Serving Canada's Interest in Human Rights

W2I a realistic upgrade on R2P

When the Responsibility to Protect (also known as R2P) was released, it promised to revolutionize the foreign policy debate on human rights and the manner in which failed states would be handled by the international community.

The doctrine simply stated that countries have the responsibility to protect their citizenry and respect their human rights. If any state failed to live up to this responsibility, the stable and wealthy nations of the world had a responsibility to step in and protect their citizens, whether that protection was from the forces of another state, militant groups within the country or from the state itself.

In some cases the western world exercised its responsibility in these matters -- in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

In other cases -- such as Rwanda and the Sudan -- this responsibility was not exercised.

The Will to Intervene, a foreign policy strategy developed by retired diplomat Robert Fowler, former International Association of Genocide Scholars President Dr Frank Chalk, Senators Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal, and former NDP leader Ed Broadbent, will hopefully fill in the missing blanks of R2P.

The report addresses numerous issues that tend to emerge around genocide and other crimes against humanity, including refugee camps (which they rightly note can help to spread various diseases, including potential pandemics).

"One of the most surprising discoveries we made ... is how vulnerable we are here in Canada to the indirect consequences of events like the Rwanda genocide," Dr Chalk noted. "These things will come back and invade the soft, quiet, safe, comfortable lives that we live in these parts of the world."

The report argues that "The chaos resulting from these atrocities poses credible danger to Canadian and American national interests at home and abroad."

"We need to redefine our national interest more broadly, not only to help failing states, but also to help and protect ourselves," the report adds. It notes that Canada should be prepared to use military force when necessary (and possible) in places where violence threatens the lives of civilians.

"If you're a leading middle power in the world and you have in the entrails of your ethos the belief of human rights and the belief in humanity and the moral strength to back up all those conventions you've signed, then you've also got to be prepared to not just throw cash at it afterwards, which usually ends up costing a lot more than preventing, but also sweat, tears and sometimes the blood of some of our youth," Dallaire insists.

"If we in fact move into a realm where we proactively intervene with the soft power elements of increasing our diplomatic capabilities, our international development capabilities, of going in and assisting to diffusing the frictions, that is peanuts compared to the billions (of dollars) ... of trying to pick up and sustain millions of people who are suffering."

Ed Broadbent elaborated on the depth of the human suffering that can be prevented if Canada acts sooner, as opposed to later.

"If the government of Canada had done the right thing when they had that information, perhaps the atrocious situation that confronted General Dallaire and the world community a year later could have been headed off," he noted.

The report recommends the establishment of a government ministry responsible for the global prevention of genocide -- clearly sharing responsibilities with the Ministers of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation -- to plan and coordinate early responses wherever crimes against humanity are taking place, as well as a Commons standing committee on preventing genocide.

The report also calls for Canada to act with its allies in preventing these atrocities.

"We should not be doing it alone," Dr Chalk announced. "But before we can co-operate with allies and a coalition of the willing, we have to improve our own domestic capacity to co-operate. That means we need more infantry, that means we need new doctrines for the Canadian military so that they're being trained to protect civilians and can interface with other armies doing the same if necessary."

Dr Chalk boldly notes that Canada may even have to circumvent the UN Security Council and plan missions without the Security Council's authorization.

Hugh Segal noted that part of Canada's strategy toward genocide requires taking decision-making power out of the hands of bureaucrats. Segal noted that they must be denied the "flexibility to avoid" the responsibility to act.

Fowler recounted the story of a foreign affairs bureaucrat writing "not in Canada's interest" on a memo his office had issued about the genocide in Rwanda.

"That is, as far as I'm concerned, a simply unacceptable reaction," Fowler fumed. “What we are talking about here is the moral imperative of engaging when truly appalling, unspeakable and unacceptable things are occurring.”

"It's about what I would call coalitions of the relevant ... acting when there is no other choice," added Segal.

As valuable a document as Responsibility to Protect was, it suffered from one fatal flaw: that many governments, including Canada's often fail to find the Will to Intervene.

W2I sends a powerful message to the world: Canada will intervene whereever possible, whenever possible, and by whatever means possible. If Canada's allies don't want to be embarrassed by inaction, they'd better prepared to muster the same will.

Five very wise men -- Robert Fowler, Dr Robert Chalk, Romeo Dallaire, Hugh Segal and Ed Broadbent -- have spoken. Now it's the responsibility of the government to do the right thing with the recommendations in this report: implement them.

Too Little, Too Late

Sudan crime against humanity charges long overdue, but who will enfore it?

In a development that has been a longer time coming than the second coming of Christ, United Nations officials have announed that the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court will lay charges of crimes against humanity and genocide against Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan.

On Monday, the prosecutor will finally present evidence of the crimes in question -- a mere six years after the genocide began -- and name some suspects.

Yet the question naturally remains regarding who will actually enforce these charges and take the suspects into custody.

However, the Sudanese government has already announed they will not cooperate with the ICC. They've also insisted that they will not retaliate for the action against any peacekeepers stationed in the region, an act the United States has warned them against.

But with the African Union unable to effect any kind of peaceful deescalation in the conflict, NATO already engaged in Afghanistan, the United States engaged in Iraq and China -- remaining one of the principle investors in the Darfur oilfield -- seems to be more than content to twiddle their thumbs while the atrocities continue unabated.

In lieu of a voluntary handover of Al-Bashir, the only way to proceed would be with a regime change in the Sudan -- particularly if Al-Bashir is tried and convicted en absentia, as may inevitably be the case.

Yet in the current state of the world today, there is simply no one available to effect such a regime change, and Sudan would unfortunately find itself too far down the list of global priorities.

The current debacle in the Sudan could have been stopped a long time ago if only the ICC had moved at some point within the last six years.

The charges laid against Omar al-Bashir are too little, too late.

Michael Byers: Politicizing the Non-Partisan

Foreign affairs "experts" come pretty cheap these days

Almost anyone with a decent handle on the subject and a shred of intellectual honesty should be able to recognize that Afghanistan is a non-partisan war.

Initiated and escalated by the Liberals (without parliamentary consultation) but extended by the Conservatives (albeit with a parliamentary vote), no one party can be credited with sole credit, or blame, for the mission.

Don't tell that to Michael Byers.

In fact, in terms of politicizing non-partisan Afghanistan mission along partisan lines, Michael Byers has been a one-man dynamo.

"This is Stephen Harper's war," Byers insists.

Yet in a recent interview with the Globe and Mail, Byers clearly demonstrates that not only does he have no idea what's going on in the Canadian government and little idea what's going on in Afghanistan, but no idea whatsoever of what's been going on in the world as a whole.

Byers tries to pin the blame for the mission of Stephen Harper, ignroes the various signs of progress in Afghanistan, and misrepresents the events unfolding in Darfur, particularly as they relate to a possible UN peacekeeping mission.

"The need for developed-country, force-multiplying peacekeepers is very real in Darfur and elsewhere," Byers says. "[Retired Lieut.-General Roméo] Dallaire reported that the UN was looking to Canada [for a Darfur peacekeeping contribution] because Canada was not a geopolitical player in northern Africa. It didn't have any stake in the oil fields in the Sudan."

Yet, it would seem that Byers is forgetting about Calgary-based Talisman Energy, a company that formerly held interests in Sudan's Heglig and Unity oilfields. In 2001 it was revealled that the Sudanese army was killing and relocating civilians from around Talisman's concessions in the two fields.

It's also important to challenge Byers on his definition of what makes a country a "geopolitical player". Canada has been spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year in foreign aid for developing countries, a significant portion of which are in Northern Africa. Canada has also been involved in peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, among other places.

Given that peacekeeping is very much a geopolitical act -- it pressures and encourages combatants to maintain their peace agreements -- Byers is flirting with misconceptions at best, and outright misrepresting facts at worst.

"Canada was seen by the UN as the optimal developed-country middle power to lead a UN mission to Darfur," Byers continues. "Had Canada stepped forward and said, 'Look, we're ready to lead a mission,' we would have seen a serious UN peacekeeping force in Darfur long before now."

Again, simply not so. It wasn't until 5 May 2006 that the Khartoum government and Minni Mannawi signed a peace agreement. Howeer, Mannawi was only the leader of the largest faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement. Other factions refused to sign the agreement.

Aside from the fact that any peace agreement in Sudan is incomplete and less than a year old, none of the delays are the result of a lack of a Canadian commitment to lead the mission. In fact, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has refused to accept UN peacekeepers, both immediately following the mission, even today. He reportedly insists that the proposed UN peacekeeping mission is really intended to protect Israel, partition the Sudan, and pirate its oil resources.

It's a common UN practice to secure the consent of all combatants before sending in peacekeeping troops. With some of the Sudanese Liberation Movement factions holding out, there is no deal on the table that falls within UN requirements for peacekeeping.

The only option vis a vis peacekeeping would actually have to be modelled after the 1992 Unified Task Force in Somalia, wherein the United States organized a task force to go in and forcefully pacify the region so UN peacekeeping operations could take over.

The 1992-93 mission, organized by the United States and mandated by the UN was actually more akin to warfare than actual peacekeeping.

With no agreement for UN peacekeeping in place, an independent (albeit UN-mandated) task force is the only real option on the table for Darfur. Then again, this is all beside the point. Despite what Michael Byers claims, the lack of UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan is not Stephen Harper's fault -- it's al-Bashir's.

Byers only reinforces his ignorance of the fact when he insists that "the lack of developed-country willingness to step in has been covered up by smoke and mirrors about how Khartoum isn't consenting and how the African Union wants it to be an all-African force."

Yet, the Khartoum government isn't consenting. Beyond this, Byers is wrong when he claims there's no developed-country willingness to step into the Sudanese void. Both Britain and the United States have supported UN peacekeeping operations in the Sudan to the extent that they have threatened sanctions against the Khartoum government.

Byers only cotninues to back himself into a rhetorical corner when he insists questions need be asked, "on whether the mission is succeeding. And realistically on what are the prospects for success and how do we measure success? And is it worth the cost inclusive of Canadian soldiers' lives?"

It isn't hard to determine whether or not Canadian efforts in Afghanistan are finding success. Consider the following figures: four million more childen in schools; 3.5 million refugees resettled; collection of 11,000 weapons; reconstruction efforts in 11,000 Afghan villages.

Furthermore, Byers is indulging himself in the same method of rationalization that allowed the peacekeeping failure in Rwanda, when American officials noted that 500,000 Rwandans would have to be killed before a single American life was worth risking.

Byers also advocates a cost-benefit analysis of the Afghanistan mission. Yet, such cost-benefit analyses would inevitably have to be focused based on whether or not Canadian foreign policy interests were being serviced. In Afghanistan, numerous interests -- participation in NATO, the elimination of states that harbour terrorists, the liquidation of terrorist networks -- are being met. In Sudan, Canada has few interests at stake (which is ironically why Byers feels so strongly that Canada should participate). In terms of cost-benefit analysis, Afghanistan is definitely the preferable mission.

When asked about what he considers success or failutre in Afghanistan, Byers is apprently perfectly happy to focus on what he cosniders the failures: "We certainly haven't managed to pacify the tribal areas up against the border with Pakistan, and as far as we know, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are still happily ensconced in northern Pakistan."

Byers does have his fair share of reasonable criticisms. "there are certainly components of the government of Afghanistan associated with atrocities committed prior to the Taliban coming into power," Byers notes. "I'm speaking here of the so-called warlords."

This is a fair criticism. Afghan warlords have historically funded their anti-Taliban operations from Opium profits, and have been implicated in new atrocities in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. It's hard to refute the Taliban's human rights abuses while in bed with groups that have dabbled in the same.

This is something that the Canadian government will have to address with the Karzai government.

In the end, it becomes apparent that Byers simply can't break himself of the meaningless peacekeeping/war dichotomy, when he notes that, "I think what we were doing in Kabul for a number of years was a quite appropriate mission, providing security and stability in the national capital in what was essentially a peacekeeping mission."

"But now we've moved into this counter-insurgency, aggressive search-and-destroy mission in Kandahar, and what, effectively, we are trying to do is secure centralized control over the entire territory of a country that's never been subject to centralized control before, and I think that's a fool's errand," Byers says.

But in the end, Byers fails to properly distinguish between peacekeeping and war. While peacekeeping at least flatters the aesthetic vanity of individuals such as Byers, it is, like war, an armed interventionalist foreign policy approach, and missions such as in Somalia and Rwanda show just how quickly a peacekeeping mission can transmute into a fully-fledged war.

Most revealing, however, is his inability to reconcile his partisan rhetoric with the realities of the mission.

"I am proud of our soldiers because they're doing their damnedest, but the decision as to whether they should be there is not their decision, and it's not a decision that should be a political partisan electoral decision," Byers insists.

This coming from the same individual who insists Afghanistan is Stephen Harpers war, despite the role of two different Prime Ministers from Harper's competing party, the Liberals, in putting Canada into both Afghanistan and into the Khandahar mission.

Byers has worked very hard indeed to politicize the war in Afghanistan along partisan lines. He has often resorted to outright misinformation in order to do this. He even, during an appearance on Mike Duffy Live tried to claim that General Rick Hillier negotiated the Canada/Afghanistan prisoner transfer agreement. The document, while signed by Hillier, was actually negotiated by then-Liberal party foreign affairs minister Bill Graham.

During the same appearance, Byers insisted he didn't want to take part in a partisan discussion. Yet, his rhetoric on the Afghanistan mission has been little if not batantly partisan, and it makes it difficult -- if not impossible -- to take him seriously.

Michael Byers has turned out not to be the non-partisan commentator he claims to be. Which is fair enough. He's turned out to not be half the expert he's supposed to be.