and Elizabeth May as "the first tentative step" toward a merger of (allegedly) leftist parties in Canada.

It's hard to see where McKinnon herself stands on this particular issue, if the piece is examined solely for explicit statements. If one reads into the subtext, however, it begins to seem as if McKinnon is very much in favor of, if not an outright merger, at least cooperation between the various parties. At the 3:32 point of the segment, McKinnon even explains how voters could accomplish such a goal.

"The truth is, if progressive voters want to stop vote splitting in order to prevent another Conservative government Green Party numbers are too small," McKinnon explains. "The vital player that these voters need is the NDP."

She then seems to level the finger of blame at the NDP for the current government. "Last election, it was abundantly clear that cooperating with the Liberals is not in the NDP's game plan."

"Far from it."

In the 2006 election, the NDP locked their sights firmly on the Liberal party, urging Liberal voters to cast ballots in favor of the NDP. Knowing how many ridings were capable of swinging based on a defection of voters, Layton convinced Liberal voters in many ridings to switch their allegiances -- whether permanently or temporarily. The result was 10 additional seats.

This, however, was a reversal of the 2004 election, wherein the spectre of a "scary" Conservative government enabled then-Prime Minster Paul Martin to rustle up extra seats at the NDP's expense, using precisely the same mantra of strategic voting. Naturally, having won power on the back of this tactic, the Liberals went right back to the well in the next election, with far less success.

One of the segment's talking heads, University of Victoria Political Scientist Reg Whitaker notes, "[The NDP] have defined themselves essentially as in a death struggle with the Liberals to command the centre-left and if the collateral damage is that the Conservatives get a majority then so be it. That seems to be the thinking."

McKinnon also points the finger of blame at Ed Broadbent for not "siding with the anti-free trade Liberals" in the election of 1988.

For the record, The Liberal party would eventually switch to a pro-free trade stance, (just as the then-Progressive Conservatives had previously opposed it).

Broadbent netted 43 seats for the NDP. According to Whitaker, "that was a success but the result was they divided the anti-free trade vote, which actually represented the majority across the country and reelected a [Progressive] Conservative majority which then enacted free trade."

McKinnon insists that "ancestral resentments and intense party loyalties keep [the four centre-left parties] apart."

In reality, the divided left remains divided by issues of principle and political culture.

The NDP -- arguably portrayed as the villains of the segment -- were founded as an outright social democratic party. Originally estabished as the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, a party designed around the protestant social gospel, the party combined with the Canadian Labour Congress, largely divested itself of its religious underpinnings, and founded a broader social democratic party.

Although often taking arguably anti-business positions, the NDP has sought to become a party for middle class Canadians. As a result, it has often struck anti-elitist positions and advocated for wealth redistribution from wealthier Canadians to poorer Canadians, in combination with an expansive social safety net.

The Bloc Quebecois is, by nature, a Quebec separatist party. With the secondary purpose of representing Quebec's interests in Ottawa, the BQ's first goal is to advance the cause of separatism from Ottawa.

The Green party, for all its futile efforts to broaden its tent, is strictly an environmental party, although Elizabeth May does hold some very interesting views regarding abortion.

The true misnomer in the idea of a united left is the Liberal party. While purporting itself to be a left-of-center party, the fact is that there is very little in the Liberal party's record to account for that claim. Throughout the party's history, it has proven just as conservative as their primary Tory opponents. On the few occasions in which the Liberal party has enacted truly left-wing policies, it has always done so as a result of pressure from the NDP.

The Liberals have proven adept at following the Mackenzie-King model of "swing" politics, in which the party "swings" left to relieve pressure applied by a powerful NDP, or "swings" right to alleviate pressure applied by potent right-wing parties.

When "swinging" to the right, the Liberal party has often proved beyond conservative. The Liberals' budget-slashing endeavours following the 1993 election have been described by many observers as text book neo-conservative fiscal policy.

But that isn't where the Liberals' flirting with neo-conservatism ends. The party has always endorsed a Straussian view of elite rulership, while most recently spreading the "noble lie" of the Conservative hidden agenda. In fact, when compared to the ideological underpinnings of Straussianism, the Liberals meet a remarkable portion of neo-conservative criteria.

So, in essence, the four players of McKinnon's dream scenario match up like this: socialists, separatists, environmentalists and neoconservatives. However, it is much more complex than this.

The socialists dislike the neoconservatives, for obvious reasons. The neo-conservatives and the environmentalists are quite amicable to each other (despite the failure of the neo-conservatives to address the issues favoured by the environmentalists, or even keep that issue under control). The environmentalists see the socialists as not left-of-centre enough for them, while the separatists have a long-standing rivalry with the neo-conservatives. To top this all off, the separatists want to separate from all of them.

If that doesn't seem like a recipe for political disaster, it isn't immediately apparent what would.

How will, for example, the Liberals, NDP and Greens accomodate the BQ within this new party? Will the new party advocate separatism, or at least accept it within their ranks? Will the NDP and Greens adopt an elitist stance to match that of the Liberals? Or will the Liberals divest themselves of their elitist tendencies?

These questions have no suitable answers. Despite all the pie-in-the-sky dreams of the "unite the left" movement, this is an impossible goal.

But it isn't the goal that makes the "unite the left" movement dangerous.

In the end, the entire "unite the left" movement has one underlying goal: ensure that a Conservative government never again comes to power. Those who single-mindedly advocate for this union prove themselves more than willing to disregard the principles of each particular party involved in order to make this happen. And why not? When one is power hungry, nothing appeals more than a stranglehold on the political system.

How can any political movement that chooses to disregard issues of principle in order to unite in pursuit of a monopoly on political power represent anything more than the political enslavement of anyone who chooses to disagree with that movement?

Even under Elizabeth May's "virtual merger" vision of a European coalition wherein potential swing ridings held by left-of-centre candidates are kept safe by the absense of competing left-of-centre candidates, uniting the left can only result in a political environment that is less competitive, and fundamentally unjust for all Canadians who disagree with a potential united left-wing party.

McKinnon notes that, in Canada, the majority of voters traditionally support these left-of-centre parties. In a democracy, the majority rules.

But then again, what Dion, May, McKinnon, and all those who share their vision of Canada want isn't majority rules. It's majority dominates. It's a betrayal of the principles the country was re-founded on, both prior to and in 1981.

The healthiest democracies are the ones in which power alternates between competitors. Yet advocates of the "unite the left" movement seem intent on preventing this from being the case in Canada.

One actually wonders what they're afraid of.